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Summary 
Banks are one of the most important elements in the economic cycle of modem society. As 
money replaced bartering banks have gradually moved into the pivotal point of the relations 
between participants in the economic cycle. No project can be realized without money today. 
On the one hand, there are the investors who, irrespective of the amount, entrust their assets to 
the banks. On the other hand, there are those whose financial needs require the granting of 
some form of credit. Banks operating in these contexts clearly bear important responsibilities 
towards the different parties. A third party, the state, is also interested in a well-functioning 
banking establishment. Economic stability, without which there can be no political stability, 
cannot otherwise be ensured. The state is accordingly keenly interested in maintaining the 
operability of this system. To this end, various laws are made in the respective countries 
aimed at supervising the banking industry. This work deals with some of the legislation 
relating to bank supervision in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of South 
Africa. 
Tn the various chapters certain aspects of bank supervision in the two countries are identified, 
juxtaposed and compared. The reasons for any differences are sought, discussed and where 
possible explained. 
From a historical point of view, the two countries developed differently. Nevertheless, the 
need to regulate this sector through legislative means arose at an early stage in both. 
Unfortunately, the catalyst for legislative development was mostly some or other financial 
crisis. 
Any measures for supervising banks must, to be binding, be constitutional. In this regard 
much must still be done in South Africa due to the fact that the New Constitution has only 
been in force since 1996. Thus certain regulations stemming from the Banks Act 90 of 1994 
need to be reconsidered in the light of the constitution. 
Bank supervisory activity is performed by a national institution in both countries. Germany 
avails itself of an independent authority. However, in South Africa it is one of the tasks of the 
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central bank which has established a specific office for this purpose. Legal and natural persons 
alike are subject to such supervision. Diverse other government institutions provide support 
for such supervisory work in both countries. 
The scope of banking supervision, that is the persons and transactions affected, is broad and 
also finely meshed. Both systems list a number of banking transactions that are subject to their 
supervision. This affects all domestic banks and all foreign banks that are domestically active. 
Access to the banking business is only permitted in both countries after an appropriate license 
has been granted. The license can be conditional. Moreover, both systems make provision for 
the revocation of the license in appropriate circumstances. The conducting of banking 
business without the necessary permission is forbidden in both countries under the threat of 
legal punishment. 
It is well recognized in modem society that legal subjects should be protected against the 
decisions of those who wield state power. The possible remedies of those affected by the 
decisions of the public authorities responsible for banking supervision in the different 
countries are investigated in conclusion. 
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Opsomming 
Banke is een van die belangrikste elemente in die ekonomiese sfeer van die modeme 
gemeenskap. Namate geld die ruilhandel verplaas. het, het banke geleidelik die spilpunt 
geword van die verhoudinge in die ekonomiese sfeer. Vandag kan geen projek sonder geld 
realiseer nie. Aan die een kant staan die beleggers wat hul bates aan die banke toevertrou. Aan 
die ander kant is daar diegene wie se finansiele behoeftes die een of ander vorm van krediet 
genoodsaak. Banke wat binne hierdie konteks opereer dra duidelik groot verantwoordelikhede 
teenoor die onderskeie partye. In Derde party, die staat, het ook belang by In goed-werkende 
banksteisel. Dit is In voorvereiste vir ekonomiese stabiliteit waarsonder daar ook geen 
politieke stabiliteit kan wees nie. Die staat is gevolglik sterk gerig op die handhawing van In 
goed-werkende banksisteem. Met hierdie oogmerk het verskeie stukke wetgewing gerig op 
banktoesighouding in die onderskeie lande die lig gesien. Hierdie tesis neem sekere van die 
wette wat in die Federale Republiek van Duitsland en in die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 
aanvaar is, in oenskou. 
• In die verskillende hoofstukke word sekere aspekte van banktoesighouding in die verskillende 
lande identifiseer, teenoor mekaar gestel en vergelyk. Die redes vir enige verskille word 
gesoek, bespreek en waar moontlik verduidelik. 
Vanuit In geskiedkundige perspektief het die twee lande verskillend ontwikkel. Nietemin het 
die behoefte om hierdie sektor deur middel van wetgewing te reguleer in beide lande vroeg 
ontstaan. Ongelukkig was die katalisator van ontwikkeling van die wetgewing dikwels die een 
of ander finansiele katastrofe. 
Enige maatreels vir banktoesighouding moet, teneinde afdwingbaar te wees, grondwetlik 
wees. In hierdie verband moet daar nog vee I gedoen word in Suid-Afrika, en weI omdat die 
Nuwe Grondwet slegs vanaf 1996 reeds in werking is. Gevolglik is dit nodig dat sommige van 
die bepalings van die Bankwet 90 van 1994 heroorweeg moet word. 
Banktoesighouding word in beide lande deur In nasionale instelling behartig. In Duitsland 
word van In onafhanklike liggaam gebruikgemaak. In Suid-Afrika, aan die ander kant, vorm 
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dit een van die take van die sentrale bank wat In spesifieke kantoor vir hierdie doel opgerig 
het. Natuurlike en regspersone is onderworpe aan die toesighoudende maatreels. Verskeie 
verbandhoudende staatsinstellings staan die toesighoudende kantoor in altwee lande by. 
Die terrein waarin die toesighoudende liggaam werk is wyd en fyn ineengevleg in beide lande. 
In altwee regsisteme word In aantal transaksies wat onderwerp word aan toesighouding 
spesifiek gelys. Sowel plaaslike banke as buitelandse banke wat plaaslik aktief is, word 
geraak. 
Toegang tot bankbesigheid word in beide lande beperk tot diegene wat die nodige 
toe stemming (lisensie) het. Die toestemming kan voorwaardelik wees. Boonop maak beide 
stelsels voorsiening vir herroeping van die toe stemming in gepaste omstandighede. Die bedryf 
van bankbesigheid sonder die nodige toe stemming word verbied en is In misdryf in beide 
lande. 
In die modeme gemeenskap word die beginsel dat regsubjekte beskerm moet word teen 
owerheidsbesluite algemeen erken. Die moontlike remedies van persone wat geraak word deur 
toesighoudende maatreels in beide lande word gevolglik ten slotte ondersoek. 
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Liebe, Dankbarkeit und Verehrung 
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Introduction 
A Formulation of the Problem 
This thesis investigates the law regarding the supervision of banks in the Republic of 
South Africa and in the Federal Republic of Germany. The elements of each of the 
supervisory systems are described and compared comprehensively. 
Banking supervISIOn IS indispensable for an economy to function effectively. The 
subject is therefore very topical. Banking supervision is not an aim in itself, but should 
rather be seen as a guarantee for the proper functioning of the financial system. The 
goals of controlling financial institutions are manifold, but the essential aim is to 
guarantee the functioning of the financial system. Although, in recent times, this subject 
has not been as controversial in Germany as in some other states, this does not.render it 
any less topical. There is no certainty that the German financial system and institutions 
will not experience turbulence again in the event of unforeseen crises. The same applies 
to South Africa. The mechanisms for banking supervision have undergone drastic 
changes over the years. Nevertheless, every year sees the collapse of many banks over 
the world. l 
New financial mechanisms, such as euronotes, currency swaps and foreign exchange 
options, contribute to the problem. The same can be said for the globalisation of the. 
financial markets and the ever-increasing intemationalisation of banking business. The 
element of foreign risk is becoming more and more important. A bank that is active 
abroad is subjected to several risks. Apart from those caused by unexpected currency 
fluctuations, government intervention in the foreign market by means of nationalisation, 
restrictions on the transfer of foreign exchange and payment moratoria can also result in 
losses. These risks are in addition to those which usually exist in every financial market. 
I Some of the better known examples are: the final collapse of the Herstatt banking house in Germany in 
1974; the crisis of the Johnson Matthey Bankers of London in 1984; the general bank crisis in the USA in 
1991; the collapse of the Mondi banking house in Hamburg in 1995; and, most recently, the collapse of 
the oldest English banking house (Barings) in 1996 (on which see Der Spiegel, No. 23 [1996] 205). 
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In view of these tendencies and the increasing integration and interdependence of the 
international financial 'markets, the banking supervision of an individual state, in order 
to be effective, needs to adapt to the trend of internationalisation. It is not only the 
element of foreign risk that is gaining more' and more importance. The linking of 
internationally active financial institutions with other industrial enterprises carries 
incalculable risks for the continued existence of these institutions. Due to the network of 
liability within a group of institutions it can be necessary for the mother company to 
cover losses of its subsidiary banks abroad, which may far exceed the amount of the 
initial investment. Banking supervision must therefore also take these foreign links into 
consideration. 
Banking supervision should accordingly take the global context into account. HO,wever, 
the possibilities of supervision and intervention by the respective supervisory 
institutions often end at their state's border. Cross-border co~operation is necessary for 
consistent, meaningful and effective supervision. The various amendments by the 
European Union aimed at the harm,onisation of banking law, and the establishment of a 
European central bank in Frankfurt, can be cited as examples of what is required. 
This thesis is intended as a contribution to the development of banking supervision in a 
global context. South Africa was chosen for its potential. This country, unlike others in 
the region, may be on the brink of becoming a strong industrial nation, provided the 
government succeeds in gaining control over the economic difficulties. The country has 
rich human and mineral resources which need to be managed cautiously. It is 
noteworthy that the involvement of German banks in South Africa has already 
intensified.2 
2 The three large German banks, Delltsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG and Commerzbank AG, as well 
as a number of smaller German banks such as the West LB and the (Bayerische) HypoVereinsbank AG 
already have branches or representatives in South Africa. 
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B Outline of the discussion 
The discussion is divided into six chapters each dealing with a particular topic relating 
to banking supervision. Each chapter starts with a discussion of the German law, is 
followed by a discussion of the South African law and ends with a summary and 
conclusion. As far as possible, the points investigated in the two systems are discussed 
in the same order to facilitate the comparison. 
The following topics within the field of banking supervision are dealt with: 
the historical development of the law relating to banking 
supervision; 
2 the concept, objectives and constitutional legitimacy of banking 
supervision; 
3 the organisation of banking supervision; 
4 the sphere of application of banking supervision; 
5 the permission to conduct business as a financial institution; and 
6 the remedies of financial institutions against supervisory action. 
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Chapter 1 
The Historical Development of the Law relating to Banking 
Supervision 
A Federal Republic of Germany 
I The Period Prior to 1918 
A modem system of banking developed later in Germany than in other European 
countries. The first instruments of state supervision were instituted in Prussia for the 
Landschaften and Staatsbanken3 which were founded at the end of the eighteenth 
century.4 Because Germany was fragmented into numerous small and economically 
insignificant states until the foundation of the Reich in 1871, and therefore did not play 
a noteworthy economic role in Europe, a functioning system of banking came into being 
considerably later than in some other countries. In England, for example, a uniform 
economic area had .developed early due to England's unified state structure and its 
colonial expansion. The colonial trade which made England the richest European 
country of that timeS was absent in Germany. As a consequence, Germany experienced a 
deficiency of capital at the onset of the industrial revolution. Therefore, German 
entrepreneurs were largely dependent on the support of banks. This led to the 
development of a system of mixed banking business in Germany, whereas in England 
different types of banking business were identified and kept separate.6 
3 Special state banks. 
4 See Hagedorn, Fred, Die Landschaften. Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Darstellung der preufJischen 
Agrarinstitute (1978). 
5 The per capita wealth of the English population was estimated to be 2.860 RM in 1845 whereas that of 
Prussia was approximately 720 RM in 1848. See in this regard Ruland, Anselm Zur Entwicklung des 
Bankenaufsichtsrechts bis 1945, (1988) Diss. MUnster,82. . 
6 The German term is Trennbankensystem. This system was causally connected to the wealth of the 
population. The tendency of every business sector to establish its own specific bank was typical of the 
development of the English system of banking. The English entrepreneurs accordingly did not rely on the 
support of deposit banks as heavily as their German counterparts. See in this regard Ruland, Anselm Zur 
Entwicklungdes Bankenaufsichtsrechts bis 1945, (1988), 83. 
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The promulgation of the Bankgesetz and the founding of the Reichsbank (the central 
bank of Germany) mo'ulded the German legislation regarding the issuing of bank notes 
(the Notenbankgesetzgebung).7 For the first time, a single institution was charged with 
issuing bank notes for the entire area of the Reich.s 
Although it had been built up with private capital, the Reichsbank was directed and 
supervised by the Reich.9 It was founded as a juristic person and its pecuniary position 
was independent of the Reich's treasury.IO The supervision required by the Reich was 
executed by a board of trustees (Reichsbankkuratorium). It consisted of 4 members 11 
chaired at first by the Reichskanzler (Chancellor), but from 1918 onwards by the 
Reichsprdsident (President). The Reichsbankkuratorium received a quarterly report 
concerning the bank's affairs as well as a general account of all of the bank's activities 
and business structures. However, the possibilities of intervention were limited since the 
Reichsbankkuratorium did not have the right to inspect the bank's books or make 
7 Bankgesetz vom 14.Marz 1875. See especially in this regard Doring W 'Die Reichsbank' in: Die 
Deutsche BankwirtschaJt Bd II Berlin (1935) 72. 
8 The establishment of the Reichsbank coincided with the foundation of the German Reich 
(Reichsgriindung) in 1871. The Reichslander which had been independent until that time, had their own 
banks that issued notes. Thus, the establishment of the Reichsbank facilitated the standardisation of bank 
notes for the entire Reich. Although these individual Landernotenbanken retained the right to issue bank 
notes, these notes were only valid in the specific Reichsland in question. There was also a restriction on 
the amount in circulation. As a consequence of the strict measures of the Bankgesetz most of these banks 
waived their right to issue bank notes. By 1905 only 4 of the original 32 Landernotenbanken still existed 
in the Reich. In 1896 legislation was passed regarding the duties of businesspeople in possession of 
foreign bank notes. This legislation can be regarded as a first step in restricting the freedom of trade of 
banks. However, it was primarily aimed at securing the functional capacity of the securities business. It 
was supposed to counteract the deposit deficits that had been caused by the collapse of a series of banks 
since 1870. Legislation introducing state supervision over mortgage banking was implemented on 13 
June 1899 (RGBI 375). See in general in this regard Ruland, Anselm Zur Entwicklung des 
Bankenaufsichtsrechts bis 1945, (1988). 
9 Hantelmann, Kurt von, Die Aufsicht des Staates iiber die Banken nach deutschem Recht (1936) Diss. 
Wtirzburg, 62. 
10 From a juristic perspective, it was regarded as a private acquisitional institution with private capital in a 
form similar to that of a public limited company with an independent personality. 
II Of the four members of the Reichsbankkuratorium, one was appointed by the Emperor (Kaiser) and the 
other three by the Bundesrat. (This was the body through which the Reichslander participated in the 
government and administration of the Reich.) 
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decisions that were binding on the Reichsbank. In practice the Reichskanzler instructed 
the directors and the officials of the Reichsbank. 12 
The Reichsbank was governed, administered and represented by its directors, namely 
the president of the Reichsbank, his representative and up to eight additional members 
who were appointed for life by the Reichskanzler. Whilst shareholders had very few 
rights, the government of the German Reich exerted significant influence over the 
Reichsbank. 13 
2 The Period 1918 - 1945 
The First World War (1914 - 1918) was an important period in the history of German 
banking. The German monarchy came to an end. Furthermore, the global economic 
system, predominantly characterised by liberalism, changed dramatically. The newly 
established and mostly still unstable democracies were soon threatened by the rise of 
dictatorships. These political developments had a marked influence on the financial 
affairs of the European states. This was also the case in Germany. The world-wide 
freedom of movement of persons, goods and capital came to an end. 14 The preparation 
for war resulted in an increasing measure of state intervention in the country's economic 
affairs. This was achieved by the establishment and expansion of state-owned 
enterprises as well as by means of the government's economic policy, which included 
measures of control and intervention. The consequences of these measures are still 
evident today. Besides the principles of a market system, some of the state planning 
tendencies which date back to the First World War still remain in effect in Germany.IS 
This period also marked the beginning of state intervention, in the sense of general 
supervision, in the affairs of financial institutions. Although these measures were 
12 See § 26 of the Bankgesetz of 1875 and Ruland, Anselm Zur Entwicklung des Bankenallftichtsrechts 
his 1945, (1988), 19. 
13 This can be ascribed to the fact that the standardisation of bank notes was regarded as urgent. See 
Ruland, Anselm Zlir Entwicklung des Bankenauftichtsrechts his 1945, (1988) 20. 
14 See in general Zunkel, Friedrich, 1ndustrie und Staatssozialismus - Der Kampf um die 
Wirtschaftsordnllng - Deutschland 1914 - 1918 (1974). 
15 Eg by means of the legislation concerning cartels and the social limitations on ownership 
(Sozialpjlichtigkeit des Eigentums) under art 14 of the Grundgesetz. 
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actually a direct consequence of the war, they tended to remain in place also after the 
war. 
The high reparation demands of the Allies left Germany with serious economIC 
problems. A major problem was to meet these demands in the light of Germany's scant 
capital reserves. German industry also had to start afresh with virtually no operating 
capital after the war. The problem was exacerbated by the high inflation rate during the 
early twenties. An exodus of capital from Germany, and the simultaneous need for it in 
Germany, led to the introduction of several statutes by which the government attempted 
to gain control over the situation by restricting the free trade of capital. 16 Although this 
legislation of the post-war period was primarily aimed at curbing the flight of capital, its 
indirect effect was akin to public supervision of banking. Thus, the protection of 
creditors was subordinated to the broader interest of ensuring that sufficient capital 
remained in the country. The Kapitalj/uchtgesetz as amended on 26 January 1923 17 
provided for certain requirements that banks had to meet. On the basis of § 6 of the 
Verordnung tiber MajJnahmen gegen die Kapitalj/ucht of 24 October 191918 inland 
revenue offices could subject deposit banks to comprehensive investigations. § 19 II of 
the Kapitalj/uchtgesetz l9 authorised the Reichsjinanzminister (Minister of Finance) to 
16 See the Verordnung tiber MaJ3nahmen gegen die Kapitalabwanderung in das Ausland, yom 21. 
November 1918 (RGBI. S. 1325); Verordnung zur Erganzung der Verordnung tiber MaJ3nahmen gegen 
die Kapitalabwanderung in das Ausland, yom 15. Januar 1919(RGBl. S. 43); Gesetz gegen die 
Kapitaljlucht, yom 8. August 1919 (RGBI. S. 1540); Bekanntmachung zur Ausftihrung des Gesetzes gegen 
die Kapitaljlucht, yom 8. August 1919 (RGBl. S. 1615); 2. Verordnung tiber MaJ3nahmen gegen die 
Kapitaljlucht, yom 14. Januar 1920, (RGBl. I, S. 50); Verordnung tiber die Verlangerung der 
Geltungsdauer des Gesetzes gegen die Kapitaljlucht, yom 8. August 1919, yom 28. August 1920 (RGBI. S. 
1688); Verordnung tiber die Kapitalabwanderung in das Ausland durch AbschluJ3 von Versicherungen, 
yom 15. Januar 1919 (RGBI. S. 49); Verordnung tiber MaJ3nahmen gegen die Kapitaljlucht, yom 24. 
Oktober 1919 (RGBI. S. 1820); Gesetz gegen die Kapitaljlucht, yom 24. Dezember 1920 (RGBl. 1921, S. 
23); Gesetz, betreffend die Abanderung des Gesetzes tiber die Kapitaljlucht, yom 4. Juli 1921 (RGBI. S. 
808); Gesetz tiber die Geltungsdauer des Gesetzes tiber die Kapitaljlucht, yom 22. Dezember 1921 
(RGBI. S. 1607); Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes tiber die Kapitaljlucht, yom 22. Marz 1922 (RGBI. S. 
282); Gesetz zur Erganzung und Abanderung des Gesetzes tiber die Kapitaljlucht, yom 22. Dezember 
1922 (RGBI. 1, S. 986); Bekanntmachung der Fassung des Gesetzes gegen die Kapitaljlucht, yom 26. 
Januar 1923 (RGBl. 1, S. 91); Notverordnung des Reichsprasidenten tiber die Aufrechterhaltung von 
Vorschriften des Kapitaljluchtgesetzes und des Weinsteuergesetzes, yom 29. Dezember 1924 (RGBl. 1, S. 
967); and the Gesetz tiber die Allfrechterhaltling von Vorschriften des Kapitaljluchtgesetzes, yom 16. 
April 1925 (RGBl. I, S. 43). 
17 See n 16 above. 
18 RGBl. II, 1820. 
19 RGBl. II, 1540. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 
issue regulations regarding banking business after consultation with the 
Reichswirtschaftsminister (Minister of Economic Affairs). A bank disregarding these 
ordinances could be prohibited from continuing to trade. 
The Autonomiegesetz of 26 May 192220 left the Reichsbank with a great degree of 
independence. In accordance with this legislation the management of the Reichsbank 
was left exclusively to its directors. From this date the institution was supervised by the 
Reich. The Reichsbankkuratorium, which effectively no longer had any function, was 
dissolved. 
After the period of inflation during the years 1923-1924 the situation in the capital 
market calmed down slightly. This led to the abolition of the Kapitaljluchtgesetz of 
191921 at the end of 1924. Between 1924 and 1930 approximately 14 million RM 
flowed into the country in the form of short-term foreign money. The threat of the 
world-wide economic crisis, however, reversed the tendency and a renewed outflow of 
capital took place. As a consequence gold reserves to the value of approximately eight 
billion RM were taken out of the country between 1928 and 1931.22 
The German banking business thus had extensive freedom of trade until its collapse in 
July 1931.23 The only measures of state intervention in the business activities of banks 
had been temporary and were mainly designed to safeguard the currency and prevent the 
flight of capita1.24 These measures were, however, in a certain sense, a form of indirect 
20 RGBI. II, 135. 
21 See n 16 above. 
22 The Government used the gold reserves as security for credit. Gold was taken out of the country by the 
Reichsbank. See Born, Karl-Erich "Yom Begin des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zum Ende der Weimarer 
Republik 1914-1933" in AschoffG, Deutsche Bankengeschichte. Band 3, (1983),105-123. 
23 In May 1931 the Gennan economy showed a deficit of 1.25 billion RM. Several large banks in Berlin 
had to transfer 94 million RM of foreign exchange during April 1931. By July 1932 this amount had 
increased to 118 million RM. The total indebtedness of Gennan banks towards foreign creditors 
amounted to 15 billion RM by the end of the crisis. See in this regard Walb, E., 'Neuzeitliche 
Entwicklungen in der Kreditwirtschaft' in: Die Deutsche Bankwirtschaft. Bd II, (1935); Born, K.-E., 
'Auseinandersetzung urn die Einflihrung der Bankenaufsicht (1931)" in: (1978) 3. Beilage, 
Bankhistorischen Archiv. Frankfurt, 14. 
24 Such as the Devisenverordnung of20. I. 1916 and the Kapitaljluchtgesetz of 8. August 1919 (on which 
see the text at n 16 above). 
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state supervision. Several attempts to introduce rules that would protect clients did not 
succeed.25 
A turning point in the development of supervision aimed at the protection of creditors 
was reached in 1931. This year marked the first efforts to establish a functioning system 
of general banking supervision. The world-wide economic crisis of 1931 led to a rush 
by creditors and clients on financial institutions. The liquidation of large amounts of 
money was demanded. The capital market of the time reached the upper limits of its 
performance level. Sufficient provision for the liquidation of debts on this scale had not 
been made. Certain institutions reacted by temporarily discontinuing payment. 
However, others were hit harder and eventually had no other choice but to terminate 
their business activities altogether. Amongst these was the Darmstadter und 
Nationalbank (Danatbank).26 For the first time, the German government tried to gain 
control by adopting emergency regulations. The effects of these measures amounted to 
general supervision. At the climax of the financial crisis banking holidays were decreed 
and the Reichsprasident, empowered thereto by Art. 48 II of the Weimarer 
Reichsverfassung (the Weimar Constitution) issued the Notverordnung tiber 
Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht und Steueramnestie vom 19. September 193127 which 
placed a1l28 private financial institutions under state supervISIOn. A 
Reichsbankkuratorium (board of trustees) was appointed once again. In addition a 
Reichskommissariar9 for banking was founded. The Reichskommissariat acted as the 
25 Panowitz, Rudolf, Kreditwesengesetz-Banking Act Kommentar, (1988), introduction, XIII. 
26 In 1930 it became known that it had accumulated losses of 30 million RM. The Reichsbank's attempts 
to obtain foreign supporting credit were fruitless. As a consequence, the Danatbank had to refuse further 
discount credit. After the combined efforts of other large banks also failed the Danatbank had to close its 
doors on 13 July 1931. See in this regard Ruland, Anselm Zur Entwicklung des Bankenaufsichtsrechts bis 
1945, (1988), 150. 
27 RGBI. 1,493: Emergency decree on company law, bank supervision and tax amnesty. 
28 Certain institutions, especially the Hypothekenbanken, were already subject to state supervision by 
virtue of special legislation. See the Hypothekenbankgesetz of 13. 7. 1899 (RGBI. S. 375). See also 
Ruland, Anselm Zur Entwicklung des Bankenaufsichtsrechts bis 1945, (1988), 46 et seq. 
29 The head of this office was the Reichskommissar fiir das Bankwesen (a state officer whose main task 
was the supervision of banks). ~\,UT'4~ 
~'\ ~ 
~ ~ 
.. I 
I, I, ' 
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direct subordinate to the Reichswirtschaftsminister and was based in Berlin.30 It· 
consisted of five members, under the chairmanship of the Reichsbankprasident. The 
other members were· the State Secretary of the Wirtschaftsministerium, the State 
Secretary of the Finanzministerium, a member of the directorate of the Reichsbank 
(appointed by the Reichsbankprasident), and the Reichskommissar for banking.3l The 
Reichsbankkuratorium had to facilitate co-operation between the Reichsbank and the 
Reichskommissar for banking. Furthermore, it had the power to decide whether an 
enterprise qualified as a "bank" under the emergency regulations. Its decision bound 
both the courts and the administrative bodies. The Kuratorium also compiled principles 
of a general nature concerning the management of banks decreed by the 
Reichskommissar.32 
The Reichskommissar was responsible for the implementation of the practical side of 
the supervision. In the execution of his duties he was bound by the guidelines set up by 
the Reichsbankkuratorium.33 He had the task of investigating the state of German 
banking and the entire credit business - with special reference to foreign relations, and 
was to report regularly to the Reichsbankkuratorium. In terms of the emergency 
regulations, he was also vested with comprehensive rights regarding information and 
audits.34 To implement his authority, he could issue fines of up to 100 000 RM to the 
proprietors and managers of banks. 35 
A clear feature of the emergency regulations was the close relationship between the 
Reichsbank and bank supervision. A similar relationship still exists in many other 
30 § 1 sub 2 1 of the Notverordnung of 19. 9. 1931. 
31 Verordnung v. J 9. 9. J 93 J, Second Part, Art. 1 § l. 
32 See Ruland, Anselm Zur Entwicklung des Bankenaufsichtsrechts bis J 945, (1988), 156 et seq. See also 
n 27 above. 
33 § 2 sub 1 of the Va. See also n 27 above. 
34 §§ 3 et seq. This included the right to inspect the books of banking institutions, the right to acquire 
information on demand and to initiate any supplementary audits he regarded as necessary. His findings 
were reported to the bank's relevant statutory organs. See Moschel, Wemhard, Das Wirtschaftsrecht der 
Banken. (1972),202 et seq. 
3S Sub I § 4 of the Notverordnung of 19.9. 1931. See also n 27 above. 
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countries today.36 Supervision was considered as a way in which the currency policy 
could be co-ordinated, and the right to supervision was vested in a central authority, the 
Reichskommissar for banking. While in force, the emergency regulations were amended 
several times.37 
The special emergency regulations of 1931 can be regarded as the basis of the eventual 
Reichsgesetz fur das Kreditwesen in 1934.38 Prior to this legislation the Reichstag, on 6 
September 1933, founded the Untersuchungsausschuj3 fur das Bankwesen which had the 
task of submitting suggestions for a comprehensive restructuring of the control of 
bankirig (in a sense a type of 'banking inquest').39 Its investigations were concluded on 
20 December 1933 and its findings were summarised in the Bericht des Vorsitzenden 
des Untersuchungsausschusses fur das Bankwesen an den Fuhrer und Reichskanzler.40 
It is important to view these developments in the light of the political developments of 
1933, the year in which the National Socialist Party came to power. Although the 
development of the economy from 1930 was certainly an important reason for the 
implementation of banking supervision, the report of the fact-finding committee reveals 
the influence of the political situation of the time. In a sense the Fuhrerprinzip41 was 
introduced to the domain of banking. 
36 Inter alia in South Africa. See Chapter 3, 76 et seq. below. 
37 See, inter alia, the Zweite Durchfiihrungsverordnung vom 20. Dezember 1932 (RGBI. I, 563); 
Verordnung zur Durchfiihrung der Bankenaufticht vom 21. April 1933 (RGBl. 1,228). 
38 RGBl. I, 1203, enacted on 1 January 1935. 
39 This fact-finding committee consisted of representatives from the fields of commerce as well as 
banking. Reports on 26 different topics were compiled. These were all published in: Untersuchung des 
Bankwesens (1933) Part 1 Vol I and II. 
40 English: 'The report of the chairman of the commission to investigate the banking system presented to 
the leader and chancellor of the Reich.' The report of the fact-finding committee listed 7 requirements: 
1 supervision of all credit institutions; 
2 the setting up of a supervisory board for the credit industry; 
3 subjecting the establishment of all credit institutions to permission; 
4 the securing of sufficient liquidity; . 
5 division of the money and the capital markets to secure the savings business; 
6 securing an ordered system of payment; and 
7 the guarding of the credit industry and extensive publicity. 
41 English: 'Principle ofleadership (by Adolf Hitler),. 
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On 5 December 1934 the Reichsgesetz uber das Kreditwesen (KWG 1934)42 was 
enacted. It came into effect on 1 January 1935. This statute represents the first 
comprehensive codification of the public supervision of banking. The KWG 193443 
defined the concept Kreditinstitut (bank) as an enterprise engaged in banking and 
savings bank transactions, and specified the nature of their business for the first time . 
. The KWG 1934 standardised the state supervision of all banks (with the exception of 
certain public banks). For this purpose the Reichsbankkuratorium was replaced by the 
Aufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen (Federal Authority for the Supervision of Banks).44 
The Reichskommissar for banking was vested with further powers.45 For the first time 
banks required the permission of the Reichskommissar to trade.46 The KWG 1934 also 
made provision for a reserved right of admission.47 One of the reasons for which 
permission could be denied was simply that there was no need for the opening of the 
particular credit business.48 The material or financial requirements banks had to meet 
were based on established principles of banking regarding liquidity, equity capital, and 
loans.49 
Prior to the KWG 1934 the availability of remedies to a bank against state action was ill 
defined. Despite enacting protection against measures by the Reichskommissar in 
isolated instances, in substance the position was not much different under the KWG 
42 RGBI. I, 1203. 
43 § 1. 
44 § 30 KWG 1934. 
45 Inter alia: to decide, in cases of doubt, whether an institution falls under this legislation; to revoke the 
pennision to trade; to allow a bank to use a certain name; and, to appoint auditors. See §§ 34 et seq. 
KWG 1934. 
46 § 30 KWG 1934 . 
. 47 §§ 11 et seq KWG 1934. 
48 § 4 sub 1 b KWG 1934. 
49 Moschel, Wemhard, Das Wirtschaftrecht der Banken, 216 et seq. 
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1934. In general the Reichskommissar's decisions and orders were considered binding, 
and only in some cases were complaints lodged with the Aufsichtsamt accepted.50 
The main task of the Aufsichtsamfl was to ensure that the statute was complied with. In 
addition it was to give effect to banking and economic policy. Its tasks further included: 
the setting up of guidelines for the activities of the Reichskommissar; the hearing of 
complaints regarding decisions of the Reichskommissar; the compilation of principles in 
accordance with which banks were to be managed; the requirements of the independent 
audits; and ensuring that appropriate steps were taken in the event of a credit institution 
running into financial difficulties. 
In order to cope with these duties, the Aufsichtsamt was given certain powers.52 It could, 
inter alia, determine the ratio between total obligations and liable equity capital and 
decide to what extent the public guarantors (dffentlich-rechtliche Gewahrstrager) could 
take the place of liable equity capital. It could also grant certain exemptions, issue 
regulations concerning non-cash payments, and determine the ratio between total 
obligations and ownership of shares. Furthermore, regulations were issued to control the 
acceptance of credit for the securities business by managers and employees of credit 
institutions, as well as by civil servants. Credit limits were set and the ratio between 
total obligations and liquid investments was determined. The rules also concerned 
savings deposits and the period of notice in savings transactions. 
The position of the Reichskommissar for banking was also circumscribed in the KWG 
1934. The post was still regarded as that of a Reichsbehdrde (Reichs-Authority) 
subordinate to the Reichswirtschaftsminister with its seat in Berlin. He was nominated 
50 § 43 KWG 1934. 
51 It consisted of the following 7 members: (i) the President of the Reichsbank's directorate (the 
chairman); (ii) the Vice President of the directorate (the President's representative); (iii) a member who 
was appointed by the Fuhrer and Reichskanzler; and (iv) and the State Secretaries of the 
Wirtschaftsministerium, the Finanzministerium, Ministerium fur Ernahrung und Landwirtschaft (Food 
and Agriculture), and the Ministerium des Inneren (Home Affairs). See Ruland, Anselm Zur Entwicklung 
des Bankenaufsichtsrechts bis 1945, (1988),182,183. 
52 See the KWG 1934 and Ruland, Anselm Zur Entwicklung des Bankenaufsichtsrechts bis 1945, 183-
185. 
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by the fuhrer und Reichskanzler53 after consultation with the President of the 
Reichsbank's board of directors. 54 The Reichskommissar had the duty to implement the 
KWG 1934 within the guidelines laid down by the Aufsichtsamt. His powers were 
extended considerably.55 He could recognise an institution as a bank for the purposes of 
the KWG 1934. He could grant and revoke permission to conduct banking business, 
prevent a company from operating, decide on the permissibility of a company name, and 
determine exceptional limits for personal credit. The Reichskommissar could also limit 
the distribution of profits, provide temporary exemptions from particular stipulations in 
the legislation, order the submission of balance sheets or other information, demand 
banks to make their books available for an audit and give instructions for a general 
inspection. He further had the power to attend or call general meetings and meetings of 
other organs of the banking institutions governed by the KWG 1934, and was entitled to 
examine depots. Finally, he was empowered to delegate his authority to another (subject 
to permission of the Aufsichtsamt). His position was strengthened by the fact that he 
could impose fines of up to 100 000 RM. 
Other matters regulated by the KWG 1934 included the provision for liquidity, cash 
reserves and the size of single credits of liable equity capital. During the period 1935-
1939 the KWG 1934 was amended several times. 56 It must further be noted that in 1934 
regulations were issued under the KWG 1934 which prevented the establishment of 
further credit institutions until further notice. 57 
In 1939 the Aufsichtsamt was eventually dissolved, on 19 September by regulation58 and 
on 25 September by legislation in the form of a new KWG (the KWG 1939),59 as a 
53 The full title of Adolf Hitler. 
54 See § 33 of the KGW 1934. 
55 See the examples mentioned in n 45 above and Ruland, Anselm Zur Entwicklung des 
Bankenaufsichtsrechts bis 1945" 185. 
56 See inter alia the Gesetz zur Anderung des Reichsgesetzes aber das Kreditwesen, vom 13. 12. 1935 
(RGBI. I, 1456); Gesetz zur Anderung des Reichsgesetzes aber das Kreditwesen, vom 4. September 1938 
(RGBI. I, 1151); Verordnung zur Anderung des Reichsgesetzes aber das Kreditwesen, vom 15. September 
1939 (RGBI. I, 1953). 
57 Verordnung aber eine Grandungssperre far Kreditinstitute vom 4. September 1934 (RGBI. I, 815). 
58 Verordnung zur Anderung des Reichsgesetzes aber das Kreditwesen vom 19. September 1939 (RGBI. I, 
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consequence of the influence of the regime. The dark period of Nazi terror had found its 
way into German banking. The entire German credit industry was subordinated to and 
brought in line with Adolf Hitler's political goals. Many highly esteemed families ?f 
bankers - especially those of Jewish descent - were dispossessed, irrespective of whether 
or not they were willing to submit to the political goals of the regime in an attempt to 
salvage their property. The authority of the Aufsichtsamt was transferred to the 
Reichswirtschajtsminister.60 The duties and powers of the Reichskommissar were 
assigned to the Reichsaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen which was immediately 
subordinate to the Reichswirtschajtsminister. 
A further restructuring was implemented in 1944.61 The Reichsaufsichtsamt which had 
been created in 1939 was disbanded and its govermental powers (hoheitliche 
Befugnisse) were taken over by the Reichswirtschajtsminister whereas the board of 
directors of the Reichsbank took over the duties of control (kontrollierenden Aufgaben). 
3 The Period 1945-1998 
After the end of the Second World War in May 1945 the KWG of25 September 1939 
and the Verordnung zur Anderung des Reichsgesetzes uber das Kreditwesen of 18 
September 1944, which regulated the financial aspects remained in effect62 and became 
federal law when the Constitution came into force. 63 
After the collapse of the German Reich and the restructuring of its territory In 
accordance with the demands of the Allies, the organisational and supervisory powers of 
1953) English: 'Regulation to Amend the Legislation Governing Credit Institutes'. 
59 RGBI. I, 1955. 
60 By this stage the Reichswirtschaftsminister had also become the Reichsbanksprasident, in accordance 
with the instructions of Adolf Hitler. 
61 Verordnung zur Anderung des Reichsgesetzes tiber das Kreditwesen vom 18. September 1944. (RGBI. 
1,211.) 
62 Moschel, Wernhard, Das Wirtschaftsrecht der Banken (1972) 219 et seq. See also BVerwGE 4, 
271/273; BVerfGE 14, 197,201. 
63 In accordance with art 123 Par I, art 125 Sub 1, art 74 No 11. 
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the Reichswirtschaftsminister were transferred to the different Bundeslander.64 The 
decentralisation of bank supervision necessitated co-ordination between the territories of 
the former Reich in which the Reichsmark was still valid. This led to the 
Sonderausschuf3 Bankenaufsicht, a committee for bank supervlSlon which was 
permanently established by the Landeraufsich(sbehdrde in 1948.65 However, since this 
institution could not issue legally binding orders, and due to the fact that 
decentralisation had rendered a uniform application of the KWG 1939 difficult, disputes 
between the Lander often arose. Questions regarding the duties of the individual public 
authorities involved in bank supervision, and regarding the all too common deviations 
in the application of the KWG 1939, were especially controversial. These problems were 
exacerbated rather than solved by new legislation66 and judgements of the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative COurt).67 
Discussions in the circles of the lawmakers which took place in an attempt to find a new 
legal structure brought to the fore an old area of conflict in Germany, namely the 
division of power between the Bundestag (Lower House of the Federal Parliament) and 
the Bundesrat (Senate of the Federal Parliament). The Bundesrat opposed the 
recentralisation of bank supervision by the creation of a new Bundesaufsichtsamt as 
intended by the Bundestag and Government.68 On 28 June 1961 the Bundestag managed 
64 The place of the ReichswirtschaJtsminister was initially taken by the Bundesjinanzminister and the 
Senators. The transfer of his powers was, however, handled in several different ways. In most instances 
his powers were taken over by the Landeszentralbanken (the central banks of the Bundeslander). See in 
this regard Moschel Das WirtschaJtsrecht der Banken (1972) 220; Beck, Heinz, Gesetz uber das 
Kreditwesen, (1961), Einleitung 2, 11; Honold, Eduard, Die Bankenaufsicht (1956); Pandtle, Manfred, 
Bankenaufsicht in der MarktwirtschaJt. Insbesondere das Problem des Kreditwesengesetzes von 1934 im 
Internationalen Vergleich, (1955). 
6S Beck, Heinz, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen, Einleitung, (1961) Einleitung E 2, 11 et seq. 
66 Gesetz uber die Deutsche Bundesbank vom 26. Juli 1957 (BGBI. I, 745). English: 'Act Governing the 
German Central Bank of 26 July 1957'; Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen vom 27. Juli 1954 
(BGB1. I, 1081). English: 'Restraint of Competition Act of27 July 1954'. 
67 See BVerwGE 8,14 = NJW 1959, 592 (which refers to the ".Apothekenurteil des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts", BVerfGE 7, 377); BVerwGE NJW 1959, 590. The latter case was 
concerned with the constitutionality of the compulsory audit of new credit institutions or their branches. 
Such audits were found to be unconstitutional (in violation of art 12 sub. 1 of the Grundgesetz (GG)), and 
could therefore no longer be required. See in this regard Sprengel, Hans-Erhard, Keine Bedurfnisprufung 
mehr bei bei der Neugrundung von Kreditinstiiuten und der Errichtung von Zweigstellen, (1959) Spk, 
123. 
68 See, concerning the lawmaking process, Beck, Heinz, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen, Einleitung, (1961) 
Einleitung E 3, 7ff; Consbruch, Johannes, Das neue Kreditwesengesetz, (1961) BB, 837; Schreihage, N., 
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to muster the majority necessary in terms of the Grundgesetz (GGt9 to override the 
objections of the Bundesrat. This meant that the new legislation, the KWG 1961,70 could 
come into force on 1 "January 1962. An attempt by several Bundeslander to have the 
new Bundesauftichtsamt declared unconstitutional was unsuccessful. 71 
The KWG 1961 was very similar to that of 1934. The most noteworthy innovations were 
the Bundesauftichtsamt fur das Kreditwesengesetz as a central public supervisory 
authority72 and the close co-operation with the Deutsche Bundesbank. 73 This brought 
about a clear differentiation between the tasks of the Bundesauftichtsamt and those of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank. The governmental functions (hoheitliche Aufgaben) relating 
to banking supervision were assigned exclusively to the Bundesauftichtsamt. 
The KWG 1961 was amended several times. The amendments were predominantly 
aimed at liberalising the provisions regarding interest and the regulation of 
competition.74 The process for a new statute was eventually set in motion in 1974 after 
the collapse of the Herstatt Banking House. Other banks also started experiencing 
liquidity problems during this period. It was clear that these events had damaged the 
confidence of the public in the German banking industry. The Government decided that 
Das kunftige Bankaufsichtsrecht. in: Mayschosser Gesprache. Fachtagung fur Leiter groj3er 
Kreditgenossenschaften, Vol. 8, (1961), 131. 
69 Art. 77 sub 4. 
70 BGBl. I, 881. 
71 The Bundeslander Bremen, Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Rheinland-Pfalz submitted a 
Normenkontrollklage to the Constitutional Court. In its decision of 24 July 1962 the Court held that the 
founding of the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen as an independent Federal High Office was in 
accordance with art. 87 par. 3 1 GG. 
72 See § 5 KWG 1961. 
73 See § 7 KWG 1961. 
74 See Schork, Ludwig, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen mit Begrundung. Durchfuhrungsvorschriften und 
Anmerkungen, (19~8) 16. ed., Introduction III. 
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the work towards new legislation had to start immediately.7s This led to the 
Kreditwesengesetz of 1976 (KWG 1976).76 
During this period the AusschuJ3 fur Bankenaufsicht (Committee for Bank Supervision) 
was also founded under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
This committee drew up the basic principles for the supervision of foreign branches 
which were taken up in the Basle Agreement (Basler Konkordat) of 1975. Germany was 
a signatory of this agreement from the very beginning.77 The importance of this body has 
increased steadily. Today its main responsibility is the unification of the different 
banking supervision concepts which are steadily being revised.78 The number of 
countries that have become members have grown steadily. They now repesent most 
parts of the world.79 
The KWG 1976 increased the powers of both the Bundesaufsichtsamt and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank to acquire information from, and to intervene in, the business of banks. It 
also led to a more stringent approach in structuring large credits. In addition it 
introduced the Vieraugenprinzip (that is that all important decisions had to be signed by 
two directors) to the management of banks. The banking industry of its own accord 
introduced the voluntary securing of deposits.so 
75 A comprehensive restructuring of the KWO had in any event been envisaged by that time. See BT-Drs. 
/3657,9. 
76 BOB!. 1,725; Bekanntmachungder Neufassungam 3.5.1976, BOB/. 1,1121 E. 
77 Bieg, Hartmut, Bankbilanzen und Bankenaufsicht, (1983), 2 et seq. 
78 Zeitler, Isabella, Internationales Bankgeschajt als Problem der Bankenausicht, (1984), 193 et seq. 
79 Mayer, Helmut, Das Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen, (1981), 207 et seq. 
80 GUnther, Hans, Die kunjtige Einlagensicherung der privaten Banken, (1975), Bank-Betrieb, 250; 
Schwark, Eberhard, Einlagensicherung bei Banken, (1974) NJW 1849; Ungnade, Dieter, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte der Einlagensicherung, (1974), ZfgK, 1072; Fischer, Reinfried, Fragen 
der Einlagensicherung in der Kreditwirtschajt, (1975), Gemhlt. 99; Starke, Otto-Ernst, Staatliche 
Bankenaufsicht und Einlagensicherung, (1976), VW, 280; Ronge, Volker, "Solidarische" 
Selbstorganisation der Wirtschajt, Der Einlagensicherungsfonds deutscher Banken, (1978), Leviathan 
176; Fritz, W., Rechtsfragen der Einlagensicherung im Kreditgewerbe, (1979); Scholl, Claus, 
Einlagensicherung der privaten Kreditinstitute, (1983); Grosjean, Rene Klaus, Die Deutsche 
Kreditwirtschajt, (1988), 2. ed., 26 et seq. 
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In 1979 a special commission (Studienkommission) appointed by the 
Bundesjinanzminister to make recommendations on, inter alia, bank supervision, 
handed in its report {GrundsatzJragen der Kreditwirtschaft).81 New legislation, the 
Kreditwesengesetz 1984 (KWG 1984),82 eventually followed. The most important 
innovations related to the legal complications of banking supervision in the context of 
the increasing internationalisation of banking business.83 The KWG 1984 had to be 
prepared under severe time pressure. To comply with an EC Directive of 13 June 198384 
the legislation had to be in place by 1 July 1985. Events during 1983 in Schroder, 
Miinchmeyer, Hengst & Co (SMH-Bank) also contributed to the pressure.85 
A further noteworthy change addressed a problem raised by a decision of the 
Bundesgerichtshofin 1979. 86 The Court found in favour of a creditor who had instituted 
an action against the Bundesaufsichtsamt for damages he suffered due to inadequate 
bank supervision. This led to the addition of the provision 'Das Bundesaufsichtsamt 
nimmt die ihm nach diesem Gesetz zugewiesenen Aufgaben nur im offentlichen Interesse 
wahr' (English: 'the Bundesaufsichtsamt discharges its duties under this Act solely in 
the public interest') to subsection 3 of § 6 of the KWG 1984. The clear intention was to 
prevent actions of this nature from succeeding in the future. 87 
81 Bundes~inisterium der Finanzen, Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft - Bericht des 
Studienkommission, (1979). 
82 BGBI. 1,1693. 
\ 
83 For detailed discussions of the KWG 1984 see: Die Bank, 1985, 27; Starke, Ernst-Otto, Die 
Bankenaufsichtsnovelle ist in Kraft getreten, (1985), VW, 185; Waldeck, Werner Michael, Die 
Novellierung des Kreditwesengesetzes, (1985), NJW, 888; Werner, Winfried, Schwerpunkte der 
Novellierung des Kreditwesengesetzes, ZHR 149 (185), 236; Eicke, JUrgen, Vom Umgang mit dem neuen 
KWG, (1985) ZfgK, 705 (I), 754 (II). 
84 Abl. EC No. L 193 of 18 July 1983 18. 
85 Geiger, Helmut, KWG - Reform und Oberlegungen zum SMH-Fall, Spk 1984, 625. 
86 15. Februar 1979, NJW 1979, 1353, BB 1979, 752. 
87 See BGH, NJW 1979, 1353 - Wetterstein Case; NJW 1979, 1879 - Herstatt-Sparer-Case; Kopf, Hans 
Christian / Baumler, Helmut, Die neue Rechtsprechung des BGH zur Amtshaftung im Bereich der 
Bankenaufsicht, (1979) NJW, 1871; Haftke, Heinz Christian, Wetterstein - Urteil und Bankenaufsicht, 
(1979) ZfgK, 626, and by the same author, Zum "Herstatt-Sparer" - Urteil des BGH, (1979) ZfgK, 1000; 
Bleibaum, Ernst, Zur Drittbezogenheit von Normen der Bankenaufsicht, (1982) ZfgK 476; PUttner, 
GUnter, Von der Bankenaufsicht zur Staatsgarantie fiir Bankeinlagen, (1982) JZ, 47; Meister, Gisela, 
Drittbezogene Amtspjlichten bei der staatlichen Aufsicht iiber Banken und Versicherungen (1982); 
Schilling, Martin, Zur Haftung des Bundesaufsichtsamtes fiir das Kreditwesen bei Aufsichtsverletzungen 
(1982); Bleibaum, Ernst, Die Rechtsprechung des BGH zur Staatshaftung im Bereich der Bankenaufsicht 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 . 
The KWG 1984 still sets the material requirements for the business activities of German 
banks today.88 However, the increasing importance of the legislation of the European 
Union has necessitated further changes.89 The establishment of a domestic European 
market on 1 January 1993 meant the start of a ·new phase in the European and German 
law of banking supervision. According to the Commission of the European Union, the 
creation of a uniform bank market would facilitate an unrestricted domestic market. An 
unrestricted offer of financial services irrespective of national borders is regarded as a 
prerequisite for a domestic market of this nature. The main tool for the harmonisation of 
the law within the European Community has been and remains Directives. Many such 
directives relating to banking supervision have been issued.90 They have all been 
complied with in the legislation currently in force in Germany, that is the KWG 1995. 
This legislation is considered in detail below. 
B Republic of South Africa 
1 Introduction 
The importance of South African trade increased as growing numbers of Europeans 
immigrated to the country. The development of a good financial system became 
necessary. In this regard it is possible to identify the following four periods: 
(1983). See also Machunsky, Jiirgen, Amtshaftung gegenuber Kapitalanlegern fur fehlerhafte 
Bankenaufsicht?, (1989) KaRS 80; Brendle, Armin, A mtshaftung fur fe~lerhafte Bankenaufsicht? (1987) 
427 et seq; Nickolaysen, Gert, Keine Staatshaftung fur die Bankenaufsicht? in: Gedachtnisschrift fur 
Martens (1987) 663; Habscheid, Edgar, Staatshaftung fur fehlsame Bankenaufsicht?, (1988). 
88 Further amendments include the introduction of a collective supervisory method, the new limitation of 
the concept of equity capital and the decreasing of the maximum limit of large credits. In 1988 German 
banks were represented in 55 countries in more than 400 places by daughter companies, branches or 
simply by representatives. See in this regard Die Bank (1988), 573. 
89 Gaddum, Johann Wilhelm, Auf dem Weg zu einem europaischen Bankenaufsichtsrecht, Deutsche 
Bundesbank Auszuge aus Presseartikeln No 52 of 20.07.1988 I f.; Boos, Karl Heinz / Mentrup, Horst, 
E.G.-Bankenrechtsharmonisierung BI, 111989, 14. 
90 Erste und zweite Bankenrechtskoordinierungsrichtlinie (Ab!. EG Nr. L 322, 17. 12. 1977, 30; Ab!. EG 
Nr. L 386, 30. 12. 1989, I); Eigenmittelrichtlinie (Ab!. EG Nr. L 124, 5.5. 1989, 16); Solvenzrichtline 
(Ab!. EG Nr. L 386, 30. 12. 1989, 14); Richtlinie uber die Beaufsichtigung von Kreditinstituten allf 
konsolidierter Basis (Ab!. EG Nr. L 193, 18.7.1983,18); Bankbilanzrichtlinie (Ab!. EG Nr. L 372, 31. 
12. 1986, 1); GroJ3kreditrichtlinie (Ab!. EG Nr. L 33, 4.2. 1987, 10); Kapitaladaquanzrichtlinie (Ab!. 
EG Nr. L 143, 18.7. 1986,35). They all are part of the KWG 1995, the current German legislation. 
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• The years 1793 - 1891, during which the first banks started trading and the first steps 
towards legislative regulation ofbankirtg were taken. 91 
• The period 1891-1919, which was marked by the centralisation of the financial 
market dominated at that stage by a small number of banks. The newly established 
Uniot:l made its first legislative attempts to give banking law a uniform legal basis. 
• The period 1920-1945, during which the trend towards the amalgamation of banking 
continued. The Second World War led to legislation aimed at restricting the financial 
sector. The South African National Reserve Bank was also established during this 
period. Further iegislation with a decisive influence on South African banking was 
introduced. 
• The period from 1946-1990, and from then until the present, which reflects the 
current developments in South African banking. 
2 The Period 1793-1891 
The first bank to trade in South Africa was the Bank van Leening, also known as the 
Lombard Bank,92 which started business in 1793 just before the first British occupation 
of the country (1795-1803). The bank was founded by two general commissioners of the 
Dutch government who had been sent to the Cape to investigate the problems which had 
arisen due to the shortage of currency and the corruption rife in the VOC. The settlers 
were dissatisfied by this state of affairs and demanded action. by the VOC.93 In order to 
solve the problems, the Rix-Dollar was introduced as the official means of payment. 
The currency was issued by the Bank van Leening. This bank accordingly functioned 
much in the same way as a state bank, although it also accepted deposits, made loans 
91 Cape Bank Act, No.6 of J 89 J. See 1 infra n. 103. 
92 The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was founded with a capital of 680 000 Rix-Dollars (the VOC 
currency of the time). Within a short period it grew to 800 000 Rix-Dollars. See Barker, H.A.F., Banking 
in South Africa (1952),302 et seq.; Day, A.C.L, The South African Commercial Banks, in: Sayers, R.S., 
Banking in the British Commonwealth (1952), 353 et seq. 
93 Day, A.C.L, The South African Commercial Banks, in: Sayers, R.S., Banking in the British 
Commonwealth (1952),353 et seq. 
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available and accepted exchange.94 It was, however, under the complete control of the 
VOC. In 1808 a daughter company of the Lombard Bank, the Lombard Discount Bank, 
opened its doors to cater specifically for short- and middle-term loans and credit.95 
The second British occupation of the colony in 1806 resulted in its final annexation as 
part of the British Empire.96 This had far-reaching effects on banking. The Rix-Dollar 
remained the only official means of payment in the colony until 1825.97 Due to the fact 
that the Rix-Dollar tended to decrease in value against British currency (Sterling)98 the 
British government decided to replace the currency entirely with Sterling. However, 
such a decision could only be implemented gradually. The Rix-Dollar finally 
disappeared from the market in 1841.99 
Many other banks were established subsequently. Their main aim was the distribution of 
the British currency. 100 Because the only legislative restrictions on banking were those 
that were in force in England at that time, there was a virtually unrestricted freedom of 
trade and settlement in the colony.IOI After the liquidation of several banks between 
94 Loans were granted at an interest rate of 5% for a period of up to eighteen months against security such 
as real estate, gold, silver, jewellery and non-perishable trading goods. Credit issued against inferior 
security could only be extended to a maximum of nine months. See Willis, Nigel, Banking in South 
African Law (1981), 11 et seq. 
95 Barker, H.A.F., Banking in South Africa (1952), 302. 
96 After the colony had again been administered by the Dutch between 1803 and 1806. 
97 Initially, the English did not change anything pertaining to the legal and the monetary system. This was 
one of the Dutch conditions for capitulation. See art 8 of the certificate of capitulation of 10 - 18 January 
1806, in: Theal, Records of the Cape Colony (1897-1905), vol. Y, 201. 
98 The original exchange rate fell to 1 pound Sterling for 9 Rix-Dollars. 
99 At that time, the exchange rate was 1 Shilling for 9 Rix-Dollars. The implementation of Sterling as the 
legal method of payment was strongly opposed by the colonists, due to the fact that it would reduce their 
buying power. 
100 By 1861 29 institutions entitled to issue bank notes had been registered in the Cape Colony. Although 
these institutions had a part in that very profitable business, none survived the following years. Several 
were taken over by other institutions or were liquidated. See Barker, H.A.F., Banking in South Africa 
(1952), 302 et seq. 
101 See Cassel, Sir Ernest, in: Sayers, R.S. Banking in the British Commonwealth (1952), Introduction, vii 
et seq., and Crick, W.F., Commonwealth Banking System (1965), Chapter I: The Framework of Inter-
Relations, 1 et seq. 
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1881 and 1890,102 the Government intervened for the first time by introducing 
legislation in the form of the Cape Bank Act 6 of 1891.103 
The Cape Bank Act required every bank to submit a certified copy of its constitution to 
the Treasury and the Registrar of Deeds. The constitution had to contain the names of 
the management and had to set out the bank's liquidity. 104 Every three months, the bank 
had to present a statement of its deposits and liabilities to the Treasury in the prescribed 
form. 105 This information was published in the Government Gazette at the bank's 
expense. The Treasury was also entitled to two further reports per year without prior 
notice. l06 It could further inspect the business practices of any bank if it had good reason 
to do SO.107 Bank notes could only be issued if securities of a corresponding amount 
were deposited with the treasury.108 The right to issue bank notes was further limited to 
the amount of paid-up capital and the current reserves. 109 The Government guaranteed 
the issued notes in the form of gold reserves. For security the government was granted a 
preferent secured claim (in the nature of pignus) over all the assets of the banks.llo 
Furthermore, a certain amount of the bank notes had to be returned to the Treasury 
every month. II I The total value of notes issued also had to be published monthly.ll2 
The Act was therefore primarily concerned with the issuing of bank notes. Powers to 
intervene were only formulated in general terms. It contained no provision protecting 
banks against steps taken by the Treasury. It also did not contain any limitations 
102 Barker, H.A.F., Banking in South Africa (1952), 307 et seq. 
103 Published in Cape of Good Hope, Act of Parliament Session of J 89 J, 219 et seq. 
104 S 3. 
lOS S 13. 
106 Ss 16, 17. 
107 S 23. 
108 Ss 30 et seq. 
109 S 34. 
110 S 42. 
III S 48. 
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concerning the permission of banks to conduct business, except for certain formalities 
with which banks had to comply. The Cape Bank Act was binding on all banks in the 
Cape Colony. Similar· legislation was also in force in the Transvaal,ll3 Natal l14 and the 
Orange Free State. llS 
3 The Period 1892 - 1919 
A number of amalgamations during this period led to the formation of some financially 
strong institutions. 116 Banking was also affected by the depression of the years 1902 -
1910. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was formed. It consisted of the Cape Colony, 
Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In 1917 the Banks Actl17 was passed in 
order to standardise the statutory law of the 4 different provinces. The provincial 
legislation was accordingly repealed. 118 The Act still required the submission of 
quarterly reports1l9 and the reports were still published. 120 The Treasury retained the 
right to demand any further information it considered necessary.121 
4 The Period 1920-1945 
During this period several important banking statutes were promulgated. 
112 S 51. 
113 Act No.2 of 1893, published in: Statute Law of the Transvaal 1839-1910, vol.. 1(1839-1900),241 et 
seq. 
114 The Banks Statements Act, No. 18 of 1881. In Natal, the foundation of the Natal Bank (Ltd.) was 
initiated by means of legislation, i.e. the Natal Bank (Limited) Laws 1888 to 1912 Private Act, No.7 of 
1912. 
115 Ordinance No. 20 of 1902, published in: The Statute Law of Orange River Colony, 516 et seq. 
116 Examples are the Bank of Africa Ltd. (1912) and Natal Bank (1914). In 1920, the Standard Bank took 
over the African Banking Corporation. At the end of that year, virtually all of South Africa's banking was 
controlled by only three institutions, the Standard Bank of SA Ltd., the National Bank of SA and the 
Netherlands Bank of SA. 
117 Act 7 of 1917. It came into effect on 12 April 1917. 
118 Ss 1,2. 
119 Ss 2-3. In this regard the requirements of the repealed Provincial legislation were supplemented. 
120 S 4. 
121 S 2 (b). 
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The Currency and Banking Act of 1920122 signalled the start of a new era in South 
African banking. It was passed mainly as a consequence of the effects of the First World 
War. The first objective of the Act was to protect the gold reserves of the Union. This 
was achieved by requiring all banks of the Union to deposit their gold reserves at the 
Treasury in exchange for gold certificates. The redemption of these certificates was 
postponed until 30 June 1923. J23 The second objective of the Act was the establishment 
of a central bank for the entire Union. 124 The bank was founded with an original share 
capital of one million pounds. 125 Its powers and duties were clearly defined in the Act. 126 
They were extended from time to time by amendments to the existing legislation as well 
as by new legislation. 127 
The Currency and Banking Act provided that only the Central Bank was entitled to 
issue bank notes for a period of 25 years. 128 Although the notes that had been issued by 
the commercial banks remained in circulation, they had to be replaced by those of the 
Central Bank and could not be renewed after 30 June 1922. This was an important 
development in the history of South African banking. The commercial banks had to give 
up what had been a profitable and privileged position. 129 Furthermore, the Act 
122 Act No. 31 of 1920. 
123 Ss 1-8 (Chapter I). 
124 S 9. 
125 S 10. 
126 Ss 13 et seq. 
127 Currency and Banking Act Amendment, Act No. 22 of 1923, Currency and Banking Act Amendment, 
Act No. 26 of 1930; and the South African Reserve Bank Act, No. 29 of 1944. 
128 S 15. 
129 See Barker, H.A.F., Banking in South Africa (1952), 311. At that time, the South African Central Bank 
had to take the gold standard principle into account when bank notes were issued. The original 
arrangement was that at least 40% of the bank notes issued by the Central Bank had to be secured by 
means of gold coins and 60% by business exchange. The idea was that the volume of notes issued should 
be directly related to the volume of trade as reflected in the number of bills offered for discount. 
However, since a large part of South African ~rade was not financed by exchange credits, the concept 
could not be implemented in practice. The Central Bank was even forced to purchase trading currency to 
meet the stringent requirements. In terms of the amendments introduced in 1923 (see above) up to 35% 
of the counter-value of issued bank notes had to be covered by British or South African treasury 
exchange. The amendments of 1930 (see n 127 above) abolished these provisions altogether. From then 
on, only gold reserves equal to at least 40% ·of the issued bank notes had to be retained. In 1933, the 
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introduced the minimum reserve system for commercial banks. This entailed, inter alia, 
that they were required to keep at least 13% of their demand liabilitiesl30and 3% of their 
time liabilities l31 as minimum reserves with the Central Bank. In the event of these 
requirements not being met, the Treasury was entitled to audit the bank's books and to 
charge a penalty interest of 10% per annum. \32 Banks that had amounts outstanding 
were not permitted to give credit or payout dividends for the duration of their 
indebtedness. \33 The Act also resulted in a more stringent approach to the regular reports 
every bank had to submit. The Central Bank was also obliged to submit a report to the 
Treasury. All reports had to be published. 134 
The second important Act of this period was the Currency and Exchanges Act of 
1933.135 It was triggered by the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the gold 
standard. This placed the South African currency under immense pressure since the 
financial markets were expecting the Union - as a member of the Commonwealth - to do 
the same. The Currency and Exchanges Act, which came into effect on 8 March 1933, 
was an emergency measure aimed at securing the stability of the currency in view of the 
abandonment of the gold standard. It empowered the Governor-General to issue 
proclamations relating to the currency or banking should he deem it necessary.136 Thus, 
the Act was mainly concerned with the possible consequences of further restrictions on 
the freedom of transfer of value, whether of gold or of bank notes. 137 In 1939, a time in 
which financial policy was largely determined by the war, these powers were used to 
percentage was lowered to 30%: Commercial banks initially had to secure at least 13% of their liabilities 
by depositing reserves with the Central Bank. This quota was lowered to 10% by legislation in 1923. 
130 In tenns of s 34 demand liabilities are credits with a maximum duration of 30 days. 
131 In tenns of s 34 time liabilities are credits with a minimum duration of 30 days. 
132 S 30(7). 
133 S 30. 
134 S 31. 
135 Act 9 of 1933. 
136 S 9. 
137 The Finance Act 27 1940 limited this power to the extent that it had to be confinned by both chambers 
of parliament within one month of its issue, or else it lapsed. 
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limit the freedom of commercial banks to transfer foreign exchange and gold. The 
transfer market was strictly regulated and restricted to a small number of authorised 
banks. 138 
In 1942 fundamental changes were made to the banking structure. As a consequence 
most of the legislation in this area was reformed. The lawmaking process was aimed at 
standardising and improving the legal basis of banks and similar institutions. 139 The 
vehicle for this comprehensive reform was the Banking Act of 1942,140 the third 
important Act of this period. 
Chapter I of the Act contained a number of general provisions. 141 The requirement of 
registration before business could begin was imposed for the first time. 142 This 
facilitated an overview of all existing financial institutions. Especially noteworthy was 
the distinction drawn between different types of banks. 143 This structure, that is the 
establishment of specialist banks for different purposes (the Trennbankensystem),144 
reveals the British influence on South African banking. Thus, Chapter II of the Act dealt 
exclusively with commercial banks,145 Chapter III with people's banks,146 Chapter IV 
138 See the Emergency Finance Regulations of 1939. The Finance Act 27 of 1940 was passed as a 
consequence of the war. It reflected, in the context of finance, the Government's intention of supporting 
the Allies. Most importantly, it dealt with trade and money transactions (Waren- und Geldaustausch). 
139 See Malan, F.R. / Faul, W., Introduction to the Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990. TSAR 
(1991), 379 et seq.; see also the Schedule 'Laws Repealed by this Act'. 
140 Act 38 of 1942. It was amended in 1944 and 1947 (see the Banking Amendment Act 34 of 1944; 
Banking Amendment Act 26 of 1947). The following discussion is based on the Act after the 1947 
amendments. 
141 These included definitions (s 1), banking institutions exempted from the provisions of the Act (s 2), 
and the establishment of a Bureau of Registration (s 3). 
142 Banks that were already in existence also had to be registered (s 4). The registration process was set 
out (s 4) along with provisions concerning temporary registration (s 5), the registration of new banks (s 
6), the restriction of business activities of non-registered institutions (s 7), the Registrar's powers (s 8), 
revocation of registration (s 9), temporary suspension or expiry of licences (s 10), the obligation to 
publish registration and the name and type of bank (s 11) and name changes (s 12). 
143 In chapter II, the act distinguished between commercial banks, people's banks, loan banks and deposit-
receiving institutions. 
144 See n 6 supra. 
145 Banks concerned mainly with deposits and loans. 
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with lending banks, J47 and Chapter V with deposit-receiving institutions. 14s The 
requirements to be met by and the duties imposed upon each of the different types of 
banks were set out in the Act. These included the duty to submit regular reports,149 
quotas of equity capital to be met,ISO and the principles of liquidity that had to be taken 
into account in the management of the banks. 151 In the case of people's banks the Act 
also placed limitations on the opening of branches. 152 
Chapter VI of the Act contained provisions which applied to all types of banks. It 
prohibited the pledging or similar encumbering of cash assets l53 as well as mergers 
without prior consent. 154 Principles of valuation for the balancing of securities were set 
OUt. IS5 It further directed all banks to provide the Registrar with a complete list of their 
managers and shareholders,ls6 to have their balance sheets auditedl57 and to submit the 
auditor's report to the shareholders at the annual general meeting. 15s In addition the 
Registrar was authorised (subject to the Minister's consent) to appoint· an inspectorl59 or 
an administrator l60 if he suspected irregularities in a bank's business. In certain 
146 These are similar to the German Genossenschaftsbanken. 
147 Credit institutions. 
148 This term was intended to embrace other institutions that were not specifically mentioned but similar 
to banks. See the definition in s I (1). 
149 The reports were to be submitted to the Registrar and not, as before, to the Treasury. See ss 13 & 18. 
ISO Ss 14(a), 19(a) and 28(a). 
151 Ss 14(b) & (c), 19(b) and 28(b). 
152 S 24. 
153 S 29. 
154 S 33. 
ISS S 30. 
156 S 37. 
157 S 38. 
158 S 41. 
159 S 42. 
160 S 43. 
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circumstances the institutions could even be wound Up.161 Banks were also directed to 
create reserves for possible losses brought about by the delictual actions of their 
employees. 162 The Minister was further empowered to make such regulations as he 
deemed necessary. 163 Finally, in terms of section 52, non-compliance with the 
provisions of the Act amounted to a criminal offence. 
The Banking Act contained no provisions which can be regarded as remedies available 
to banks against overzealous supervisory actions. 
Further legislation of this period must be noted briefly in conclusion. The Savings Bank 
Societies Borrowing Powers Act of 1932164 applied to both savings banks and building 
societies. The multiple regulation brought about by this Act was abolished soon 
thereafter by the promulgation of the Building Societies Act in 1934. 165 Further 
legislative reforms concerning the Central Bank led to the passing of the South African 
National Reserve Bank Act in 1944. 166 
5 The Period 1945-1990 
The first major new legislation concerning the financial sector from 1945 onwards was 
the Banks Act of 1965. 167 This Act replaced the Banking Act of 1942, which had been in 
161 S 45. 
162 S 48. 
163 S 53. 
164 Act 6 of 1932. 
165 Act 62 of 1934. 
166 Act 29 of 1944. 
167 Act 23 of 1965. See in general on this Act Oelofse, A.N., State Control of Banking Institutions in 
South Africa, HBL (1987), 34 et seq. The Banks Act was amended numerous times. A discussion of the 
amendments would be beyond the scope of this thesis. The emphasis is therefore on the Act and its final 
version. Further in-depth reading would span the following Acts: Financial Institutions Amendment Act 
80 of 1965; Finance Act 82 of 1965; Second Finance Act 58 of 1966; Limitation and Disclosure of 
Finance Charges Act 73 of 1968; Financial Institutions Amendment Act 23 of 1970; Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act 89 of 1972; Financial Institutions Amendment Act 91 of 1972; Financial Institutions 
Amendment Act 67 of 1973; Financial Institutions Amendment Act 101 of 1976; Financial Institutions 
Amendment Act 94 of'1977; Financial Institutions Amendment Act 80 of 1978; Financial Institutions 
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force until then. It contained many new provisions directly applicable to banking 
supervIsIOn. 
Chapter I of the Act consisted entirely of general definitions. It distinguished only 
between two different types of banks, namely· banks and discount houses. 168 This was 
also the first attempt of the legislature to define the term 'bank' as it is commonly 
used. 169 
Chapter II was concerned with the issue of registration of banks 170 and the permission to 
conduct business. The fact that an entire chapter of the Act was devoted to this issue, 
highlights the importance thereof.17I Provisions regarding the duty to register before 
~onducting business,172 the temporary or final expiry of registration, I73 and the 
publication of matters pertaining to registration, all of which formed part of the previous 
legislation, although partly modified, were essentially retained. The accepting of 
deposits for banking purposes without prior registration was rendered legally 
ineffective. 174 The Act further required temporary registration for a period of twelve 
months before final registration. 175 A bank could be finally registered during this period 
Amendment Act 103 of 1979; Financial Institutions Amendment Act 99 of 1980; Financial Institutions 
Amendment Act 36 of 1981; Financial Institutions Amendment Act 82 of 1982; Disclosure of Finance 
Charges Act 73 of 1968; Financial Institutions Amendment Act 80 of 1969; Inspection of Financial 
Institutions Act 38 of 1984; Corporation for Public Deposits Act 46 of 1984; Financial Institutions 
Amendment Act 86 of 1984; Financial Institutions Amendment Act 106 of 1985; Building Societies Act 
82 of 1986; Transfer of Powers and Duties of the State President Act 97 of 1986; Financial Institutions 
Amendment Act 6 of 1988; South African Reserve Bank, Banking Institutions, Mutual Building Societies 
and Building Societies Amendment Act 96 of 1988; and Banking Institutions, Mutual Building Societies 
and Building Societies Amendment Act, No. 113 of 1989. 
168 S 1 (1). 
169 The original Act of 1965 did not include this definition. It was inserted by the Financial Institutions 
Amendment Act, No. 106 of 1985. 
170 Ss 4 - 128. 
171 The. Banking Act, No. 38 of 1942 dealt with registration as one of the general provisions in the first 
chapter. 
172 Ss 4 - 8. 
173 Ss 10, 11. 
174 S 9. Such deposits had to be returned. 
175 Ss 4 (4), 8. 
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provided the necessary requirements had been met. 176 While it was temporarily 
registered, a bank could only conduct business on a limited scale.177 
Information regarding majority shareholders and controlling companies had to be listed 
with the Registrar. 17s In this respect a series of prohibitions and restrictions, some of 
which are referred to below, was developed. 
The provisions concerning liquidity and equity capital were also amended. This was 
done because the Act only distinguished between banks and discount houses. 179 The 
rules were aimed at ensuring the solvency of the credit industry. ISO As Willis states 
"[t]hese requirements [were] designed to safeguard the deposits and investments of the 
public, to maintain economic stability and to facilitate the implementation of monetary 
and fiscal policy".ISI Higher requirements regarding the amount of equity capital and 
reserves were accordingly introduced. ls2 The limitations concerning ownership of a 
bank's shares should be viewed against this background. The Act, for the first time, 
dealt with this issue comprehensively in order to prevent an unhealthy concentration of 
power in the financial sector. IS3 Majority ownership of shares by individuals or 
companies was, in principle, prohibited. ls4 Mergers or take-overs of companies by 
institutions required the permission of the Minister of Finance. ls5 This rule was 
considered to be in the best interests of the public. ls6 
176 S 4 (7), (8), (9). 
177 S 4 (5). 
178 Ss 12A - 12B. 
179 See Chapter IV 'Financial Requirements' (ss 14 - 25). 
180 Oelofse, A.N., State Control of Banking Institutions in South Africa, JIBL (1987), 38. 
181 Willis, Nigel, Banking in South African Law (1981), 57. See also Registrar of Banks v Trans Africa 
Credit and Savings Bank 1963 (2) SA 687 (C) 692C and Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the 
Monetary System and Monetary Policy in South Africa (RP 70/1984) par. 17.45 - 17.69. 
182 Ss 14, 15. See also Oelofse, A.N., State Control of Banking Institutions in South Africa, JIBL (1987), 
38 et seq. 
183 Oelofse, A.N., State Control of Banking Institutions in South Africa, JIBL (1987), 42. 
184 Ss 28 - 28D. 
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The Act further provided that South African banks could only conduct business outside 
the borders of the Republic with the consent of the Registrar. 187 Requirements for the 
deposit businessl88 and the limit of permissible turnover, were also stipulated.189 
The Act also placed banks under the obligation to have their balance sheets checked by 
independent auditors. 19o Banks that encountered financial difficulties could be placed 
under administration; the Registrar could replace the directors and appoint an 
administrator. 191 Alternatively, the Registrar had the power to apply for a court order to 
have the bank's affairs wound Up.192 Banks were further prohibited from holding their 
own shares. 193 The Registrar's permission was necessary to change company 
contracts. 194 Banks were required to make provision for delicts by their employees. 195 
The Act also contained sanctionsl96 and empowered the Minister to make regulations. 197 
To summarise, this was the first legislation concerning bank supervision in which the 
Registrar was given a key role to play. He was granted extensive powers to enable him 
to perform his duties as set out in the Act. The financial requirements were expanded 
substantially and for the first time provisions were introduced that were aimed at 
185 Ss 30, 30A. 
186 S 28D (2). This permission could, however, only be granted to a person or company in the country. 
187 Ss 27A, 27E. 
188 S 21. 
189 Ss 21 A, 22. 
190 S 35. The corresponding auditing companies were to be permanently employed by the banks. 
191 S 40. 
192 S 41. 
193 S 27. 
194 S 32. 
195 S 45. 
196 S 49. 
197 S 50. 'Regulations' correspond to the German Verordnungen. 
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curbing the possibility of a small number of individuals or companies monopolising the 
banking industry. 
A crisis which brought 9 South African banks to their knees l98 arose in the 1970s. It 
became apparent that the reasons for these collapses was bad management as well as the 
inadequate security for credits. Although the Registrar was able to prevent a catastrophe 
in South African banking by taking control, these events clearly demonstrated that the 
information required by the supervisory bodies was not comprehensive enough to 
identify this type of crisis timeously. 199 It must be noted, however, that at that time South 
Africa was not a signatory of the Basle Agreement, nor did it sign the Revision in 1983. 
This only occurred in 1985. This led to the founding of the Technical Committee on 
Bank and Building Society Legislation which commenced with its work in July 1987. 
Eventually, in 1990, the labours of the Committee led to new legislation which replaced 
the Banks Act 23 of 1965. 
6 The Period since 1990 (Banks Act, No. 94 00990) 
In 1990 the Banks Act of 1965 was replaced by the new the Banks Act of 1990.200 
This legislation was an attempt to compile a standardised codification for deposit-taking 
institutions, including provisions for their supervision. For this purpose, the earlier 
legislation that distinguished between building societies and banks or banking 
198 The 6 largest of these banks were Spes Bona Bank Ltd, Rand Bank Ltd, Breda Bank Ltd, Rondalia 
Bank Ltd, Concorde Bank Ltd and the UDC Bank Ltd. 
199 Jordaan, Michael, The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions, A Comparative Analysis of 
the United Kingdom, Germany and South Africa, (1997) PhD, Stellenbosch, 156. See also Koseff, S., 
Bank Failure in South Africa, (1984) University of the Witwatersrand 50ff., 123ff. who makes a number 
of suggestions to address this problem. See further Brtimmerhof, W., Finansieringsaktiwiteite van 
Bankinstellings wat nie in hulle Balansstate Verskyn nie: 'n Kritiese Ontleding van Heersende 
Bankpraktyke en Imp/ikasie vir Banktoesigowerhede in die RSA en Enkele Westerse Lande, (1988), PhD, 
Stellenbosch, 422 et seq. 
200 Act 94 of 1990. The name 'Banks Act' is the present name of the Act. When it was first enacted, 
/'lowever, it was known as the Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990. On the reasons for the name 
change see the text at n. 203 infra. The Act was amended several times. See the Deposit-Taking 
Institutions Amendment Act 81 of 1991; Deposit-Taking Institutions Amendment Act 42 of 1992; Safe 
Deposit of Securities Act 85 of 1992; Deposit-Taking Institutions Amendment Act 9 of 1993; Transfer of 
Walvis Bay to Namibia Act 203 of 1993; Proclamation 132 of27 July 1994; Banks Amendment Act 26 
of 1994 and Banks Amendment Act 55 of 1996. 
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institutions was repealed.201 The new legislation was aimed at establishing and 
maintaining financially sound deposit-taking institutions which conduct their business 
in such a way that the investments of depositors were safe and the integrity of the 
banking system as a whole well protected.202 
The act was initially named the Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 9 of 1990. This name, 
which was intended to emphasise the legislature's intentions,203 was, however, not 
generally accepted. The legislature accordingly amended the title to the original 'Banks 
Act' in the Deposit-Taking Institutions Amendment Act 9 of 1993.204 The Banks Act of 
1990, including its amendments until 1997, forms the basis of much of this thesis. It is 
considered in detail and in different contexts below. 
Further legislation of this period that must be noted in conclusion is the Inspection of 
Financial Institutions Act 38 of 1984. This Act deals specifically with the powers of the 
Registrar. 205 
C Summary and Comparison 
A comparison between the historical development of the law of banking supervision in 
South Africa and Germany reveals several differences. The first legislative attempts at 
supervision of the financial sector occurred considerably earlier in Germany. A central 
bank was also established some 45 years earlier in Germany than in South Africa. This 
can probably be ascribed to the fact that a united national state came into being some 39 
years earlier in Germany than in South Africa. Both bank supervision in general and the 
201 I e the Banks Act 23 of 1965 and the Building Societies Act 82 of 1986. 
202 Itzikowitz Angela 'The Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990: Its History and an Overview of 
Its Main Provisions' (1992) 4 SA Merc LJ 175. 
203 See the preamble to the act, and also Itzikowitz Angela 'The Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of 
1990: 1 ts History and an Overview of 1 ts Main Provisions' (1992) 4 SA Merc LJ 170 et seq. 
204 See further Itzikowitz, Angela, Financial Institutions and Exchanges, Paper read at the Annual 
Banking Law Update (ABLU) Conference 1993, Witkoppen. 
205 See s 6 (1) of the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990. 
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establishment of a central bank in particular, are clearly closely related to the 
incorporation of a number of previously separate territories into a unitary state. The 
central banks of the two countries did, however, have much in common. Both had the 
exclusive right to issue bank notes, and both were primarily responsible for 
safeguarding the country's currency. During ·the course of these developments, the 
commercial banks in both countries lost many of their former privileges. The state's 
supervision of the central bank and the activities of the commercial banks was thus 
restricted to the issue of notes. The protection of creditors was not really an issue. 
Nevertheless, although the financial requirements the banks had to meet were aimed at 
ensuring the solvency of every institution, they did offer creditors some protection. 
However, the first attempts to restrict the freedom of entrepreneurs to establish banks, 
which became prevalent in both countries, occurred earlier in South Africa than in 
Germany. Even before the formation of the Union of South Africa, in terms of the Cape 
Banks Act 6 of 1891 permission to conduct business as a bank had to be acquired in the 
Cape and was dependent upon registration, although there were no special prerequisites 
for such registration. In Germany, developments of this nature only set in with the 
preparations for the First World War. However, since these measures were due.to the 
war, they clearly had a different purpose. The German post-war legislation was marked 
by the victor's justice (Siegerjustiz) of the AlJies as revealed in the Treaty of Versailles. 
Its exclusive purpose was to secure the currency and maintain the economic capacity of 
war-tom Germany. The first actual intervention in the freedom of trade in the financial 
services sector in Germany was necessitated by the banking crisis of 1931 which led 
first to the issuing of emergency regulations and then to the enactment of the KWG 
1934. Similar legislative measures are found in the Banking Act 38 of 1942, and, to a 
greater extent, in the Banks Act 23 of 1965. 
In both countries the law of banking supervision consists almost exclusively of statutory 
law. This is self-explanatory in the case of the German legal system, which forms part 
of the civil-law tradition of continental Europe. Although the South African legal 
system is based on Roman-Dutch law; case law holds much importance because of 
British influence during colonial times. Nonetheless, banking supervision is statutorily 
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regulated in a single Act. This does not mean that this part of the law was not influenced 
much by English law. The South African legislation reflects the principle of the English 
system of specialised' banks. The supervision of individual types of banks such as 
savings banks and building societies was initially regulated under separate Acts. 
In Germany there is general legislation regarding competition (the 
Kartellgesetzgebung)?06 This is also the case in South Africa (the Maintenance and 
Promotion of Competition Act 96 of 1979). In South Africa, however, competition in 
the context of banking is also regulated in the Banks Act 94 of 1990.207 
The organisational structure of banking supervision also developed differently in the 
two countries. In Germany it became the responsibility of a separate independent 
authority.208 The Deutsche Bundesbank only played a supportive role. In South Africa, 
however, as is the case in many other countries, banking supervision became the 
responsibility of a particular department or branch of the South African Reserve 
Bank.209 
The developments in the law of banking supervision must also be seen in connection 
with German membership of the European Union, whose various guidelines on co-
ordination have to be incorporated into national law. This development becomes evident 
in the KWG 1995. However, tendencies towards the internationalisation of the 
supervisory function are also evident in South Africa. Since the activities of the South 
African financial industry are becoming increasingly international - especially after the 
country was opened up to the world in the post-apartheid era - these developments are 
urgently necessary. Both countries have acknowledged these developments and thus co-
operate in the framework of the Cooke Committee at the Bank for the International 
Settlements in Basle (B.I.S.). 
206 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, BGBl. 1,235 in der Fassung vom 20. 2. 90. 
207 See ss 36 - 69 of the Banks Act No. 94 of 1990 and chapter 4 below. 
208 The Reichsaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen and the Reichsbankkuratorium, and later the 
Bundesaufs ichtsamt. 
209 Registrar of Banks. 
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Chapter 2 
The Concept, .Objectives and Constitutional Legitimacy of 
Banking Supervision 
A Federal Republic of Germany 
1 Banking Supervision - Definition of the Concept 
The standards which apply to the banking industry form part of Wirtschaftsrecht 
(commercial law). There is no widely-accepted definition of this term in Germany.21O 
The law of banking supervision, however, forms part of a specific subdivision of 
Wirtschaftsrecht, namely Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht (administrative commercial law), 
which aims to set minimum standards for trade and commerce. As such, banking law 
forms part of public law. 
The provisions pertaining to the credit industry and banking law in general form part of 
Handelsrecht (trade law). They facilitate the state's supervision of business. In addition 
they serve to an extent as standards for the state's organisation of business 
administration. This, in tum, enables the state to control the economy, and to promote 
the functioning of the economy in the monetary sector.211 They also provide the 
infrastructure for the supply of money and credit in the monetary sector of the 
economy.212 The Kreditwesengesetz (KWG)213 forms the foundation for the organisation 
of the banking industry.214 
210 The economy can, in general terms, be defined as the sum of institutions and measures designed to 
meet the human needs of goods, services and performances in a planned way (Fikentscher, Wolfgang, 
Wirtschaftsrecht vol. I (1983) 1; Rinck, Gerd / Schwark, Eberhard, Wirtschaftsrecht 6. ed. (1986) 7). 
Wirtschaftsrecht, on the other hand, has been defined in a variety of ways. Some see it as the legal 
provisions which directly affect the economic process as a whole as well as the economic activity of 
individuals (Frotscher, Werner, Wirtschaftverfassungs- und Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht, 2). Others 
define it as the legal norms that regulate the transfer and allocation of economic goods through general 
principles and by way of broad and specific intervention in order to guarantee a balanced self-realisation 
and care of the citizens in the economy in accordance with standards of economic justice and within the 
framework of a fixed economic constitution. (Fikentscher supra). Yet another group regard it as the 
totality of the legal provisions that are aimed at realising the collective economic order. See Rittner, Fritz, 
Wirtschaftsrecht, 2. ed. (1987), 15; Huber, Ernst Rudolf, Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht, vol. I 2. ed. 
(1953), § 1; Badura, Peter, Wirtschaftsverfassung und Wirtschaftsverwaltung (1971), 116 et seq. 
211 Stober, Rolf, Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht (1991), § 51 I. 
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The KWG enables the state to reconcile the legal subject's self-interested participation in 
private business transactions with the legal rules which serve the interests of society at 
large.215 It is thus a necessary regulation of the freedom of profession and of trade. 216 
The state's economic policy and banking supervision should, however, be kept well 
apart. Although both are in a sense concerned with the state's influence on the economy, 
their respective goals are decidedly different. Economic policy is implemented in order 
to change the economy from a current, diagnosed position to one that is specifically 
intended.217 The law of business supervision and especially that of banking supervision, 
on the other hand, is aimed at protecting the economy of the day from dangers and 
abuses, and to enable the free movement of persons within the framework of that 
economic system. Thus, the purpose of the law of banking supervision is to ensure that 
the behaviour of banks is in accordance with the law.218 Supervision must be restricted 
to these objectives and should not endeavour to shape a country's economy. 
Banking supervision should also be distinguished from general state supervision. The 
latter pertains to the relationship between the state and its own administrative bodies. In 
this domain, supervision occurs internally. Here, several different possibilities exist. For 
ex~ple, a superior administrative body may intervene to secure the fulfilment of 
functions when an inferior body does not carry out its obligations. Banking supervision 
is, however, concerned with private participants in the market. As such, banking 
supervision has a regulatory function in the marketplace.219 
213 Unless otherwise stated the abbreviation "KWG" refers to the 1995 version. 
214 BGH WM 1979,482,483. 
215 Schmidt, Reiner, Wirtschaftsaufsicht in: HdWW, vol. 9 (1982),34 et seq. 
216 Art. 14 GG. 
217 Badura, Peter, Besonderes Verwaltungsrecht, 8. ed. (1988), 283 et seq. 
218 Stein, Ekkehard, Die Wirtschaftsaufsicht (1967), 81. 
219 This means that public juristic enterprises are actually subject to double control. First, as 
administrators within the framework of state supervision and secondly, as private participants in the 
market within the framework of economic supervision. For example, building societies, as public 
enterprises, are subject to regulation in terms of administrative law. However, when a building society 
engages in market related activities such as the conclusion of contracts, it is regulated by private law. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
The law of banking supervlSlon must also be viewed in the light of the German 
Constitution (Grundgesetz). Supervision includes the enforcement of legal 
requirements. Therefore state intervention must be in accordance with the due process 
of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) as entrenched in art 20 III GG. This implies that the 
possibilities for intervention must be clearly set out in the laws pertaining to banking 
supervision. It must be possible to safely predict how the law will be applied.220 In the 
context of day-to-day business activities, however, this is problematical, since a quick 
and flexible response is often necessary.221 Lawmakers have attempted to solve this 
problem by using general clauses and vague legal terminology, as the facts of every case 
differ and cannot be foreseen and sufficiently provided for. The application of the 
constitutional provisions have accordingly been somewhat problematical in the context 
of banking supervision.222 
The Bundesverfassungsgerichf23 has had to deal with several of these problems. On the 
one hand, it has addressed the issues of clarity, precision and predictability. On the other 
hand, it has also decided - in favour of the lawmakers - that flexibility was indeed 
possible.224 This decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht leaves it up to the lawmakers 
to determine whether, when using a certain term, it intends the term to describe a range 
of related aspects or whether it refers to a narrowly-defined, specific scenario. The 
utilisation of general clauses and vague terminology can, according to the Court, be 
reconciled with the principle of legality, the trias politica system and the 
Rechtsstaatsprinzip. The Constitution, however, requires that lawmakers do not use 
vague general clauses that leave it up to the executive to determine the limits of the 
individual's freedom. 225 This decision can be justified by the uncertainty and lack of 
220 Schnapp, F.E, in: von MUnch, I: Grundgesetzkommentar, vol.. I 3. ed .. (1985), margo n. 23 on Art. 20 
GG; Herzog, Roman, in: Maunz, DUrig, Grundgesetzkommentar, vol. II, margo n. 57.,62 on Art 20 GG. 
221 See also Ipsen, H.P., Concerning measures in the framework of insurance supervision, DOV (1975), 
805 et seq. 
222 See, for example, § 46 I KWG where the term "danger" (Gefahr) is used and no definition for it is 
provided. The problems predominantly arise from the fact that business supervision, with the help of 
broad enabling provisions, may shape the economy instead of merely regulating it. 
223 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. 
224 BVerfGE 8, 274, 326; 13, 153, 164; 21,73,79; 38, 61, 82. 
225 BVerfGE 8, 274,325. 
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precision pertaining to economic findings. Also, rapid technological changes and the 
dangers that have to be managed concurrently make broad definitions indispensable.226 
2 Objectives of Banking Supervision 
The duties of the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen (the Federal Supervisory 
Authority) are described in § 6 KWG. These duties indirectly reveal the objectives or 
goals of the state's supervision of banking institutions. Subsection I provides that the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt must carry out the supervision of banking institutions 
(Kreditinstitute) in accordance with the stipulations of the KWG. A Kreditinstitut is 
defined in § 1 KWG as an enterprise engaged in banking transactions (Bankgeschdfte)227 
provided that the volume of such transactions requires a commercially organised 
business operation.228 
Except for the Bundesbank which should rather be seen as taking part in supervision 
than being subject to it,229 only those institutions that are subject to some other special 
form of supervision are partially or completely exempt from the application of the 
KWG. These institutions listed in § 2 KWG include the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaujbau 
226 Scholz, Rupert, Wirtschaftsaufsicht und subjektiver Konkurrentenschutz (1971), 19, 38. 
227 The term Bankgeschafte (banking transactions) is comprehensively defined in § 1 I KWG as follows: 
1. the receipt of monies from others as deposits, irrespective of the payment of interest (deposit 
business); 
2. the granting of money loans and acceptance credits (credit business); 
3. the purchase of bills and cheques (discount business); 
4. the purchase and sale of securities for the account of others (securities business); 
5. the custody and administration of securities for the account of others (safe-custody business); 
6. the transactions designated in § 1 of the Law concerning Investment Fund Companies (investment 
fund business); 
7. the incurring of the obligation to acquire claims in respect of loans prior to their maturity; 
8. the assumption of guarantees, warranties and other sureties for the account of others (guarantee 
business); 
9. the effecting of transfers and clearings (giro business). 
The Federal Minister of Finance may, after consultations with the German Federal Bank, by ordinance 
designate further transactions as banking transactions if, in the accept view of the business community, 
this is justified having regard to the supervisory aims of this Law. 
228 "Credit institutions are enterprises engaged in banking transactions, if the volume of such transactions 
requires a commercial organised business operation." 
229 Cj § 7 KWG. 
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(Reconstruction Loan Corporation), insurance enterprises and enterprises engaged m 
pawnbroking.230 
Banking supervision is therefore only concerned with a restricted sphere of the state's 
supervision of the economy.231 The supervision of banking is also restricted to credit 
trade, because in the same way as § 1 KWG positively limits the concept and activities 
of Kreditinstitute, § 3 KWG232 prohibits a number of transactions. § 10 KWG further sets 
stringent requirements for equity capital and § 33 No 3-5 KWG provides for the refusal 
of permission to conduct business. This ensures that only Kreditinstitute perform the 
business of banking. On the other hand, this also determines the framework within 
which the public supervisory activities are performed. Supervision of the credit industry 
is thus restricted to the credit trade and cannot extend its supervision to other branches 
by regulating enterprises that are involved in a variety of activities 
The duties of the Bundesaufsichtsamt are set out in subsection II of § 6 KWG which 
requires of the Bundesaufsichtsamt to take action against abuses in the banking system 
which may either endanger the security of assets entrusted to banks, or adversely affect 
the proper conduct of banking transactions, or have a material detrimental effect on the 
general economy.233 This general provision reflects a three-pronged differentiation in 
the goals and objectives of banking supervision, namely: (i) the securing of a 
fundamental order within the banking industry; (ii) the maintenance of the functional 
230 See § 2 KWG for further exceptions. 
231 Business law contains a number of provisions for other branches of industry which are very si~ilar, 
especially considering their goals. 
232 § 3 KWG: "Prohibited Business. The following types of business are prohibited: 
(1) the conduct of deposit business where the depositors mainly comprise employees of the enterprise 
(employee savings banks) and where no other banking business is conducted which exceeds the 
volume of the said deposit business; 
(2) the acceptance of deposits under terms whereby the majority of depositors obtain a legal claim to 
receive loans out of such deposits or to have property of any kind purchased for them on credit 
(special purpose savings institutions); this does not apply to building savings and loan associations; 
(3) the conduct of credit or deposit business where agreement or business practice render it impossible, or 
particularly difficult, to withdraw in cash the amount of credit or the deposits." 
233The subsection reads as follows: "The Federal Supervisory Authority shall take action against abuse in 
the banking system which may endanger the safety of assets entrusted to credit institutions, adversely 
affect the propper conduct of banking transactions, or have material adverse effect on the general 
economy." 
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capacity of the credit industry; and (iii) the most extensive possible protection of the 
client's assets that are entrusted to banks.234 The legislature has accordingly attempted to 
give effect to the fundamental principle of the freedom oftrade.235 Simultaneously it has 
attempted to retain the power to influence activities in the event of an extraordinary or 
improper state of affairs or a risky situation arising in the banking trade in general or in 
individual institutions. The comprehensive special legal regulation of the banking 
industry is legitimate in the light of these goals. It is especially necessary because the 
banking industry is to a large extent based on trust. Virtually no other business in the 
economic context is similarly placed. Furthermore, crises in the banking industry 
invariably affect other sectors of the economy. A high degree of security is accordingly 
necessary for this part of the economy. A possible loss of trust in just a single bank can 
easily result in the loss of trust in other institutions and, in a worst case scenario, to the 
collapse of the entire system.236 
In terms of § 6 III KWG the Bundesaufsichtsamt exercises the duties placed upon it by 
this and other legislation "solely in the public interest". All the activities of the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt are accordingly aimed at ensuring that the banking industry 
functions smoothly in the public interest. An important implication of this fact is that 
there can be no claim on the basis of breach of official duty against the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt under § 839 BGB. 237 The protective function of the law corresponds 
to the customary understanding of the aim of the state's supervision.238 On the one hand, 
individuals who have a special relationship with certain credit institutions cannot 
demand that the Bundesaufsichtsamt must intervene. On the other hand, clients of a 
234 BGH (1979) NJW, 1354 ("Wetterstein-Urteil"); (1979) NJW, 1879 ("Herstatt-Sparer-Urteil"), 
BVerfGE 14, 197,216; Reasons/or the governmental plan (Regierungsbegriindung), BT-Drs. 311114 19 
and 7/3657 10. 
235 See art 12 s I 1 GG and its historical fore-runner § 1 Gewerbeordnung (GewO), the Industrial Code. 
236 The crisis of the Darmsttidter und Nationalbank in 1931 eventually triggered the bank crisis of that 
year even though the government of the Reich had guaranteed the security of the deposits at that 
institution. The collapse of the Herstatt banking house in 1976 was similar. C.j Chapter 1 page 17. 
237 See art 34 GG. 
238 This almost undisputed interpretation was, ho'wever, rejected by the Bundesgerichtsho/(Federal Court) 
in two decisions since it did not narrow down the purpose of the legislation. (BGHZ 74, 144; 17, 120). 
This subsection was therefore added subsequently as part of the third KWG-Anderungsgesetz vom 20. 
Dezember 1984 (BGBI I 1693). 
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bank who suffer damage as a consequence of a bad decision of the Bundesaufsichtsarnt, 
have no c~aim against it for official liability. 
3 Constitutional Legitimacy of Banking Supervision 
3 1 Introduction 
The extensive regulation in the sphere of banking sometimes appears controversial from 
a constitutional point of view.239 On the whole, however, it conforms with constitutional 
requirements. 240 
32 The Wirtschaftsverfassung (Constitutional Business Law) 
Although the Weimarer Reichsverfassuni41 contained a special section242 concerning 
business (the Wirtschaftsleben), there is no similar section in the current Constitution. 
This has led to doubt as to the role of the Constitution in the context of business law. 
The dispute has become known as the Streit urn die Wirtschaftsverfassung. The law of 
banking supervision is accordingly marred by the lack of specific constitutional 
provisions that justify the supervision of certain sectors of the economy. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has taken the view that the Constitution does not entrench 
f 
any specific economic order. The neutrality of the Constitution simply means that the 
compilers of the Constitution did not really have a specific economic system in mind. 
Government can accordingly implement its economic policy provided the Constitution 
is respected. In other words, different economic policies and different forms of social 
organisation are possible under the Constitution.243 The question is thus not whether 
banking law is reconcilable with the current economic and social policy but rather 
whether its implementation conforms with the constitution.244 
239Moschel, Wernhard, Das Wirtschaftsrecht, 269 et seq. 
240 Jarass, Hans D., Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht (1984), 76 et seq. 
241 The Constitution of the German Reich from 1918. 
242 See art 151-165. 
243This was the import of a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court (B VerjGE 4, 7, 17f.). Cj also the 
later decisions: BVerjGE 30,292,315; 50, 290, 336. 
244 Frotscher, Werner, Wirtschaftsverfassungs- und Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht (1988),21. 
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3 3 Constitutionality in General 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) has had to deal with the 
constitutionality of the banking legislation in general. In a decision reached on 24 July 
1962 it held that the legislation as it was on 10 July 1961 245 was reconcilable with the 
Constitution.246 This case was triggered by the dispute between the Federal States 
(Bundeslander) Nordrhein-Westfalen, Bremen, Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz and the 
Bundestag concerning the competency of the Federal Parliament to appoint an 
independent federal authority (the Bundesaufsichtsamt).247 In these proceedings, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht only determined whether the KWG is a law which must be 
passed by the Bundesrat (Upper House of Parliament) as well as the Bundestag (Lower 
House of Parliament).248 The Bundesrat represents the German Lander in the National 
Parliament. If the consent of the Bundesrat were necessary, the Lander would be able to 
block the KWG and prevent central banking supervision. The argument therefore 
focused on the issue of centralisation of banking supervision and not the need for 
banking supervision. 
3 4 Reconcilability with Specific Constitutional Provisions 
Introduction 
In terms of art 19 III GG credit institutions are capable of having rights. They therefore 
have legal capacity in the sense that the scope of constitutional protection also extends 
to them and their activities.249 
245 BGBI I 881. Cf n. 70. 
246 BVerjGE 14, 197, 198. 
247 Cf Reischauer, FriedrichlKleinhans, Joachim, Kreditwesengesetz (KWG), Kommentar Loseblatt, 
introduction 4 et seq. 
248 See art 87 III I and 84 IGG. See also SVerfQE 14, 197, 210 et seq. 
249 Moschel, Wernhard, Das Wirtschaftsrecht der Banken 119 et seq. The Bundesverfassungsgericht has a 
different view concerning building societies. (SVerfGE 75, 192, 195 et seq.) In this decision the 
constitutional capacity of a Offentlich-rechtliche Sparkasse (public saving bank) was denied. 
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Art 3 GG250 
The importance of banking in the economy justifies its special treatment in law. 
Therefore the supervision of banks by the Bundesaufsichtsamt on the basis of the KWG 
does not violate the principle of equal treatment which is entrenched in the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Germany.251 
Art 12 GG252 
The KWG contains a series of provisions that touch on the scope of protection afforded 
by art 12 I GG. Perhaps most importantly, the requirement of permission limits the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to occupational freedom. Occupational freedom not 
only includes freedom to practise the occupation but also the freedom to choose an 
occupation. The violation occurs whenever access to an occupation is restricted. In 
response the Federal Constitutional Court develop the so-called "stufentheorie" in the 
famous Pharmacy Case. 253 In terms of the stufentheorie the regulating authority of the 
legislature is limited to three types of measures. And since the measures are listed from 
the least to the most interventionist the legislature may only resort to the next "step" 
(Stufen) if the previous measure was unsucessfully tried in order to address the danger 
the law is aimed at. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht has taken the view that the KWG meets the requirements 
developed by the Court (the Stufentheorie). The first level deals with restrictions on the 
250 "Art 3 (Equality before the law): 
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law. 
(2) Men and women shall have equal rights. 
(3) No one may be prejudiced or favoured because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his 
homeland and origin, his faith, or his religion or political options." 
251 Moschel, Wernhard, Das Wirtschaftsrecht der Banken (1972), 273. 
252 "Art 12 
Right to choose trade, occupation or profession 
(I) All Germans shall have the right to choose their trade, occupation, or profession, their place of work 
and their place of training. The practice of trades, occupations, and professions may be regulated by 
or pursuant to a law. 
(2) ... " 
253 C.j the famous "Apothekerurteil" (BVerjGE 7, 377), in which the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
concerned itself with the freedom of settlement of pharmacists and developed the principles which are 
applicable in this context. 
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practice of a profession. Although some justification for the restriction of the freedom of 
practice is required, there is, at this level, significant scope for limiting occupational 
freedom, as long as the freedom to enter the occupation is not restricted. All forms of 
administrative regulations that aim to protect third parties from professional people are 
of course examples of a first level violation of occupational freedom. But, as was stated, 
the legislature has considerable leeway in deciding which measures it will use as long as 
the measure is not obviously unreasonable or does not impose a disproportionate burden 
on the individual. It is clear that the restriction of the freedom of practice in the banking 
profession254 is both meaningful and necessary in order to attain the goals of the KWG 
mentioned above.255 The great importance of banking in the economy makes it evident 
that continuous regulation is necessary. Intervention may for example take the form of 
regulating equity capitaF56 and liquidity. 257 
The second level developed by the Court relates to the subjective conditions in terms of 
which access to a profession is limited. The requirements for the permission to conduct 
business are second level limitations. These are found mainly in the qualitative and 
quantitative prerequisites of permission set out in §§ 32, 33 KWG. These restrictions are 
necessary since certain knowledge is essential for conducting a banking business. If 
such knowledge is absent, the individual's activities may present danger for the 
functioning of the credit industry as a whole. 
The third level is concerned with objective limitations on access to a profession. 
Currently there are no such limitations in the KWG. But earlier there were. For 
example, § 4 I b of the KWG 1939 provided that access to the profession could be 
limited on the basis that there was no public need for further banking businesses. This 
restriction was found to be unconstitutional by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht in 1958. 
The Court held that a limitation of the number of banks is not a suitable way of averting 
254 By §§ 1-3 KWG. 
255 See 40, 41 above. 
256 § 10 KWG. 
257 § 11 KWG. 
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the general and undesirable trends in the economy. Inflation, is for example, caused by 
other factors. 
Banking supervision, the control of interest as well as other forms of regulating the 
competition between banks, should rather have been considered by the legislature. The 
provision was therefore declared invalid and has not been re-enacted. 
Art 14 GG258 
The inroads made by the KWG on art 14 GG (the property clause) are justified. In terms 
of the German Constitution private property imposes duties and should also serve the 
public weal.259 The affected institutions are charged 90% of the total cost of measures 
implemented in terms of the KWG.260 However, the fact that banking supervision is in 
the public interest does not exclude this distribution of costs. It is a common principle 
that institutions whose business operations endanger the public may be required to 
contribute towards costs of this nature. An individual entrepreneur can, to protect 
himself from certain dangers, demand security at his own cost. This principle is just as 
applicable in the context of public supervision. Thus, there is no cause for concern from 
a constitutional point ofview.261 
258 "Art 14 
(Property, Right of inheritance, Expropriation 
(1) Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be determined by 
the laws. 
(2) Property impose duties. Its use should also serve the public weal. 
(3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It may be effected only by or pursuant to a 
law which shall provide for the nature and extent of the compensation. Such compensation shall be 
determined by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interest of those 
affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the 
ordinary courts." 
259Art 14(2) GG. 
26°§51 I. 
261 Schork, Ludwig, Kommentar zum Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen, Commentary, on § 51. 
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Art 2 I GG262 
This article, which is in the nature of a general constitutional right to "freedom of 
action" does not apply in the areas governed by the more specific constitutional rights 
embodied in art 12 and 14 GG. 
B Republic of South Africa 
1 Banking Supervision - Definition of the Concept 
In South Africa banking supervision is almost exclusively regulated by the Banks Act, 
No. 94 of 1990 and it thus forms part of what is known as banking law.263 Banking law 
is often regarded as a subdivision of commerciallaw64 which is generally perceived as 
forming part of private law rather than public law.265 It must be noted, however, that this 
is not true of banking law. Banking law touches many other legal disciplines. The Banks 
Act is clearly concerned with inter alia criminal law/66 company law67 and 
administrative law.268 Unlike the position in Germany there is no strict jurisdictional 
separation between these different areas of law. There is, for example, no special 
administrative court. 269 There is also no comprehensive codification of the principles of 
administrative law or of the procedure to approach the courts in administrative law 
262 "Art 2 
(Rights of liberty 
(I) Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality in so far as he does not 
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code. 
(2) Everyone shall have the right to life and to inviolability of his person. The liberty of the individual 
shall be inviolable. These rights may only be encroached upon pursuant to a law." 
263 Willis, Nigel, Banking in South African Law (l981), 5 et seq., 13. 
264 Hahlo, H.R. / Kahn, E., The South African Legal System and its Background (1968), 126. 
265 Du Plessis, Lourens M. / Du Plessis, A.G., An Introduction To Law {I 995), 223. 
266 For example ss II (2); 17 (6); 22 (3); 40; 91. 
267 For example ss 15 (I), (3); 27; 28; 38 (I), (2); 43. 
268 See this chapter infra especially 50 - 54, 56, 58, 60et seq. 
269 Baxter, Lawrence, Administrative Law (l991), 43 et seq. 
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matters.270 Therefore a clear division between the individual spheres of the law is of 
purely academic interest. 
The responsible authority for banking supervision in South Africa is the South African 
National Reserve Bank as recognised by the new Constitution, the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996.271 Further details concerning this 
institution are to be found in the South African National Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989.272 
This Act stipulates that the Reserve Bank is a legal person.273 It does not specify whether 
it has legal personality in terms of public law or of private law. All the shares of the 
Reserve Bank are privately owned.274 It is also entitled to accept deposits like any other 
commercial bank.275 It may ~rther purchase shares of other companies, even 
commercial banks.276 From this one can conclude that the Reserve Bank is a legal 
person in the private-law sense. 
However, the structure and the duties of the bank are determined by law and are not set 
out in a memorandum and articles of association.277 Furthermore, the Minister of 
Finance may call a meeting of shareholders. The size of the dividends is also regulated 
by law and not by the managing bodies of the institution. The acquisition of shares is in 
certain instances subject to the permission of the Minister of Finance.278 Although the 
Reserve Bank has the right to accept deposits, it is exempt from the provisions of the 
270 Wiechers, Marius, Administrative Law, in: Joubert, W.A., The Law of South Africa (1993), First 
Reissue, Vol. 1, par. 57. 
271 Ss 223 - 225. Its actual time of foundation was in the year 1920. 
272 It was originally founded in terms of s 9 of the Currency and Banking Act, No. 31 of 1920 which was 
later repealed by the South African Reserve Bank Act, No. 29 of 1944, which in tum was repealed by the 
current Act. 
273 S 2 of the South African National Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989. 
274 Du Plessis, Esme, The structure and operation of the Reserve Bank and its relationship to the 
government, MB (1980), 86, 88. See also ss 21-23 of the South African National Reserve Bank Act, No. 
90 of 1989. 
275 S 10 (I) (e) of the South African National Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989. 
276 S 13 (b) of the South African National Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989. The permission of the 
Minister is, however, a prerequisite. 
277 S 10 of the South African National Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989. 
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Banks Act.279 Its main duty is to protect the value of the currency in the interests of 
balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic. Profit-oriented objectives 
must not influence the bank's decisions.28o The possible liquidation of the bank may 
only occur in terms of an ACt.281 These provisions indicate that the Reserve Bank is a 
legal person in the public-law sense. A clear classification of the legal position of this 
institution is thus not possible in this way.282 
In any event, the Reserve Bank is an organ of state283 in terms of the Constitution.284 
Although the Reserve Bank discharges public duties in its supervision of banks, and is 
thus an organ of the executive, it was also established as an institution independent of 
the executive.285 As such, it is not subject to the government's directives. However, 
278 S 13 (b) of the South African National Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989. 
279 S 2(i) of the Banks Act No. 94 of 1990. 
280 S 224 (1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996 and s 3 of the South 
African National Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989. 
281 S 25 of the South African National Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989. 
282 Although it can be said that the South African National Reserve Bank acts with sovereignty in the 
perfonnance of its duties regarding the supervision of banks, this does not necessarily imply that it is a 
juristic person in the public-law sense. The legal structure of this institution contains too many elements 
that are typical of private-law legal personalities. For a contrary view see Oelkers, Felix, The South 
African Reserve Bank under the Interim Constitution, TSAR 1996 (4) 701 et seq. 
283 The tenn organ of state can already be found in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
No. 200 of 1993 (hereafter: the Interim Constitution). Here the tenn encompassed every statutory body or 
functionary. See Du Plessis, Esme, The structure and operation of the Reserve Bank and its relationship 
to the government, MB (1980), 86, 88; Basson, Dion, South Africa's Interim Constitution - Text and 
Notes (1995), 299f. Basson defines the tenn very broadly to include every statutory body or functionary. 
284 S 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. 
285 S 224 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. See also: Malan, 
FR.; Banks, The Reserve Bank and the Bills of Exchange Act, No. 34 of 1964, TSAR 1993 (4), 755, 759; 
Big Dutchman v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1993 2 SA 426 (N); Du Plessis, LM. / Corder, H., 
Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994), 11 Of. In this context it should be said 
that the Interim Constitution contained a provision defining the tenn "organ of state" in s 233. The 
authors distinguish between three different types statutory bodies: those that are organs of the 
government, those that are established on the basis of an Act but which are mainly treated as or run by a 
natural person from a private law perspective, and those that have private law status but were not 
established because of an Act although they perfonn certain duties under state control. The South African 
National Reserve Bank does not fall under any .one of these categories. As a result, banking supervision 
could not be judged in tenns of constitutional principles. However, the authors specified at this point that 
the categorizatiQn .only deals with examples that deviate from the function .of the statutQry body. The 
SQuth African NatiQnal Reserve Bank undoubtedly perfQnns state duties. These nQt .only comprise 
banking supervision but also the issuing of bank notes, the securing of the currency's stability and mQre. 
That is why this institution eQuId be regarded as a statutory body under the Interim ConstitutiQn The tenn 
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being an organ of state it undoubtedly forms part of the state, which in terms of the 
Constitution286 means that it must perform its duties in accordance with the principles of 
the Constitution. The' supervision is performed by the Registrar, a department of the 
Reserve Bank.287 The Registrar must accordingly comply with the Constitution in the 
performance of his duties. 
There is no general codification of commercial law in South Africa. The individual 
branches of the economy are regulated separately. Nonetheless, the Banks Act can be 
described as a basic code in terms of which the banking industry is ordered and 
structured. This Act attempts to reconcile the constitutional rights of freedom of trade 
and occupation288 with the interests of public welfare.289 
Furthermore, the Act does not include any prOVlSlons which define economIC and 
political goals. The limitations of chapters IV290 and V291 of the Act are to be understood 
in this context, since they have the sole purpose of preventing an unhealthy 
concentration of power in banking. 292 
organ of state, as defined in s 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 
1996, has very much the same meaning, although the term is defined more specifically as follows: "(a) 
any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; or (b) 
any other functionary or institution - (i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function 
in terms of any legislation, but does not include a court or judicial officer". 
286 S 8. 
287 S 4. 
288 S 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. 
289 Pimstone, Gideon, Trading in principles - The economic activity clause of the Interim Constitution, 
(1995) (2) SAPL, 356 et seq. 
290 Chapter IV "Shareholding in, and Registration of Controlling Companies in Respect of, Banks". 
291 Chapter V "Functioning of Banks and Controlling Companies with Reference to Companies Act". 
292 Itzikowitz, Angela, The Deposit-taking Institutions Act. 94 of 1990: Its History and an Overview of its 
Main Provisions, (1992) 4 SA MercU, 170, 180 et seq. 
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Supervision as understood in the Banks Act must also not be confused with the state's 
general supervision over its own internal administration.293 The Registrar's supervision 
of banks does, however, pertain.to the private-law sphere of finance. 
As mentioned above, the Registrar/94 as an organ of state, performs public duties. This 
means that all measures implemented by him are subject to section 1 (c) of the 
Constitution in terms of which the supremacy of the Constitution as well as the principle 
of the rule of law must be taken into consideration. These provisions are further 
strengthened by section 2 of the Constitution which provides that every action in 
violation ofthe Constitution - specifically an action that violates a fundamental right - is 
invalid. This principle is to be taken into consideration whenever Government exercises 
power. Thus, it follows that measures which are based on the Banks Act must not 
contradict these principles. The Act contains many provisions that equip the Registrar 
and the Minister of Finance295 with wide discretionary powers.296 The question is to what 
extent such provisions are reconcilable with the Constitution. The exercise of wide 
discretionary powers may be inconsistent with the principles of a constitutional state.297 
The problem of undetermined legal concepts or general clauses has been raised in the 
context of the doctrine of separation of powers in South Africa.298 The doctrine299 was 
293 Wiechers, Marinus, Administrative Law, in Joubert, W A., The Law oj South Africa (1993), First 
Reissue Vol. 1, par. 85. 
294 As part of the South African National Reserve Bank. 
295 See s 1 "Definitions". 
296 See inter alia ss 12(3); 14(1); 16(3); 17(1),(2); 18A(3). 
297 The principle of legality fonns part of the notion of the constitutional state. This means that 
administrative action must have a legal basis. If not, the administrative act will be unlawful. 
298 Separation oj powers has several meanings. A summary of these can be found in Marshall, H.H., 
Constitutional Theory (1971), 100. In Gennany, the administration may only exercise a discretion in 
accordance with criteria set out in the enabling statute. In South Africa, it is possible to delegate the 
authority to the administation not only to exercise the discretion, but also to detennine the criteria and the 
consequences of its decisions. See also Baxter, Lawrence, Administrative Law (1991), 31 f.; Mathews, 
Antony S., The Darker Reaches oj Government (1971), 178; Kelson, H., General Theory oj Law and 
State (1961),269; Devenish, G.E., Interpretation oJStatutes (1992), 10. See further S v Vermaas, S v Du 
Plessis 1995 (3) SA 292 (CC), 1995 (7) BCLR 851 (CC); Collins v Minister oJInterior 1957 (1) SA 552 
(A); S v Fazzie 1964 (4) SA 673 (A); Bernstein v Bester NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC), 1996 (4) BCLR 
449 (CC); More v Minister oj Co-operation and Development 1986 (1) SA 102 (A); Du Plessis v De 
Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC), 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC); Gardiner v Whitaker 1996 (6) BCLR 755 (CC); 
Key v Attorney General 1996 (6) BCLR 788 (CC); Teo Soh Lung v Minister Jor Home Affairs (1990) 
LCR (Const) 490; Cabinet oj the Transitional Government Jor the Territory oj South West Africa vEins 
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considered by the Constitutional Court in the case of Executive Council, Western Cape 
Legislature & others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others.30o The 
Constitutional Court decided that such general and enabling provisions were in principle 
not inconsistent with the Interim Constitution.301 The decision concerned a dispute 
between the Executive Council of the Western Cape Government and the Central 
Government, represented by the President of the Republic of South Africa. The question 
was to what extent it was permissible to transfer legislative powers to organs of the 
executive. The court held that in principle Parliament was entitled to delegate power to 
the executive to make laws.302 
The power is restricted in that Parliament may not authorise organs of the executive to 
amend or abrogate national legislation. In particular Parliament cannot authorise the 
executive to amend or abrogate the legislation in terms of which the executive's power 
to make law is conferred. Such authorisation would clearly violate the manner and form 
provisions of the Interim Constitution303 and would thus be unconstitutional. 304 
The Constitutional Court confirmed this approach in another case, Ynuico Limited v 
Minister of Trade· and Industry & others,305 in which it emphasised the necessity of 
broadly framed statutory provisions. According to the Court, many statutes prior to the 
Interim Constitution had allowed an extensive transfer of legislative authority. Such 
laws could not be tested against the doctrine of separation of powers, since this would 
mean that most of them would be unconstitutional. The court further pointed out that 
1988 (3) SA 369 (A); Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (2) BCLR 232 (W); Ynuico Limited v 
Minister of Trade and Industry 1996 (6) BCLR 798 (cq. 
299 See also in general Baxter, Lawrence, Administrative Law, 353-364. 
300 Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 22. 
September 1995,1995 (4) SA 877 (cq, 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC). 
301 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 200 of 1993. 
302 In this context, the court referred specifically to the historical development (I 292F). 
303 See ss 59, 60 and 61. 
304 South African law allows the legislature to transfer extensive powers to the executive. This can be 
explained by the absence of a clear distinction between the legislative and executive bodies. 
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this result would make nonsense of section 229 of the Interim Constitution, which 
contained an express provision in terms of which all laws remained valid.306 In terms of 
section 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, legislation was to be interpreted to 
include subordinate legislation passed in terms of an empowering Act. The New 
Constitution contains a similar provision.307 
It would accordingly appear that wide and discretionary powers are in principle valid in 
South African law. The framework within which organs of the executive must stay in 
the execution of such empowerment is virtually unrestricted. It is suggested, however, 
that the constitutionality of such provisions is suspect. This is because the provisions308 
are not clear and precise enough to facilitate their consistent application. They may lead 
to arbitrary decisions being taken. This may well violate the general principles of a 
constitutional state. It remains to be seen whether the Constitutional Court will in future 
depart from the stance taken in the decisions discussed above. 
2 Objectives of Banking Supervision 
The regulation of the financial sector can be justified on the basis that it is aims at 
creating a stable financial system which, in tum, is a prerequisite for economic growth. 
In South Africa the financial sector is a highly sensitive branch of industry. Should it be 
adversely affected, this would, as elsewhere in the world, have far-reaching 
consequences for many other branches of industry. Thus, the legitimacy of, and the need 
for banking supervision is not questioned. It has been left to the lawmakers to enact 
certain laws where they see a need for this. It is, however, not clear where the line is to 
305 Ynuico Limited v Minister of Trade and Industry, 21 May 1996, 1996 (6) BCLR 798 (CC), 799 (H). 
See also n. 304. There is actually no real distinction between legislature and executive in this sense. 
306 S 229 of the Interim Constitution: "all laws which immediately before the commencement of this 
Constitution were in force ... shall continue in force ... subject to any repeal or amendment of such laws 
by a competent authority". 
307 See s 242 read with Schedule 6 s 2. 
308 Such as s 13 (2) (a) of the Banks Act in terms of which the Registrar is authorized to refuse an 
application concerning the establishment of a bank if he is of the opinion that it would not be in the 
public interest. The question is how an applicant can predict his chances of success in advance if the 
decision regarding public interest is left entirely to the Registrar. 
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be drawn.309 South African courts cari accordingly expect a number of legal problems in· 
this regard. 
The central provision relating to banking supervision is section 6 of the Banks Act. This 
provision sets out the authority of the Registrar to fulfil the duties assigned to him by 
the Act. The objectives of supervision must therefore be ascertained from the Act as a 
whole. South African banking supervision aims to protect depositors from losses 
incurred by the collapse of banks, and to offer general protection by ensuring a 
functioning banking system with integrity. The prevention of the abuse of the power of 
banks is also an objective, as well as the prevention of too great a concentration of 
power. These last objectives are also aimed at maintaining healthy competition amongst 
banks. 
In terms of section 88 of the Act, the Registrar performs his duty of supervision in the 
public interest only. This should prevent creditors who have suffered losses as a 
consequence of faulty supervision from instituting an action for damages. 
3 Constitutional Legitimacy of Banking Supervision 
3 I Introduction 
In South Africa banking supervision is a public function. In terms of the Constitution 
South Africa is a constitutional state.3lO From this it follows that no legislation or 
administrative action (in the widest sense) may be in conflict with the Constitution. 
3 2 Constitutional Law in the Economy 
The Constitution does not contain any indications as to a specific type of economic 
system that should be promoted. The comprehensive Bill of Rights311 rather provides a 
309Conceming the control of the executive in general, see Asmal, Kader, Administrative justice and 
democracy within the South Africa context, 12 et seq.; Davis, D.M., Administrative justice in a 
democratic South Africa; and Meer, Yasmin Shehnaz, Legislative Controls of the Executive, 83 et seq. 
(all of them in Corder, Hugh / McLennan, Fiona, Controlling public power - Administrative justice 
trough the law (1995)). 
310 Ss 1 (c), 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. 
311 Ss 7 - 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. J08 of 1996. 
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framework which guarantees the freedom of the individual as far as possible. It may be 
argued that the promotion of a certain economic structure would be in contradiction 
with this freedom. However, this is not so. Fundamental rights such as the right to 
equality,312 the freedom of the person,313 or also the freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession,314 do not demand neutrality concerning economic policy from the state. The 
government of the day may adopt the economic policy of its fancy. It could be a free 
market economy or a planned economy. This is possible as long as the fundamental 
rights are not infringed. It would appear that the German Streit urn die 
Wirtschaftsverfassung31S has not really emerged in South Africa. Although certain 
provisions such as section 22316 guarantee freedom of contracting on a micro-economic 
level, they do not prescribe a specific economic system.3J7 
3 3 Constitutionality in General 
Before the South African Constitution came into operation, the Banks Act was 
comprehensively amended by the Banks Amendment Act 26 of 1994. Under Section 
44(1) of the Constitution, read with Schedule 4 Part A ("Consumer Protection and 
Trade") the Parliament of the Republic has the authority to make legislation of this kind. 
The legislative authority of Parliament is comprehensive. Legislation pertaining to 
almost any matter is possible.318 In this respect, the legislative authority of the individual 
provinces is restricted and reduced to a minimum.3J9 
312 S 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No.1 08 of 1996. 
313 S 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. 
314 S 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. 
315 See 43 above. 
316 Freedom of trade, occupation and profession. 
317 Davis, Dennis, Economic Activity, in Chaska1son, Matthew; Kentridge, Janet, Klaaren, Jonathan, 
Marcus, Gilbert; Spitz, Derek; Woolman, Stuart Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996), 29-4f. 
318 C.j s 45 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. 
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34 Reconciliation with Individual Provisions of the New Constitution320 
Introduction 
In South Africa, banking institutions are all established as legal persons in accordance 
with the Companies Act, No. 61 of 1973.321 In terms of section 8(4) of the Constitution 
they are accordingly "entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by 
the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person". 
Section 9 of the Constitution 
Section 9 of the Constitutin is concerned with equality before the law. It is possible 
under the Constitution to differentiate between groups and individuals in accordance 
with their needs and interests.322 It is submitted that the important role of banking in the 
economy justifies the special treatment of banks in South Africa, and does not violate 
the principle of equal treatment. 
Section 2 of the Banks Act may, however, be problematical since it excludes certain 
institutions from the provisions of the Act. As explained above, the Reserve Bank also 
acts as a "normal" bank in the financial sector. This poses the question why, when it acts 
in this capacity, it is not subject to supervision. However, if it were to be subjected to 
supervision this would lead to the problem that supervision would have to be excluded 
from the scope of its duties in order to prevent a conflict of interests. 
319 The tendency towards a centralization of power of institutions in the Republic has mainly political 
reasons. Too much decentralization could jeopardize the cohesion of the Republic as a whole since there 
have recently been efforts to separate in different parts of the country. 
320 I have had to refer almost exclusively to commentary relating to the Interim Constitution. However, it 
largely corresponds with the subsequent final Constitution. A comparison of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights of the two constitutions can be found in Heaton, Jacqueline, A comparison of the Bills of Rights in 
the Interim and Final Constitution, (1997) De Rebus, 331 et seq. 
321 See s 13 (2) (c) of the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990. 
322 Kentridge, Janet, Equality in Chaskalson, Matthew; Kentridge, Janet, Klaaren, Jonathan, Marcus, 
Gilbert; Spitz, ~erek; Woolman, Stuart Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996), Chapter 14 - 5 et seq. 
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Section 18 of the Constitution 
Section 18 of the Constitution safeguards the freedom of association. This basic right 
does not concern only . freedom of political association but also other domains of law. 323 
The provisions of the Banks Act concerning participation and the limitation of the right 
to vote with such participation324 may be controversial in this context. It is submitted, 
however, that these provisions are not unconstitutional as they are not aimed at 
restricting freedom of association but rather at preventing a dangerous uncontrollable 
concentration of power in the banking industry. The public interest in preventing such 
concentration of power must be regarded as taking precedence over an unfettered 
freedom of association. 
Section 22 of the Constitution 
In terms of section 22 every person has the right to choose an occupation or profession 
freely. However, the section also recognises that an occupation or profession may be 
regulated by law. The permission to conduct business as a bank requires prior 
registration.325 As such this requirement impacts upon the freedom of occupation. The 
requirement of registration, however, is necessary due to the importance of the banking 
industry and in order to realise the objectives of the Banks Act. It is precisely 
considerations such as these that underlie the recognition in section 22 that a particular 
occupation or trade may be regulated by law.326 This provision has not been 
authoritatively interpreted as yet. The principles underlying section 26 of the Interim 
Constitution are the only point of reference. 
The entrenchment of this provision in the constitution was very controversial.327 In the 
light of the transition to a democratic, constitutional state in which all population groups 
323 Basson, Dion, South Africa's Interim Constitution - Text and Notes (1995), 30. 
324 See Chapter IV and V. 
325 S II (1) of the Banks Act, No. 94 of J 990. For a discussion of the South African right to freedom of 
economic activity see in general S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (Ce). 
326 This must also be seen in the historical context (Le. the unequal treatment of larger parts of the 
population during colonial and apartheid times). See Pimstone, Gideon, Trading in principle - the 
economic activity clause of the Interim Constitution, 1995 (2) SAPL, S. 356, 359f. See also Du Plessis, 
Lourens M. / Corder, Hugh, Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994), 55, 179f. 
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were equally represented and empowered, certain political parties or movements328 
feared that a provision of this nature would result in the rich getting richer and the poor 
poorer. On the other hand, especially considering the stark poverty of large parts of the 
population, the constitutional entrenchment of the provision was seen to have many 
advantages. It was not only hoped to promote e'conomic development but also to protect 
the economically weak. It could, for example, protect the street vendor from 
disproportionate restrictions and thus guarantee the basis of his existence. These 
considerations eventually silenced those opposed to the provision.329 
The freedom of occupation may only be limited on the basis of section 36 of the 
Constitution, that is "only in terms oflaw of general application", and "to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society". These 
constitutional principles determine the boundaries of any limitation. It is submitted that 
the provisions of the Banks Act which specifically regulate the admission to the banking 
business, stay within these limits. The restrictions concerning the admission to banking 
business on the one hand and the protection of the financial sector on the other must be 
balanced in terms of the relevant constitutional principles. The individual is not refused 
admission as such. Admission is merely tied to certain material and personal 
requirements. The individual's interest of unhindered admission, free from any 
conditions, must be regarded as less important than the interests of the general public to 
have a properly functioning banking industry 
Section 25 of the Constitution 
Section 25 of the Constitution protects property. The term property in South African 
law refers to movable as well as immovable property. Property may be expropriated 
"only in terms of law of general application" .330 The section does not specifically make 
327 Du Plessis, Lourens M. / Corder, Hugh, Understanding South Africa's transitional Bill of Rights 
(1994),179. 
328 Specifically the ANC and the PAC. 
329 S 26 (2) of the Interim Constitution was also seen as a compromise of these conflicting interests. This 
section regulated the possibilities of limiting this fundamental right and is thus complementary to s 33 of 
this constitution. Others considered the section to be superfluous since, according to them, the 
Constitution contained sufficient other provisions which would have permitted a limitation of this 
fundamental right. See Basson, Dion, South Africa's Interim Constitution - Text and Notes (1995), 40. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
60 
provision for the principle encountered in German law that private property imposes 
duties and should also therefore serve the common weal. This principle can nevertheless 
be derived from the principles underlying the constitution as a whole.331 
The relevant aspect of bank supervision in this' context is the power of the Registrar to 
recover costS.332 This, it is submitted, is not unconstitutional. The power is limited in that 
it is activated by the business activities of a bank. The principle of causation333 is also of 
some importance here, in the sense that costs may only be recovered from those affected 
by supervision. This ensures that the constitutionality of these provisions is beyond 
doubt. 
Section 33 o/the Constitution 
Section 33 ensures just administrative action and is therefore probably the most 
important right in this context. This right is recognised as fundamental by the 
Constitution. The Banks Act contains several provisions which leave decisions entirely 
to the discretion of the Registrar.334 Any of these decisions can potentially be attacked 
as being unconstitutional on the basis of section 33. This fundamental right influences 
almost every administrative action. 
The right to just administrative action was traditionally determined incrementally in 
judge-made law. Applicants relied on the fundamental rights to freedom, property, 
equality or other elementary fundamental rights.335 This provision in the New 
Constitution expanded these common-law principles.336 Administrative action must 
affect either a rig~t or a legitimate interest of the person' concerned. Personal 
330 A 25(2) of the Constitution. 
331 Du Plessis, Lourens M. / Corder, Hugh, Understanding South Africa's transitional Bill of Rights 
(\ 994), 182. 
J32 S90(\). 
333 In German: Verursacherprinzip. 
334 e.g. ss 13 (2) (a); 14 (\); 17 (2). 
335 See Administrator, Transvaal & Others v Traub & Others 1989 (4) SA 731 (A), 755 (C). 
336 Basson, Dion, South Africa's Interim Constitution - Text and Notes (\ 995), S. 34. 
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involvement is an essential prerequisite to confer standing on an applicant in a claim of 
this nature. There is no general enforceable public right to just administrative action. 337 
Thus, every measure, whether it concerns intervention, performance or fiscal 
administrative action, must be in conformance with the requirements of section 33. The 
Registrar must also be guided by the section. This means that his decisions must be 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. In the case of rights that have been adversely 
affected, he must give written reasons for his decision. Certain provisions of the Banks 
Act which grant the Registrar a very wide authority or discretion may well be in conflict 
with the Constitution. Clearly the Registrar must exercise his discretion with great care. 
The reasons for his decision must also be clear and understandable. 338 
C Summary and Comparison 
The systematic classification of the law of banking supervision is very different in the 
two countries. In Germany the law of banking supervision has a clear place. It IS 
regarded as part of Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht (business administration law), a 
specific branch of administrative law. As such it is clearly part of public law.339 In South 
Africa the law regarding banking supervision is less clearly placed. It is simply regarded 
as part of banking law which is linked to both private and public law. Essentially, 
however, the questions that come to the fore in the context of banking supervision are 
mostly questions of administrative law. 
The basic conception which underlies banking supervlSlon in the two countries is, 
however, very similar. A certain branch of industry is controlled by a central, national 
institution. The Federal Republic of Germany makes use of a special authority,340 the 
337 Basson, Dion, South Africa's Interim Constitution - Text and Notes (1995), S. 35. 
338 Mureinik, Etienne, Introduction the Interim Bill of Rights, (1994) Part 1 SAJHR, 38 et seq. 
339 See 37 et seq. 
340 See 40, 41 and Chapter 3 Organisation of Banking Supervision, 65 et seq. 
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Bundesauftichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen. This institution has a small structure which 
necessitates close co-operation with other institutions, especially with the central bank, 
the Deutsche Bundesbank. In South Africa, on the other hand, this function is performed 
by a specific department341 of the central bank, the South African Reserve Bank. 
The Bundesauftichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen operates under directives of the 
Finanzminister. It is linked to this Ministry as Bundesoberbehorde.342 In South Africa, 
on the other hand, banking supervision is performed independently by the South African 
Reserve Bank. The Constitution guarantees the independence of this institution so that it 
may also perform its duties and functions independently.343 
Both institutions have far-reaching powers to enable them to perform their duties and 
functions of banking supervision properly. Supervision does not only include the 
continuous surveillance of the business policies of existing financial institutions but also 
involves measures aimed at institutions that have not yet commenced business. 
Every measure implemented by both the institutions may be tested against principles 
entrenched by the respective constitutions. The principle of a constitutional state, which 
is entrenched as a basic principle in both countries' constitutions, plays an important 
role. 344 
A further similarity is that in both legal systems, the legislation confers general 
authorisations which enable the supervising institutions to react to circumstances that 
are not precisely defined in the legislation. The form of empowerment is decidedly 
different in the two countries. However, in both countries this empowerment has been 
held to be constitutional. In this respect the South African Constitutional Court goes 
341 See 50, 51 and Chapter 3 Organisation of Banking Supervision, 76. 
342 See Chapter 3 Organisation of Banking Supervision, 65. 
J43 See 50 et seq., n. 285. 
344 See especially ss 1 (1) (c), 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996 
.and art 19 IV GG. 
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further than its German counterpart.345 The essential difference is that whilst the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht sets clear limits concerning the scope of the discretion, the 
South African Constitutional Court has accepted that Parliament has the right to confer 
wide ranging powers and discretions.346 
The objectives of banking supervision are very much the same in the two countries. 
This flows from the central role of financial institutions in the economies of both 
countries. The creation of a basic structure in this branch of industry, the maintenance of 
the functioning of the financial sector and the protection of creditors are the primary 
objectives of both the Kreditwesengesetz and the Banks Act. The Banks Act, however, 
also attempts to prevent an unhealthy concentration of power in the financial sector and 
contains several provisions relating to competition, a matter regulated by separate 
legislation (Kartellgesetz und Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) in Germany.347 
In Germany the Bundesaufsichtsamt exercises its supervisory duties in the public 
interest only. This implies that it cannot be liable for damages.348 The Banks Act349 
contains a similar provision. Presumably claims of this nature kind are therefore also not 
possible in South Africa. 
There are noteworthy similarities in the constitutions of the two countries. Neither 
constitution contains any provisions which obliges the state to promote a certain 
economic system. There is no specific Wirtschaftsverfassung in either country. The 
constitutions of both countries contain comprehensive measures designed to protect the 
freedom of the individual as well as his or her personal development.350 
345 C.j pages 52 et seq. and n. 298. 299. 
346 See the decisions in n. 224, 298, 300 and 305. 
347 C.j 40 et seq., 54 et seq. 
348 § 6 III KWG. 
349 S 88. 
350 See 43,44 and 56 et seq. 
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The principal instruments of banking supervIsIOn were also passed by national 
legislative authorities in both countries.351 In both countries, banking supervision is a 
matter of national importance. It is therefore performed centrally. Neither country has 
delegated this authority to the individual provincial (in the case of South Africa) or state 
(in the case of Germany) institutions.352 
Finally, it must be noted that the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Banks Act 
may be suspect in the light of the catalogue of fundamental rights in the new 
constitution.353 Time will tell to what extent the Constitutional Court will follow its 
earlier decisions in these questions. 
351 Art 87 III GG and s 44 (I) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act. 108 of 1996. 
352 For example in the USA, a different provision exists because of the marked federal character of the 
constitution and the Americans' fundamental mistrust of centralization. There, individual Federal States 
have their own empowerments to supervise and extensive use is made of these. 
353 See for example s 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act. 108 of 1996. 
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Chapter 3 
The Organisation of Banking Supervision 
A Federal Republic of Germany 
1 The Bundesaufsichtsamt 
The organisation of banking supervision in Germany is largely determined by §§ 5 - 9 
of the Kreditwesengezets (KWG). In terms of § 6 I, 5 I 2 KWG, the Bundesaufsichtsamt 
(Federal Supervisory Authority) is charged with the public supervision of banking in 
Germany.354 This office has its headquarters in Berlin.355 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt exists as an organisatorisch selbstandige Bundesoberbehorde 
(organisationally independent356 supenor federal authority)357 for which the 
Bundesjinanzminister is responsible. It is accordingly subject to the instructions of that 
Ministry.3S8 The Bundesjinanzminister is also responsible for the supervision of the 
JS4 Banking supervision was centralised (became the responsibility of the federal parliament) by the KWG 
1961. There was much opposition to this move by the Bundeslander. A Normenkontrollklage (abstract 
review proceeding) which was instituted failed (BVerfGE 14, 197ft). See also text on n.71 and also text 
on page 44. 
JSS The reasons for the decision to open the office in Berlin when the Aufsichtsamt was established in 
1962 were historical. Although the government at first favoured Frankfurt am Main for practical reasons, 
the fmal decision was nevertheless for Berlin. After the restoration of state unity, the Aufsichtsamt will be 
moved to Cologne. This move will probably be completed by the year 2000. 
JS6 The essential characteristic of this independence is the power of the head of the Aufsichtsamt (the 
President) to sign in his own name. In terms of German administrative law, an administrative office that 
only signs as "representative" or "under instruction" of a Federal Ministry is not an independent 
Bundesoberbehorde. 
JS7 In those spheres in which the Federal Parliament has legislative status it can establish an independent 
Bundesoberbehorde. This is authorised by art 87 III 1 GG. A BundesoberbehOrde is by legal nature 
organisationally and functionally an independent Federal Authority without an own legal personality (in 
the sense that in an action the defendant is the government and not the Behorde). These authorities are set 
up to fulfil functions that need to be performed throughout the entire Germany, and are therefore central 
authorities. They do not have any subordinate structures. They are also not authorised to employ 
Landesbehorden (authorities of federal states) in order to fulfil their duties. Assistance of a purely official 
nature is possible (BVerfGE, 14, 197,211; 35, 141, 145.). The advantage of establishing this type of 
authority lies in its relatively easy administration. A Bundesoberbehorde is a central administrative 
authority immediately subordinate to a Ministry-(the highest Federal Authority). Its field of responsibility 
extends acroSs the entire area of the federal parliament. C.j Maunz, Theodor / DUrig, GUnter Grundgesetz 
- Kommentar, on art 87, margo n. 166 et seq. 
JS8 Originally, the Bundeswirtschaftsminister was also responsible for banking supervision. However, 
with the move of the social-liberal coalition into the Office of Federal Chancellor in 1972, essential parts 
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Bundesaufsichtsamt filr das Kreditwesen and is entitled to issue general or specific 
regulations in this regard.359 
The President of the Bundesaufsichtsamt who heads the office, is appointed in terms of 
§ 5 II of the KWG by the Bundesprasident (State President) acting on the 
recommendation of the Federal Government. In terms of the KWG360 the Federal 
Government must consult with the Bundesbank before making its recommendation. 
This provision is aimed at promoting trust and co-operation between the Bundesbank 
and the Bundesaufsichtsamt. Such trust and co-operation is desirable due to the fact that 
these two bodies must work closely together. The consultation with the Bundesbank 
also ensures that the President of the Bundesaufsichtsamt has the necessary knowledge 
for the job. This consultation is an absolute prerequisite for appointment; without such 
consultation the appointment cannot be made.361 
The President of the Bundesaufsichtsamt is entitled to attend the proceedings of the 
Zentralbankrat (Central Bank Council) of the Bundesbank to the extent that matters 
within his sphere of competence are discussed. This is an enforceable right, and is not 
dependent upon an invitation from the Bundesbank. In accordance with the general 
principles regarding the co-operation of authorities, the Bundesbank is obliged to inform 
the Bundesaufsichtsamt if anything relating to the functions of the Bundesaufsichtsamt 
are to be discussed. 
The functions of the Bundesaufsichtsamt are set out in § 6 of the KWG. The KWG aims 
at having both a quantitative influence (for example reserve policy) and a qualitative 
influence (for example conditions for admission) influence on credit institutions. This is 
to ensure that the goals of the legislation, namely is to guarantee general order in 
of the division money and credit were assigned to the Bundesjinanzminister. Along with this, the 
responsibilities pertaining to banking supervision were transferred to that Ministry. 
359 Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 5, margo n. 1; 
Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred Kommentar zum Kreditwesengesetz, § 5, margo n. 1. 
360 § 5 II 2. 
361 Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 5, margo n. 9. 
The Law does not make any mention of dismissing the President. Since his appointment represents an 
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banking, to maintain the functioning capacity of banking, and as far as possible to 
protect creditors from losses,362 are attained.363 
As a general rule the Bundesaufsichtsamt performs its functions directly, that is without 
the involvement of regional authorities. In terni.s of § 8 I of the KWG it may, however, 
employ the services of other persons and institutions.364 The Act accordingly reserves 
the most important position in banking supervision for the Bundesaufsichtsamt. 
Although a significant part of the supervisory work is performed by the Bundesban1265 
and other functions are performed by the Federal Ministries of Finance and Justice, as 
well as by the Federal Government, these can be regarded as supplementary to the work 
of the Bundesaufsichtsamt.366 The real responsibility rests with the Bundesaufsichtsamt, 
which alone has the power to pass administrative measures.367 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt is subdivided into five departments. The functions of one are of 
a general nature, and the other four of a supervisory nature. 
• Department I is concerned with fundamental questions of banking supervision, 
international problems of banking, questions pertaining to matters such as the rate of 
interest, the interpretation of the KWG and the preparation of provisions regarding the 
implementation of the KWG, the co-ordination of supervision, general legal questions 
and the issues of cartels, competition, balance sheets and audits. 
administrative act in the sense of § 35 VwVfG, the procedure of dismissing the President is detennined 
by general principles of administrative procedure. 
362 See in this regard the decision reached by the BVerwG on 25 June 1980 - BVerwG 1 C 13/74. In this 
decision it was established that the primary objective of banking supervision was to ensure the orderliness 
of all banking transactions. The protection of creditors is therefore not a direct but an indirect objective. 
If it were a direct objective it would be conceivable for a customer to institute action against the 
Government on the basis that the supervisory measures did not adequately protect deposits. 
363 Reasons for the governmental plan KWG 1961 A II sub 3, III sub 1. 
364 PUttner, GUnter Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht (1988), 213. 
365 See also infra 69. 
366 See infra 72 et seq. and see the following paragraph of this chapter concerning the participation of the 
Gennan Federal Bank, 69 et seq. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
68 
• Department II continuously supervises the private credit banks. This includes the 
evaluation of credit reports, monthly returns, financial statements and audit reports. This 
department supervises the large banks, regional banks, private bankers and the 
Teilzahlungsbanken (finance houses, sales finance companies, and the consumer finance 
companies) . 
•. Department III deals with the supervision of savings banks and Landesbanken368 as 
well as private and public Realkreditinstitute (real estate credit institutions or mortgage 
banks). The building societies which are also subject to the Bundesaufsichtsamt in terms 
of the Bausparkassengesetz169 also fall under this department. 
• Department IV supervises the Kreditgenossenschaften (co-operative banks) as well as 
the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank (clearing institution for all co-operative banks in 
Germany). 
• Department V supervIses Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (capital investment co-
operatives), branches and daughter divisions of foreign credit institutions as well as the 
distribution of foreign investment participation. This department is also responsible for 
winding up institutions in accordance with currency legislation, for exempted 
enterprises and the audit of depots.370 
In terms of § 6 III of the KWG the Bundesaufsichtsamt exercises its duties under this 
legislation "solely in the public interest".371 From this, it follows that no individual may 
demand that the banking supervisors intervene in a particular case.372 
367 Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 6, margo n. I 
368 State banks owned by the Bundeslander. 
369 The legislation dealing with mutual loan association and building societies. 
370 Schork, Ludwig, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen, § 5, margo n. 2; Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl 
Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 5, margo n. 7. 
371 § 6 III KWG: "nur im offentIichen Interesse". 
372 See also Chapter 6 below as well as a decision of the OVG Berlin of7 October 1981 - OVG I 80/80. In 
this case the plaintiff alleged that she had a private-law claim for payment in the amount of 1.654.000 
OM against the (defendant) Bank GmbH. The Bundesaufsichtsamt dismissed an application by the. 
plaintiff to order banking supervisory intervention against the (defendant) bank in September 1976. This 
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2 The Bundesbank (Gennan Federal Bank) 
The Bundesbank is a public-law institution with legal capacity which is seated in 
Frankfurt am Main. Within its area of competence it is independent and does not act on 
instructions of the Federal Government. It is not subject to supervision. 
This privileged position can be justified in light of the duties of the bank. These are set 
out in § 3 of the Bundesbankgesetz. 373 To be able to perfonn its functions and to protect 
it from political intervention the Bundesbank was granted this special, independent 
position in several paragraphs ofthe Bundesbankgesetz.374 
Besides its most important function, namely the safeguarding of the Gennan currency, 
the Bundesbank is also involved in a number of supervisory activities. The Bank's co-
operation with the Bundesaufsichtsamt is derived from § 7 of the KWG. 375 In tenns of 
application to order the bank to pay, made in December 1979, was dismissed by the administrative court 
of Berlin by a decision reached on 27 August 1980. On 3 October 1980, the plaintiff appealed against this 
decision of which she was notified on 24 September 1980. Reasons for the decision: The permissible 
reference was unfounded. The appeal was dismissed because the plaintiff could not demand of the 
defendant to order the ... Bank GmbH to pay 1.654.000,-DM to the executor. The Gesetz iiber das 
Kreditwesen does not provide legal grounds for claims of this nature. The Bundesaufsichtsamt correctly 
pointed out that it is not authorised to interfere with private law disputes between clients of banks and 
credit institutions. See also the court order of the VG Berlin of 19 October 1982 (VG 14 A 149/82); 
decision of the VG Berlin of 4 January 1984 (VG 14 A 388/83); court order of the VG Berlin of21 March 
1985._See further Schork, Ludwig, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen, commentary on § 6 III, remarks No .. 3; 
Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 6, margo n. 13. 
373 "Die Deutsche Bundesbank regelt mit Hilfe der wahrungspolitischen Befugnisse, die ihr nach diesem 
Gesetz zustehen, den Geldumlaufund die Kreditversorgung der Wirtschaft mit dem Ziel, die Wahrung zu 
sichern und sorgt fiir die bankmaj3ige Abwicklung des Zahlungsverkehrs im Inland und mit dem 
Ausland. " 
("With the aid of the fiscal policy authorisations granted to it by this law, the Deutsche Bundesbank 
regulates the flow of money and the supply of the economy with credit with the aim of securing the 
currency and it also sees to the domestic transfer of payments as well as that with foreign countries. ") 
374 See §§ 2, 12 and 13. See also Samm, C.T., Die SteUung der Deutschen Bundesbank im 
Verfassungsgefiige (1967) 54 et seq.; Stem, Klaus, Staatsrecht, vol. 2, 464 et seq.; Gramlich, Ludwig, 
Kommentar zum BBankG, Einleitung (Introduction) § 12. 
375 The English translation reads as follows: "Cooperation with the German Federal Central Bank: 
(l) The Federal Supervisory Authority and the Deutsche Bundesbank shall act in cooperation in 
accordance with this law. The Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Supervisory Authority shall 
exchange observations and findings which may be of importance in the performance of their 
respective functions. To this end the Deutsche Bundesbank shall also make available to the Federal 
Supervisory Authority the data which it collects based on statistical returns received in accordance 
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this paragraph both institutions must. inform each other of any fact that could be of 
importance in the fulfilment of their respective duties.376 This close co-operation is wise 
due to the overlapping of the functions of these two institutions. Measures concerning 
currency policy can affect the position of ba:m:s377 and directives aimed at banking 
supervision can affect currency policy.378 The Bundesaufsichtsamt cannot supervise 
effectively without the co-operation of the Bundesbank.379 
There is accordingly an obligation on the two bodies to work together, to support one 
another and to share information with one another.380 
This duty to inform falls primarily on the Bundesbank as it, with its mne 
Landeszentralbanken and over 200 branches, is in a unique position to discover relevant 
facts.381 The Bundesaufsichtsamt reports to the Bundesbank mainly to assist it in 
performing the functions assigned to it under the KWG. There is accordingly no bank or 
office secrecy in this respect.382 The supervision conducted by the Bundesbank takes the 
form of routine inspections of the reports, monthly returns and balance sheets that have 
to be submitted to it.383 Flowing from its general function as "bank of banks" it 
with § 18 of the Bundesbankgesetz. Before requiring the collection of such statistics it shall consult 
with the Federal Supervisory Authority; § 18, sentence 5 of the Bundesbankgesetz shall apply. 
(2) The president of the Federal Supervisory Authority, or where prevented from attending, his deputy, 
shall be entitled to attend proceedings of the Central Bank Council of the Bundesbank to the extent 
that subjects are discussed within his sphere of competence. He shall have no right to vote, but may 
propose motions." 
376 § 7 I 2 KWG. 
377 For example, an interest rate increase by the Bundesbank indexed by currency policy can lead to a 
change in the level of yield in the case of mid- and long-term credits financed congruently with notice. 
378 An example of this is the restriction of limiting the issuing of credits (amount) by a regulation of the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt in accordance with § 10 KWG. See also n. 383 infra. 
379 BVerfGE 14, 197,211. 
380 Whilst information requested from an authority on the basis of the Ve,:pjlichtung zur Amtshilfe (duty of 
officials to render assistance) in accordance with Art 35 GG, § 4 VwVfG, requires a request from the 
authority seeking assistance, this is not necessary in this case. The co-operation is a duty irrespective of 
whether any request has been received. See Eyermann, Erich / Frohler, Ludwig / Kormann, Joachim, 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, Kommentar, § 14, margo n. 1. 
381 Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 7, margo n. 4. 
382 Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 7, margo n. 5. 
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supervises the inner structure of credit institutions.384 In this respect, the Bundesbank 
functions as a screening mechanism and brings only noteworthy matters to the attention 
of the Bundesaufsichtsamt. 385 
This co-operation IS also necessary to ensure economical administration. The 
Bundesaufsichtsamt does not have its own subordinate structures. It can only achieve 
the required geographical proximity with the aid of the network of branches of the 
Bundesbank. 
Before the Bundesaufsichtsamt can issue general regulations concerning banks that may 
affect the operational sphere of the Bundesbank, it must obtain the permission of the 
Bundes bank. 386 
3 Co-operation with other Agencies 
The possibility of co-operation between the Bundesaufsichtsamt and other agencies is 
expressly included in the provisions of § 8 of the KWG. 387 The idea underlying this 
provision is that the Bundesaufsichtsamt should legally be able to perform its 
comprehensive functions with a relatively small staff.388 The necessity of such co-
operation may arise as a consequence of the fact that the Bundesaufsichtsamt is located 
far from the majority of the banks it has to supervise. This means that it cannot become 
involved on the location in each individual case. In addition expert assistance is also 
required in some instances.389 The Bundesaufsichtsamt can, however, only make use of 
383 C.f §§ l3 (large credits), 14 (credits of one million or more), 24 (obligations to report), 25 (monthly 
returns), 26 (financial statements). 
384 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 6, margo n. 29. 
385 Official explanation BT-Drs 3 / 1111423. 
386 Official explanation BT-Drs 3 / 11114 23. In this context, §§ 10 I 2, 11 2 KWG could be cited as 
examples. 
387 § 8 KWG provides as follows: 
"Cooperation with other Agencies 
(1) In the performance of its functions the Federal Supervisory Authority may employ the services of 
other persons and institutions. 
(2) ... " 
388 Schork, Ludwig, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen, commentary on § 8. 
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such other agencies if the nature of the case does not require it to deal with the matter 
itsele90 
This provision authorises, and does not oblige, the Bundesaufsichtsamt to make use of 
other agencies. However, article 35 of the GG obliges the recipient of a request for 
official assistance from the Bundesaufsichtsamt to comply with the request.391 
According to § 1 IV of the VwVfG, authorities are under obligation to assist those who 
perform functions of official administration. These include the Bundesbank,392 the 
Bundes and Landeswirtschaftsbehorden, the Inland Revenue Office, the Chambers of 
Idustry and Commerce, other public juristic credit institutions, the courts (both the 
Bundes and Landesgerichtshofe), the other Public Supervisory Authorities specified in § 
52 of the KWG, and auditors and auditing companies.393 Excluded under article 35 of the 
GG are offentlich-rechtliche Prufungsverbande von Kreditinstitutionen (registered 
associations having right to audit) as well as the private and co-operative banks.394 
4 Participation of the Federal Government 
In terms of article 80 I of the GG the Federal Government can be statutorily authorised 
to issue Rechtsverordnungen (ordinances). Against this background § 47 of the KWG 
authorises the Government to intervene in the event of the economy being endangered 
by a certain state of affairs in the banking industry.395 Whilst the power of intervention 
of the Bundesaufsichtsamt is concentrated on individual banks,396 this empowerment of 
389 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 8, margo n. 1. 
390 Official explanation BT-Drs. 311114, regarding § 7 30. This is especially true as regards administrative 
acts. Without express legal authorisation, such acts cannot be delegated to other authorities. (BegrReg£ 
KWG 1961 for § 7). In principle the Bundesaufsichtsamt is duty bound to exercise its discretion itself. It 
cannot delegate the authority to formulate and implement banking supervisory measures to other 
authorities. 
391 Art 35 GG, § 4 VwVjG. 
392 Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, Kommentar zum Kreditwesengesetz, § 8, margo n. 3. 
393 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 8, margo n. 1. 
394 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 8, margo n. 12. 
395 Art. 72, 73 No.4 GG, § 47 KWG. 
396 See Stem, Ekkehart, Staatsrecht (1988) 157, Hesse, Konrad Grundzuge des Verfassungsrechts der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, margo n. 206, 525 et seq., 623, 739. 
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the Government is primarily intended to ward off general crises.397 Such measures 
essentially amount to either a moratorium concerning individual banks, or the 
suspension of the entire banking and stock exchange business under § 47 of the KWG. 
The powers to impose a moratorium or to suspend are limited. § 48 II of the KWG 
determines that they are for a maximum period' of three months, after which they expire 
automatically. In terms of § 47 II of the KWG the Government must consult with the 
Bundesbank before introducing such measures. 
5 Participation of the Bundesfinanzminister 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt falls under the Bundesjinanzmin ister. He is entitled to issue 
instructions to it. He also has the authority to issue Rechtsverordnungen aimed at 
regulating banking in general. 398 As permitted under the KWG399 this authority was, 
however, delegated by the Bundesjinanzminister to the Bundesaufsichtsamt by an 
Verordnung of 28 June 1985.400 The Bundesbank must be consulted before such 
Rechtsverordnungen are issued.401 
6 Participation of the Bundesjustizminister 
The participation of the Bundesjustizminister in banking supervision is restricted to a 
much smaller area. He is entitled to issue Verordnungen containing guidelines for the 
structuring of the financial statement forms402 with the permission of the 
Bundesjinanzminister. 403 
397 Official explanation BT-Drs. 311114 for §§ 46,47, page 42 et seq. 
398§§ 1 13, IOIl 1 No.3, lOa III, 24 IV, 25 IV, 29 III, 30 II 1,31 1,51 13 KWG. 
399 Art. 80 I GG, § 1 I 3 KWG. 
400 BGBl. I, 1255. 
401 § 1 I 3, III 2; § lOa III 6; § 25 IV; § 31 I KWG. 
402 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar § 26, margo n. 3 as 
well as § 52a. 
403 §§ 330 HGB, 25a II, 26 IV, 52a KWG. 
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7 Co-operation with Authorities from other States within the European Union 
A common domestic market within a uniform European economic area was supposed to 
be in operation by January 1993. According to the time schedule of the Commission of 
the European Community, this should have been accompanied by a uniform European 
banking market. With the final liberalisation of the national banking markets the full 
freedom of service and of settlement was to become a reality in accordance with article 
52, 59 of the EC-Treaty. A domestic financial market of this kind requires a minimum 
standard of supervisory laws.404 The plans for creating a uniform system of banking 
supervision with a central supervisory authority were unsuccessful. 405 Subsequently 
several European Community guidelines aimed at harmonisation were issued. They 
were designed to equalise, to an extent, the different forms of banking supervision 
within the different individual member states. Guideline No 7717801EWG provides for 
close co-operation between the banking supervisory authorities of the member states.406 
It further prescribes compulsory consultations when a decision taken in one member 
state may prevent a branch in another member country from conducting business.407 
Guideline No 83/350lEWG regulates the transfer of information between the different 
supervisory authorities of the member states. In Germany this led to the addition of 
subsection III to § 8 of the KWG 1984. A further noteworthy addition to the KWG was 
§ 44a which regulates cross-border information and audits.408 
8 Co-operation with Banking Supervisory Authorities of States that are not Members of 
the European Union 
A further attempt of harmonising international banking supervision came into existence 
with the Basle Agreement of 1975 in the 1983 revision. Agreement was reached on 
404 Schulte-Mattler, Hennann, Preisrisiken im Mittelpunkt der Sechsten KWG-Novelle, (1994) WM, 1412, 
and, by the same author, Entwicklungstendenzen in der europiiischen und internationalen 
Bankenaufsicht, ZBB 4/94,333 et seq. . 
405 Hom, Norbert, Bankrecht auf dem Weg nach Europa, (1989) ZBB, 107, 111. 
406A71. 
407 A 8 IV. 
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certain ground rules for the supervision of branches of foreign banks.409 This body can 
only make non-binding recommendations relating to co-operation between the 
supervisory bodies of the signatory states.41O In practice, however, its decisions, like 
those of the Cooke Committee, go further. 411 This is due to the fact that the countries 
that have become party to this agreement have regarded themselves as bound to give 
effect to such decisions by converting them into nationallaw.412 
9 Participation in an EinlagensicherungsfOnds (deposit insurance fund) 
Commercial banks may form a deposit insurance fund with the main purpose of 
protecting depositors. In the event of a call being made on the fund, the bank concerned 
will, as a rule, cease to compete in the banking market. The deposit insurance covers 
unsecured deposits from private persons, businesses and public authorities up to 30% of 
the bank's liable capital per creditor. Liabilities exceeding this amount are insured up to 
the stated level. The fund acquires its resources from annual contributions paid by the 
participating banks. These contributions are calculated with reference to the bank's 
liabilities to its customers.413 
The public sector (communities, associations of communities, districts) is liable as 
guarantor for the liabilities of the public savings banks. The central savings banks or 
central giro institutions have also formed an insurance reserve with the Deutschen 
Sparkassen und Giroverband (German Association of Saving Banks and Giro 
Institutions).414 
408 Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, § 44a. 
409 Published by the Deutsche Bundesbank in Bundesanzeiger of 15th June 1983,5606. 
410 Ibid. 
411 The recommendation of 11 July 1988 relating to the nonns for the supervision of 
Eigenkapitaldeckung (equity capital cover) provides a good example. 
412 Moschel, Wemhard Bankenaufsicht und internationales Geschajt, (1989) ZBB, 168. 
4\3 Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar Einleitung 
(Introduction), 46 et seq. 
414 Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar Einleitung 
(lntroduction),47. 
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The co-operative sector has also founded a reserve fund under the auspices of the 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e. V (German 
Commercial and Agriculture Credit Co-operation e.V.).415 
The Liquiditats-Konsortialbank (Liquidity Syndicate Bank), of which all types of banks 
are members, was founded 1974. The purpose of this institution is to grant liquidity in 
case of need to banks of impeccable credit standing in order to prevent chain reactions 
in the wake of bank failures.416 
B Republic of South Africa 
1 Introduction 
As is the case In Germany, the supervision of the financial sector has a complex 
structure in the Republic of South Africa. No branch within this sector exists in isolation 
from the other. Co-operation between the different institutions is accordingly essential 
for effective supervision.417 The Registrar of Banks, however, bears the brunt of the 
responsibility in this regard. 
2 The Registrar of Banks 
Banking supervision in the Republic of South Africa is organised mainly in section 9 of 
the Banks Act 94 of 1990. This Act provides for the establishment of an office, the 
"Registrar of Banks"418 under the auspices of the South African National Reserve Bank. 
The Registrar's office is responsible for the supervision of banking. Internally, banks 
refer to this office as the "Banking Supervision Department".419 It is situated at the head 
415 Szagunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar Einleitung 
(lnroduction),47. 
416 Panowitz, Rudolf/Jung, Harald, Kreditwesengesetz - Kommentar (1988), S. XXVI. 
417 See Falkena, H B, Financial Regulations in South Africa (1994), 62 concerning the manner in which 
supervision of the financial sector is structured in South Africa. 
418 S 3. (Hereinafter referred as to the Registrar). 
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office of the Reserve Bank in Pretoria. It sees its mission as providing "a regulatory and 
supervisory environment that will facilitate the optimisation of the quality and 
effectiveness of financial risk-management in the system ".420 
The idea underlying the provisions of the Banks Act is that banking supervision must 
ensure that there is proper risk-management of the individual banks within the scope of 
the Act.421 For this purpose every banking institution must submit regular returns to the 
Registrar's office.422 However, certain other role players also make important 
contributions towards the realisation of the goals of the Banks Act.423 These include the 
Board of Directors,424 the Management (of the Bank),425 the Audit Committee of the 
Board of Directors, the (internal and external) Auditors,426 and the Public.427 In addition 
there is also some co-operation with other state institutions.428 
Since the Registrar's office falls under the auspices of the South African Reserve Bank, 
banking supervision is effected by an organ of state. This gives this institution the 
419 Until 1985 the office of the Registrar was subordinate to the Ministry of Finance. In light of many 
changes effected by amendments of the Banks Act, this office was made part of the central bank again. 
420 Jordaan, Michael, The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions, A comparative Analysis of 
the United Kindom, Germany and South Africa, (1997) Dissertation (PhD) Stellenbosch, 158. 
421 South African Reserve Bank Banks Supervision Department Annual Report (1991), 6. 
422 S 75. 
423 South African Reserve Bank Banks Supervision Department Annual Report (1991), 6 et seq.; (1992) 7 
et seq. and (1993) 12 et seq. See also Greuning, J. H.; The Implementation of a Risk-based Approach to 
Bank Supervision as a Micro-Economic Component of Monetary Policy (1993) DCom. Thesis, University 
of Pretoria. 
424 S 60 together with ss 38, 39 of the Regulations to the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990. 
425 The management is the most important organ directing an enterprise of this kind. It is appointed by the 
Board of Directors which also detennine the division of duties. Qualification and reliability of these 
persons are thus irreplaceable prerequisites for effective perfonnance of these functions. See Jordaan, 
Michael, The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions, A comparative Analysis of the United 
Kindom, Germany and South Africa, Dissertation Stellenbosch, 158, especially n. 198. 
426 See Jordaan, Michael, The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions, A comparative 
Analysis of the United Kindom, Germany and South Africa, Dissertation Stellenbosch, 256 et seq. as well 
as South African Reserve Bank Banks Supervision Department Annual Report (1996), 2. 
427 Jordaan, Michael, The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions, A comparative Analysis of 
the United Kingdom, Germany and South Africa, Dissertation Stellenbosch, 159, especially n. 201. 
428 See also infra 80 et seq. 
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qualities of a public authority. 429 It accordingly follows that the implementation of 
measures must be regarded as administrative actions, which means that they have to 
respect certain procedural principles.430 
The Registrar, who manages this office, is appointed by the Governor of the South 
African Reserve Banle The Registrar must be an employee of the Reserve Bank. Before 
he or she may resume office, however, the permission of the Minister of Finance must 
be obtained. The Registrar performs the supervisory functions under the control of the 
Reserve Bank and is accordingly bound to give effect to its instructions. In this manner, 
the Reserve Bank can set guidelines for supervision.431 The Deputy Registrar is also an 
employee of the Reserve Bank. His appointment is also subject to the approval of the 
Minister of Finance.432 The Deputy Registrar is empowered to take over the duties of the 
Registrar should this become necessary. 
The office of the Registrar is subdivided into five departments. The different areas of 
responsibility are subdivided in such a way that one of the departments deals with the 
actual supervision while the other four are more concerned with issues of fundamental 
principles and information. Every department has a head who is directly subordinate to 
the Registrar. 
The department "Supervision of Individual Banks" is responsible for the actual 
supervision of banks. Its functions include: the consolidated supervision of banking 
groups; discussions focusing on strategic issues with various levels of bank 
management; the assessment of risk-management and controls; the promotion of sound 
risk-management practices; the holding of annual trilateral discussions and giving 
presentations to the board of directors; the monitoring of compliance with prudential 
requirements; the analysis of risk-based supervisory information submitted by banks; 
429 See Chapter 2, 50 et seq. supra. 
430 See Chapter 2,51 supra. 
43\ S 4 (l). 
432 S 4 (2). 
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and, finally, the analysis and research of issues of concern and the discussion thereof 
with banks.43J 
The department "Operations, Information System and Research" has the following 
functions: to represent the office in outside committees on emerging issues and new 
developments; the review of regulations and risk-based returns and drafting of proposed 
amendments; correspondence with banks; handling of administrative matters in terms of 
the Act; and the preparation and monitoring of the departmental budget. 434 
The department "Legal and Regulatory Administration" is concerned with the 
following: the drafting of proposed amendments to the Act; the drafting of proposed 
circulars to banks; dealing with all litigation regarding liquidated banks and banks 
placed under curatorship; the handling of new applications for registration as banks and 
branches of foreign banks; contraventions of the Act; and, finally, mergers and 
acquisitions of banks. 435 
The department "Information Systems" collects the necessary relevant information for 
the Registrar. This includes the collection of statutory returns; the capturing of 
information on electronic databases; the preparation of data for review by analysts; the 
processing of data and the production of risk-based reports; the preparation of graphs to 
reflect trends; the maintenance of information on database; and necessary research on 
latest technology to ensure that technology used in the department is at the cutting edge 
of development.436 
Finally, the functions of the department "Management Information Research and 
Policy" are as follows: the analytic review of aggregated information submitted by all 
the institutions making up the banking sector; the compilation of a macro-report on the 
banking sector; the updating and administration of training material and a training 
433 South African Reserve Bank Banks Supervision Department Annual Report (1996), S.54. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Ibid. 
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database; the presentation of lectures for training purposes; research on the latest 
developments in the field of bank supervision; and the development of policy responses 
in respect of emergingissues.437 
The functions fulfilled in terms of the Banks Act are undertaken in the public interest. A 
claim for damages against the South African Reserve Bank or any of its officials on the 
grounds of some action taken by the Registrar is precluded by section 88 of the Banks 
Act. 
3 The South African Reserve Bank 
The constitutional status of the South African Reserve Bank arises from sections 223 -
225 of the Constitution. Section 225 specifically provides that the powers and functions 
of the Reserve Bank must be determined by Act of Parliament. This is done in the South 
African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989. In terms of section 10 (v) of this Act, its 
functions also include any functions assigned to it under the Banks Act 94 of 1990. 
The South African Reserve Bank is the South African central bank. It is an executive 
organ in the context of banking supervision since the office of the Registrar is 
established under its auspices. The fact that the Registrar is an employee of the bank is 
indicative of the close relationship between the two. This also explains why the 
Registrar is bound by directives of the bank. Any concern which the Reserve Bank 
might have regarding banking supervision can be directly addressed by means of such 
directives. The Central Bank can accordingly influence supervision policies directly. Its 
position in the supervision system is therefore very strong. 
The role of the Reserve Bank within the system of supervision accordingly coincides 
largely with that of the Registrar himself 438 '\ 
437 Ibid. 
438 In the South African Reserve Bank Banks Supervision Department Annual Report (1996), 6, the South 
African Reserve Bank relates what it considers its contribution towards banking supervision to be. 
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4 Co-operation with the Minister of Finance 
The role of the Minister of Finance in the context of banking supervision is mainly that 
his consent is necessary for certain actions. In the first place the very appointment of the 
Registrar is dependent upon the consent of the Minister. Secondly, certain measures can 
only be introduced subject to the permission of the Minister, for example the placing of 
a bank under curatorship,439 or the cancellation of its registration.440 In addition, the 
Minister has the authority to make regulations relating to fulfilment of the duties set out 
in the Banks Act. 441 Finally, the Registrar must also submit an annual report of the 
supervision undertaken during the year to the Minister.442 
The close connection to the Ministry of Finance can be ascribed to the very nature of the 
banking supervision. 
The financial services sector is also closely linked with government activities in the 
sense of the government participating in this sector as a private juristic person, in the 
sense that the state also sometimes needs to deposit funds. Wh~n it does so it acts as the 
bearer of state power but as a juristic person in the private law domain. 
The Ministry of Finance is accordingly the natural home for this part of government. 
Due to the close relationship between the Registrar and the Minister, the Registrar needs 
the trust of the Minister. Clearly the policies of the Registrar must conform with the 
approach of the Minister of Finance. 
5 Co-operation with Parliament 
The report submitted by the Registrar to the Minister of Finance must also be passed on 
to Parliament within fourteen days of its submission to the Minister.443 
439 S 69. 
440 S 23 (1). 
441 S 90. 
442S 10(1). 
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6 Co-operation with other Institutions within the State 
Introduction 
In South Africa there are several institutions that supervise certain financial institutions 
or groups. Since banks only constitute part of the financial sector and some overlap of 
activities within this sector is unavoidable, the effective supervision of the entire 
financial sector can only be achieved by close co-operation between these institutions. 
This co-operation mainly takes the form of an exchange of information. The main 
objective is the achievement of a uniform standard of supervision within the financial 
sector. 
The Registrar for Financial Institutions 
In the past, the responsibility for the supervision over the financial services sector was 
assigned to the office of the Registrar of Financial Institutions. This Office was 
established as a department within the Ministry of Finance in 1956. It became evident, 
however, that this authority was not capable of dealing with the wide range of duties 
assigned to it. This was mainly because it was exceptionally difficult to find competent 
employees who were skilled in these areas and to tie them to the office on a long-term 
basis. In the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Winding-up of the Short-term 
Insurance Business of the AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd (1988/44 this problem 
was explicitly raised. The recommendations of the Commission445 led to a 
restructuring.446 The result was the establishment of the Van der Horst Committee. On 
the basis of its final report447 the Financial Services Board was established.448 
443S10(2). 
444 Par. 4.6 " .. .It would appear that the difficulties in the Office of the Registrar were, and are, caused 
mainly by the lack of suitably qualified permanent staff. This is apparent from the various annual reports 
of the Registrar and the evidence before the commission. This shows that apart from the shortage, there 
has been an almost complete change in the staff supervising short-term insurance over the past few years. 
" 
445 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Winding-up of the Short-term Insurance Business of the 
AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd. (1988), Par. 4.6 (e) " ... A commission or working group should be 
appointed to consider the creation of a national·council or board for financial institutions on the lines of 
the National Energy Council. ... " 
446 Jordaan, Michael, The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions, A comparative Analysis of 
the United Kindom, Germany and South Africa, Dissertation Stellenbosch, 161. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
The Financial Services Board 
As noted above449 the Financial Services Board came into existence as a consequence of 
the recommendations of the Vander Horst Committee. It was founded by the Financial 
Services Board Act 140 of 1990. In terms of the Act it has the following functions: (i) to 
supervise the exercise of control, in terms of any law, over the activities of financial 
institutions and financial services; and (ii) to advise the Minister on matters concerning 
financial institutions and financial services both, of its own accord and upon request by 
the Minister.45o 
The Financial Services Board is, inter alia, responsible for the supervision of insurance 
companles. 
The Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation 
This institution was founded on 1 July 1993. In November of the same year, it was re-
structured to form a legal institution when the Policy Board of Financial Services and 
Regulation Act 141 of 1993 came into operation. The Board does not have the authority 
to intervene, in the sense discussed above. However, it carries much responsibility 
concerning the formulation and co-ordination of the policies, which may determine 
further developments of the financial sector. This includes the proposal of legislation in 
this field. Thus, the Board actually functions as a body of experts which may advise the 
Minister.451 
447 Van der Horst Verslag (1989) Verslag van die Komitee oor hul ondersoek na In Nasionale Raad vir 
Toesighouding oor Finansiele Instellings, Johannesburg, September, 8 et seq. 
448 See next point infra. 
449 Page before supra. 
450 Jordaan, Michael, The Regulation of DeposiHaking Financial Institutions, A comparative Analysis of 
the United Kindom, Germany and South Africa, Dissertation Stellenbosch, 162. 
451 Concerning the understanding this institution has of itself, see De Swardt, Adressing the Problems of 
Regulation, Supervision and Restructuring of Regulatory Institutions and Guarding against Systemic 
Risk; Presentation at the 1994 Banking Industry Conference, Sandton, 2-3, February 1994. 
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Co-operation within the Context of the Companies Act 
A bank being by definition a public company/52 there is of necessity an overlap between 
the provisions of the' Banks Act and the Companies Act. This calls for some co-
operation. A good example is within the field of compromises, amalgamations, 
arrangements and affected transactions. Such transactions are often subject to 
clearances, decisions and rulings by the Securities Regulations Panel established under 
section 440 of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973. In terms of section 54 of the Banks Act, 
the ruling of the Securities Regulation Panel can only be made once the Minister's 
consent has been obtained.453 
Supporting Commissions 
The commissions that have most recently assisted in banking supervision are the 
Masterbond-Nel Commission, the Jacobs Committee and the Melamet Committee. 
These commissions all more or less served as consultants. They were brought into being 
as a consequence of the bankruptcy of large financial institutions or in order to maintain 
competition. Parts of their final reports have had much influence on new legislation.454 
7 Co-operation on an International Level 
The Republic of South Africa has also committed itself to co-operating with the new 
1983 version of the Basle Agreement of 1975. In certain instances, the South African 
legal system explicitly refers to it.4SS The principles, which were developed within the 
framework of the Basle and the Cooke Committees, have already partly been 
incorporated into nationallegislation.456 
452 S 1 of the Banks Act. 
453 Such as ss 11, 51 et seq. 
454 See Jordaan, Michael, The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions, A comparative 
Analysis of the United Kindom, Germany and South Africa, Dissertation Stellenbosch, S. 161 et seq. 
455 See s 34 (2B) (b) (ii), for example. 
456 See the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Banks Act. 
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8 Participation in a Deposit Insurance Fund 
There is no deposit insurance fund akin to that in Germany in the South African banking 
industry. There is no statutory foundation for such a fund. Thus, deposits are not secured 
against complete loss in the event of a bank failure. 
C Summary and Comparison 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, only the Bundesaufsichtsamt has the authority to 
implement measures relating to banking supervlSlon. As an independent 
Bundesoberbehorde it forms part of the unmittelbare Sttasverwaltung (direct state 
administration). On the other hand it is subordinate to the Bundesjinanzminister and 
thus bound by his instructions. It co-operates most closely with the German Bundesbank 
which, m essence, provides the intermediary structure required by the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt to fulfil its functions. Through its extensive network of 
Landeszentralbanken, the Bundesbank also assists with the gathering of information. 
This is an important contribution.457 
In the Republic of South Africa, a different structure was chosen to perform this 
function. The task of supervising banks is undertaken by the South African Reserve 
Bank (the central bank). The Registrar's office, which forms part of the Reserve Bank, 
is primarily responsible for the supervision of banks in South Africa.458 The link 
between the Reserve Bank and the Registrar is indicative of a relationship of 
dependence. Because of his affiliation to the Reserve Bank, the Registrar is subordinate 
to it and boUnd to observe its instructions.459 The Reserve Bank can thus have a decisive 
influence on banking supervision. 
457 See supra 65 et seq. and 69 et seq. 
458 See supra 76 et seq. 
459 See supra 80. 
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In South Africa it is mainly the Registrar who has the authority to implement measures 
relating to banking supervision. In some instances, however, he needs the permission of 
the Minister of Finance.46o Certain measures relating to banking supervision can only be 
implemented by the Minister himself, and not by the Registrar.461 This is indicative of 
the close co-operation between the Minister of Finance and the Registrar. 
It would accordingly appear that the Registrar is more closely bound to the Ministry of 
Finance in South Africa than the Bundesaufsichtsamt is in Germany. In practice, 
however, it is difficult to imagine banking supervision to deviate from the instructions 
of the respective Ministries in either of the countries. Clearly, in both countries, the 
Ministry of Finance can have considerable influence on banking supervision by passing 
the subordinate legislation (regulations in South Africa and Verordnungen in Germany) 
he sees fit, or simply by political pressure. 
An important similarity in the organisational structure of banking supervision of the two 
countries is that responsible authorities co-operate in international bodies working 
.towards international unification of banking. Germany's position differs slightly from 
that of South Africa in this respect, since it, as a member of the European Union, also 
needs to be involved in the process of harmonisation within the Union. This process has 
progressed very rapidly. One of the consequences has been that credit institutions are 
now free to establish branches in the entire area of the European Union, provided that 
their head office is situated in one of the members of the European Union. 
In both countries, the problem of securing deposits is regulated on a voluntary basis. 
Unlike the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of South Africa does not have 
general deposit insurance.462 In Germany, however, this problem is solved in part by 
460 S 23 Cancellation or suspension of Registration by Registrar. 
461 S 69 Appointment of curator to bank. 
462 This problem is the subject of much discussion. Attempts to establish such an insurance failed due to 
the fact that it was opposed by large banking institutions on the basis that it would be too costly. See 
10rdaan, Michael, The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions, A comparative Analysis of the 
United Kindom, Germany and South Africa, Dissertation Stellenbosch, 273 et seq. 
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indirect pressure exerted towards the desired state, which is participation in a securing 
fund of this nature.463 
In conclusion, it can be said that the manner in which banking supervision is structured 
in Germany as well as in South Africa, is complex. The co-operation with other state 
departments and supporting commissions is, broadly speaking, similar in the two 
countries. The aim is to cover the financial sector to the extent necessary to ensure 
optimal supervision. The financial sector is extremely innovative. As a consequence a 
growing number of mixed institutions offer a wide spectrum of financial services. This 
places high demands on structures involved in supervision. Close co-operation between 
those responsible for supervising banks and those responsible for supervising insurers is 
also highly desirable, since these branches of the financial sector overlap 
considerably.464 
463 See below Chapter 5, 124. 
464 Here, reference can be made to the ABSA-Group in the Republic of South Africa. In Germany the 
Deutsche Bank AG as well as the AlIianz-Versicherungs AG have many daughter companies which offer 
a comprehensive range of financial services that are nonetheless closely incorporated into the structure of 
the concerns. . 
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Chapter 4 
The Scope of Banking Supervision 
A Federal Republic of Germany 
1 The Term Kreditinstitut (Credit Institution) 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt (Federal Supervisory Authority) supervIses Kreditinstitute 
(credit institutions) in accordance with the provisions of the Kreditwesengesetz 
(KWG).465. 
The term Kreditinstitut is defined in § 1 I KWG in terms of which it is an enterprise 
engaged in banking transactions provided that the volume of such transactions requires 
a commercially organised business operation. The term was in.corporated into German 
legislation by the Verordnung uber eine Grundungssperre fur Kreditinstitute vom 4. 
September 1934466 and was adopted by the KWG of 1934,1939 and 1961 as well as by 
other statutes.467 The term has often been considered in case law.468 Whilst the term is 
defined in general terms in § 1, § 2 specifies certain institutions that are Kreditinstitute 
for the purposes of the KWG. 
The term is defined in the first instance to include only banking establishments of a 
specific size.469 Subject to certain exceptions a specific legal form is not required.470 It is 
465 See § 6 I KWG. 
466 See n. 57. 
467 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § I, margo 
n. 1. 
468 OVG Berlin vom 3. August 1988 (OVG 1 B 4/87), vom 24. Februar 1986 (OVG 1 S 1/86), vom 11. 
November 1983 (OVG 1 S 16/83), vom 13. Juli 1983 (OVG I S 27/83); VG Berlin vom 18. November 
1986 (VG 14 A 98/86), vom 23. Dezember 1985 (VG 14 A 376/85), vom 6. Dezember 1985 (VG 14 A 
315/85), vom 8. Juni 1984 (VG 14 A 318/84), vom 13. April 1983 (VG 14 A 77/83), vom 3. Marz 1983 
(VG 14 A 38/83) and many others. 
469 It is not decisive whether the requirements of § 4 HGB have been met. With reference to BVerwG, 
GewA 1981, 70 = Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar on 
§ 1, margo n. 8, the Bundesaufsichtsamt considers the following to be the minimum requirements for a 
commercially organised business operation: 
• a deposit volume ofDM 25,000; this amount may be exceeded if the total volume consists ofless than 
6 individual deposits or a portfolio of25 individual deposits; 
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also irrelevant whether a license was issued by the Bundesaufsichtsamt in terms of § 32 
KWG, or has been withdrawn in accordance with § 35 KWG.471 The existence of such 
business activities is in itself sufficient to subject the enterprise to supervision by the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt. The Unternehmens-Begriff(enterprise) is not defined.472 
Since far-reaching consequences are linked to the properties which render an enterprise 
a Kreditinstitut, the term is clearly defined. The types of business to be regarded as 
banking business within the meaning of the KWG are enumerated in § 1 (1) sentence 2 
No.1 to 9. The transacting of just one of these types of business is sufficient to render 
the enterprise a bank473 provided the limit specified in 2 is exceeded. 
In terms of this provision only Kreditinstitute conduct banking transactions. It does not 
matter whether a in kauJmtinnischer Weise eingerichteter Geschtiftsbetrieb 
• a total lending volume of OM 1 million; this amount may be exceeded if the total lending volume 
consists of less than 21 individual loans, or a portfolio of 100 outstanding loans; 
• a total volume of OM I million in discounted and still outstanding bills or cheques; this amount may 
be exceeded if the total volume consists of less than 21 discounted and still outstanding bills or 
cheques, or a portfolio of 100 discounted and still outstanding bills or cheques; 
• The volume of the securities business depends on the individual case. There are no generally valid 
limits, but it is taken on a case-by-case basis; 
• the administration of 5 safe-custody accounts or the administration of25 separate securities; 
• a total liability volume of OM 1 million; this amount may be exceeded if the total volume of all 
guarantees assumed consists of less than 21 separate guarantees, or a portfolio of 100 guarantees 
assumed. 
The above limits are reduced if several types of banking business are transacted alongside each together. 
Enterprises whose banking activities remain below the above-mentioned limits are not subject to the 
provisions of the KWG. In the case of doubt, the Bundesaufsichtsamt fiir das Kreditwesen decides 
whether an enterprise is subject to the provision of the act. In § 4 KWG it is provided that this decision is 
binding on all administrative authorities. The transaction of banking business without the necessary 
licence is punishable with imprisonment of up to three years or with a fine (§ 54 KWG). 
(Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 1, margo n. 8.) 
470 Amtl. Begriindung, BT-Drs. 311114 27. With the second KWG-reform in 1976 (BGBI. I, 725) § 2a 
KWG was added. In accordance with this provision credit institutions may no longer conduct business in 
the form of a sole proprietorship. See also § 2 I HypBG and § 2 I SchiffsBG: For some special institutions 
such as mortgage banks and Schiffspfandbriefbanken (specialized banks in financing ships) which may 
only be conducted as Aktiengesellschaften (public limited companies) or as Kommanditgesellschaften auf 
Aktien (company limited by shares, but having one or more general partners), special duties concerning 
legal form are valid. See also Schork, Ludwig Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 1. 
471 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl Geset~ iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, n § 1, margo n. 6. 
472 This is ascribed to great practical difficulties (groJ3e praktische Schwierigkeiten). See BegrRegE on § 
15 AktG. 
473 This is the case even if the enterprise also conducts many other types of transactions. 
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(commercially organised business operation) actually exists. What is important is 
whether, jUdging by commercial criteria and business management principles, a full 
commercial organisation (especially accounts, central filing system, personnel) is 
necessary. There is no general answer to the question of what volume of banking 
business requires a commercially organise.d business operation; the individual 
circumstances in each case must always be taken into account. 
In the event of an enterprise conducting banking transactions as well as other 
commercial transactions, the provisions of the KWG usually only apply to the banking 
transactions. However, certain provisions, such as that directors of the enterprise must 
be qualified as required by the KWG, apply to the whole enterprise. 
The banking transactions specifically listed in § 1 I s 2 KWG are: 
(i) The Receipt of Monies as Deposits, Irrespective of whether Interest is Paid (Deposit 
Business). 474 
Although roughly475 defined in the Zinsverordnung vom 5. Februar 1965476, the term 
"Einlagen" (deposit) is not defined in the KWG. In practice the Bundesaufsichtsamt 
essentially regards deposit business as being the acceptance of money from persons 
other than credit institutes, as a loan for consumption or something similar, without a 
written contract or the usual bank securities,477 and that can be reclaimed any time after 
maturity by the depositor.478 
474 See also n. 227. 
475 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 1, margo n. 
17. 
476 BGB!. I, 33 (Regulations concerning interest): "Einlagen sind fremde Gelder, die Kreditinstitute von 
Nichtkreditinstituten entgegennehmen, mit Ausnahme von Geldern, die zur Weiterleitung als 
durchlaufende Kredite angenommen werden, zur Durchfuhrung Offentlicher Kreditprogramme 
zweckgebunden angenommen werden und als Kredit angenommen werden, sofern fur den Einzelfall ein 
schriftlicher Kreditvertrag geschlossen und der Kredit bankiiblich gesichert wird." 
477 Securities that are individually required for creditors and that would provide satisfaction directly 
without the co-operation of third parties (BAK I 5 173-70/82 vom 23. December 1985). 
478 OVG Berlin 12,217,219. 
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So viewed, money owed to the credit institute by another credit institute, as well as 
other rights such as to claim compensation for damages, or payment of a purchase 
price, are not regarded as deposits. Deposits by partners also do not qualify as 
deposits.479 
(iiJ The Granting of Money Loans and Acceptance Credits (Credit Business/so 
Lending comprises the granting of money loans or acceptance credits, regardless of the 
type or fonn of the loan. Even if a bank grants a loan in its own name for the account of 
a third party (a conduit loan), this must still be regarded as lending business within the 
meaning of this provision. It is also immaterial whether the loans are granted from a 
bank's own funds or from outside funds. 481 Not included under the concept of lending 
business is loan intennediation on an agency basis in so far as the agent concludes loan 
agreements exclusively on behalf of his principal, but not in his own name.482 
In the case of an acceptance credit, the bank undertakes to accept a bill of exchange 
drawn by the customer on the bank on the basis of a contract of mandate. The bank is 
obliged to honour the bill at maturity. In his relations with the bank, however, the 
drawer of the bill must ensure that cover is available.483 The client can acquire funds by 
discounting the accepted bill of exchange.484 
479 See, inter alia, OVG Berlin yom 10. Februar 1988 (OVG 1 81187) and VG Berlin yom 21. August 
1987 (VG 14 A 214/87); yom 23 Juli 1987 (VG 14 A 16/87); yom 23. December 1985 (VG 14 A 
376/85); yom 6. Dezember 1985 (VG 14 A 315/85). 
480 See also n. 227. 
481 Reischauer-Kleinhans, KWG-Kommentar, § 1, margo n. 21. 
482 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 1, margo n. 
36. 
483 Ibid. 
484 Concerning this section, see OVG Berlin yom 12. Juni 1970 (OVG V B 48/69); vom 13. Mai 1965 
(OVG VI B 36/63) and VG Berlin yom 8. Juni 1984 (VG 14 A 318/84). 
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(iii) The Purchase of Bills and Cheques (Discount Business/85 
Discount business is ·very similar to credit business. It takes place when bills and 
cheques are purchased at a discount prior to maturity.486 
(iv) The Purchase and Sale of Securities for the Account of Others (Securities 
Business/87 
A security is a certificate in which a personal right vests in such a way that the 
possession of the certificate is necessary in order to exercise the right.488 They include 
shares,489 mining shares,49o provisional certificates,491 interest, dividend and renewal 
certificates; bonds and other securities such as investment certificates, and property 
certificates irrespective of whether or not the issuer is located abroad. 
Fixed-date transactions with such securities as well as commission transactions in the 
sense of §§ 383,406 HGB are also covered by this section.492 
(v) The Custody and Administration of Securities for the Account of Others (Safe-
custody Business 
The safe-custody business comprises the safe-custody and administration of securities 
for the account of others. The legal relation between the depositor of the securities and 
the custodian bank are governed by the Depotgesetz (Act Concerning the Safe-Custody 
485 See also n. 227. 
486 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 1, margo n. 
39. In addition, see OVG Berlin of 12. Oktober 1972 (VG III A 74/72). 
487 See also n. 227. 
488 Heinsius, Theodor / Hom, Norbert / Than, Peter, Kommentar zum Depotgesetz, on § 1, margo n. 3. 
489 §§ 1 et seq. AktG. 
490 § 1 I PrABG. 
491 §§ 8, 10 AktG. 
492 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Woh1schie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 1, margo n. 
40 et seq. See also OVG Berlin vom 8. Oktober 1979 (OVG I S 258/79); VG Berlin vom 11. Januar 1988 
(VG 14 A 384/87), vom 5. Mai 1980 (VG 14 A 83/79). 
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and and Procurement of Securities) of 1937. The custody of $ecurities in the form of a 
sealed deposit and the leasing of safes are not regarded as safe-custody business.493 
(vi) Investment Fund Business;494 
The investment fund business may only be transacted by capital investment companies. 
They are defined in § 1 of the Gesetz -aber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, 1970 (Capital 
Investment Companies Act). They are enterprises whose business activity consists of 
investing moneys deposited with them in their own names for the joint account of 
depositors in accordance with the principle of risk diversification in securities, real 
estate or long-term building leases deriving from such investments. It must be the sole 
object of business. They are not allowed to mix the activities with other banking 
activities as designated in the KWG.495 
(vii) Revolvingkreditgeschaft (Revolving Credit Business);496 
This activity is actually also a credit transaction since it provides the client with the 
possibility of intermediate financing of obligations that are not yet mature.497 
(viii) The Assumption of Guarantees, Warranties or Suretyship for the Account of 
Others (Guarantee Business/98 
Guarantees are not regulated in the KWG. This aspect of banking business takes the 
form of the bank, after it has been paid a guarantee commission, issuing a guarantee in 
493 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschief3, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 1, margo n. 
40 et seq and 50. 
494 See also n. 227. 
495 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschief3, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § I, margo n. 
57,58. 
496 See also n. 227. 
497 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschief3, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 1, margo n. 
60. . 
498 See also n. 227. 
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favour of another for its customer.499 Guarantees are regulated by §§ 765ff BGB, 349f 
HGB.500 
(ix) The Effecting of Transfers and Clearings (Giro Businessyo1 
In the first instance, giro business is understood· as the cashless transfer of payment (giro 
transfer). It exists in the form of transfers, cheque entries, debit entry transfers and other 
forms of the collections business. Legally this concerns - besides the actual banking 
contract - the contract of business procurement as set out in § 675 BGB. 
In addition, due to the innovation encountered m the financial sector, the 
Bundesjinanzminister has the authority under § 1 sIs 3 KWG to classify other 
transactions502 as banking transactions by Verordnung (regulation) if this is the generally 
accepted view. In so doing the Minister must give due consideration to the purposes of 
supervlSlon. 
2 Credit Institutions Located Abroad 
2 1 Introduction 
The scope of application of the KWG is restricted to the territory of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Nonetheless, in terms of § 53 foreign credit institutions settled in Germany 
are subject to the KWG. 503 
499 Canaris, Claus Wilhelm, Bankvertragsrecht (1981) margo n. 1102 et seq. 
500 See also OVG Berlin vom 19. Oktober 1966 (OVG V B 19/66), vom 28. Oktober 1965 (OVG VI B 
43/64;VG Berlin vom 13. Oktober 1983 (VG 14 A 299/83), vom 13. August 1970 (VG III A 284/69), vom 
12. September 1968 (VG III A 130/68), vom 16. Dezember 1965 (VG III A 77/65); BVerwG vom 27. 
Februar 1967 (BVerwG I B 12/67). 
501 See also n. 227. 
502 Such as factoring and leasing business. 
503 Diehl, Wolfram Zweigniederlassungen auskindischer Banken 1978, 15 et seq. 
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A distinction should, however, be made between rechtlich selbstdndigen 
Tochtergesellschaften (legally independent subsidiaries), rechtlich unselbstdndigen 
Tochtergesellschaften (legally dependent subsidiaries) and representative offices. 
2 2 Legally Independent Subsidiaries 
Legally independent subsidiaries are ·not subject to any specific regulations. However, if 
they meet the requirements of § 1 KWG, they are fully subject to supervision by the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt and, in particular, are obliged to acquire a license as set out in § 32 
KWG. 504 They are, therefore, not treated differently from domestic German credit 
institutions. 
2 3 The Legally Dependent Subsidiaries (Branch Settlements) 
Since the directors and organs of the main establishment· are located in a different 
country, any coercive measures or fines imposed in terms of the KWG would be difficult 
to enforce. Therefore, in accordance with § 53 II no 1 KWG, the enterprise must appoint 
at least two natural persons residing within the area in which the KWG applies who are 
empowered to manage and represent the business. They must be registered in the 
commercial register. Such persons are deemed to be directors for the purposes of the 
KWG and are accordingly bound by all regulations concerning directors in genera1.505 
Two such directors must be employed so that the four-eyes principle, which is inherent 
to the KWG, can be realised.506 
In terms of § 53 II no. 2 the institution must keep separate books and prepare separate 
financial statements covering its transactions and the assets utilised. The regulations of 
the Bankbilanzrichtliniengesetz (BaBiRiG) and the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) 
pertaining to accounting are applicable. These regulations also make clear that the books 
must be kept and safeguarded within the territory of the Federal Republic of 
504 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 53, margo n. 
1 et seq. 
505 § 53 II NR. 1 S. 2 KWG. 
506 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 53, margo n. 
10. 
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Germany.507 An overview of assets must be compiled at the end of every business year 
in accordance with § 242 I HGB. 508 
As a rule, the German branch of a foreign credit institution is, for balance-sheet 
purposes, managed as a booking post from the main location. The branch does not 
therefore have any equity capital as contemplated in the KWG. § 53 II no. 4 KWG is 
thus aimed at ensuring that there is a minimum degree of security. The paragraph 
requires branches to be left with sufficient assets to cover liabilities. Working capital 
and profits that were made are included. These must remain within Germany. 
In terms of § 53 II no 5 of the KWG legally dependent branches of a foreign 
Kreditinstitut whose main office is outside the European Union509 need permission510 to 
conduct business. 51 I The KWG treats such branches and domestic Kreditinstitute in the 
same way. Both require a license in accordance with § 32 KWG. The grounds for refusal 
of the license set out in § 33 I KWG are also equally applicable. It must further be noted 
that the license can also be refused in the absence of reciprocity, that is if branches of 
German banks are not allowed to trade in the country concerned. 512 
507 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 53, margo n. 
14 et seq. 
508 § 53 II Nr. 3 KWG. For further details see Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das 
Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 53, margo n. 18 et seq. 
509 The Vertrag zur Griindung der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft vom 25. Marz 1957 (BGBI. 11 
766) (Treaty to found the European Community) makes provision for the gradual abolition of the 
restrictions on the establishment of banks between member states. Therefore, according to the first 
banking law co-ordinating guideline of the EC (Guideline 77/780IEWG), a license must be granted before 
the first branch may commence with business activities. Notice must be given to the Bundesaufsichtsamt 
of the opening of each further branch (§ 24 I Nr. 7 KWG). Art. 6 I 1 of the second banking law co-
ordinating guideline (guideline 89/646/EWG) allows for this requirement to be cancelled as well. 
510 In terms of § 24 I Nr. 7 KWG the establishment of a branch of a German Kreditinstitut outside 
Germany needs only to be notified to the Bundesaufsichtsamt. See Schork, Ludwig, Geselz iiber das 
Kreditwesen, commentary on § 24. 
511 Cj § 1 IV - IX KWG. 
512 § 53 II Nr. 5 S. 2 KWG. 
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Another important provision regarding branches of foreign banks is § 53 IV KWG 
which provides that the jurisdictionS I) of the German courts cannot be excluded by 
agreement. 
2 4 Reprasentanzen (Representative Offices) 
In accordance with § 53a KWG, notice must be given of the opening, transfer or closing 
of a representative office. No banking transactions are conducted from representative 
offices. They serve the general purposes of advertising and maintaining links. The 
notice requirement ensures that the Bundesaufsichtsamt as well as the German 
Bundesbank are kept informed of all the representative offices operating in Germany. 
This facilitates their task of investigating whether such offices remain within the scope 
of activities suited to their status. 514 
3 Institutions that are not Subject to Supervision in terms of the KWG 
Certain institutions that conduct banking transactions in the sense of § 1 I KWG, are 
fully or partially exempted from the provisions of the Act and are not subject to 
supervision by the Bundesaufsichtsamt in the full sense. These exceptions which are 
necessary for practical reasons515 are set out in § 2 KWG. They are: 
(i) The Bundesbank 
The German Bundesbank is itself a supervisory organ within the framework of the 
KWG. In terms of § 7 KWG it performs its duties in close co-operation with the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt. The supervision, under the KWG, of an institution which itself has 
the duty to supervise under the KWG would clearly not make sense. The Bundesbank is 
therefore in no way subject to the KWG. It is, however, the only institution fully 
exempted from the provisions of the KWG. 516 
51) See § 21 of the ZivilprozeJ3ordnung (civil procedure legislation). 
514 See VG Berlin vom 22. Januar 1979 (VG 14' A 4/78); Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschief3, Karl, Gesetz 
iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 53a, margo n. 1 et seq. 
515 BT-Drs. 3/1114 27f. 
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(ii) The Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaujbau (Reconstruction Loan Corporation) 
The Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaujbau was founded by legislation introduced on 5 
November 1948.517 The current legislation dates back to 29 June 1969.518 This 
Corporation was exempted from supervision by the Bundesaufsichtsamt on the basis 
that its business activities were narrowly defined in the legislation and that it worked 
closely together with state offices.519 However, in accordance with § 2 II KWG read with 
§ 14 KWG it must report credits of one million DM or more. It is also subject to the 
regulations concerning the handling of a crisis provided for by §§ 47 I no 2 and 48 
KWG. 
(iii) The Sozialversicherungstrager und the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (Social Security 
Institutions and the Federal Labour Office) 
The social security institutions are the health insurance companies, trade co-operatives, 
insurance companies, the Federal Insurance Company for Employees and the Federal 
Miners' Association. These bodies, as well as the Federal Labour Office, conduct credit 
business by investing their assets. 520 They are exempted from normal banking 
supervision due to the fact that they are subject to specialised state supervision.521 In 
terms of § 2 II KWG they are, however, obliged to report credits one million DM or 
more as stipulated in § 14 KWG. 
516 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Geselz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommenlar, on § 2, margo n. 
2. 
517 WiGBL. 123. 
518 BGBI. I 573. 
519Begr.RegE KWG 1961 on § 2 IV. 
520 E.g. by means of the investment of promissory note loans: 
521 Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG - Kommenlar, on § 2, margo n. 5, Beck, Heinz, Geselz 
iiber das Kreditwesen, commentary on § 2, margo n. 62. 
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(iv) Versicherungsunternehmen (Private and Public-law Insurers) 
In terms of § 1 of the· Gesetz uber die Beaufsichtigung von Versicherungsunternehmen 
(VAG)522 Versicherungsunternehmen are enterprises which conduct insurance business 
and are not Sozialversicherungstriiger (social securities authorities). Insurers are subject 
to supervision in terms of the VAG. The supervising authority is the Bundesal:lfsichtsamt 
fur das Versicherungswesen (Federal Insurance Supervisory Authority). There is 
accordingly no need for supervision under the KWG. 
(v) Pfandleihbetriebe (Pawnbrokers) 
A pawnbroker is an enterprises that issues a professional loan against a pledge of 
movable things (pignus). In accordance with § 2 III KWG pawnbrokers are only ·subject 
to supervision to the extent that they conduct banking transactions that do not form part 
of their normal business (nicht eigentumliche Bankgeschiifte). 
(vi) Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaften (Investment-fund Companies) 
In terms of the Gesetz uber Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaften (Statute on 
Business Participation Companies)523 such a company has the exclusive aim of 
acquiring, administering and selling shares or participations (Beteiligungen) as silent 
partner of an enterprise situated within the country and whose shares, at the time of 
acquisition, were neither admitted nor listed at a local stock exchange, nor traded with at 
a foreign stock exchange.524 
In accordance with § 2 III KWG Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaften are only 
subject to supervision to the extent that they conduct banking transactions that do not 
form part of their normal business (nicht eigentumliche Bankgeschiifte). 
522 Translation: Act on the Supervision ofInsurance Companies. 
523 § 2 II Gesetz iiber UnternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaJten, of December 17, 1986 (BGBI. I 2488). 
524 Ibid. 
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(vii) The DeutscheBundespost 
The German Bundespost (Postal Service) was also formerly exempted under § 2 KWG. 
However, the Bundespost has recently established the Postbank AG and is now treated 
on a par with other credit institutions. The reference to the Bundespost was accordingly 
struck from this paragraph. 
As evident from (v) and (vi) above it may be crucial in certain cases to determine 
whether certain conduct amounts to nicht eigentumliche Bankgeschdfte (banking 
transactions that do not form part of normal business). This concept is, however, not 
defined in the legislation. In this regard the specific type of enterprise (under § 2 I no 5-
9 KWG) is referred to in each case. 
In case of doubt, the Bundesaufsichtsamt has the competence, in accordance with § 4 
KWG, to decide whether an enterprise is subject to the KWG. 
Since the concept of bank is very broadly defined in § 1 (1), enterprises which, owing to 
the nature of their business, do not require supervision may nevertheless fall under the 
KWG. These include, for example, purchasing associations or purchasing companies 
that engage in guarantee and lending business within the framework of a centralised 
settlement system, or automobile associations that engage in guarantee and lending 
business by issuing letters of credit. § 2 (4) KWG, therefore, stipulates that in individual 
cases the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen will exempt such enterprises from 
provisions imposing special requirements on banks (for example capital adequacy and 
liquidity provisions, lending business and submission of monthly retums).S2S 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt can exempt all banks or certain specified banks from specific 
provisions. In terms of § 31 KWG a statutory order of the Bundesjinanzminister is 
required. The order can only be issued after consultation with the Bundesbank.S26 The 
525 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz aber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 2, margo n. 
29. 
526 Szagunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz aber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 31, margo n. 
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Bundesjinanzminister can, however, delegate this power to the Bundesauftichtsamt, 
which he did in 1985.527 
In terms of § 31 II KWG the Bundesaufsichtsamt may also exempt individual parent 
banks (within the meaning of § lOa (2) and 13a (2) KWG) by administrative act from 
certain obligations contained in the legislation concerned.528 
Whilst the exemptions under § 2 IV and 31 KWG are not subject to time limits (zeitlich 
unbefristed) exemptions under § 12 III are temporary (voriibergehend).529 § 12 KWG 
limits the illiquid assets of a bank. The basic idea is that assets serving the business 
operations of a bank on permanent basis should not be financed by funds from outside 
sources. On application, the Bundesaufsichtsamt can allow temporary exceptions from 
these provisions. 
4 Prohibited Business 
In the interests of general order in the banking industry § 3 KWG prohibits business of 
such a nature that deposits or the currency are exposed to particular risk. Thus the 
operation of employee savings banks (§ 3 No.1) and specific-purpose saving banks (§ 3 
No.2) are prohibited. Furthermore the transaction of lending or deposit business is 
prohibited if, as a consequence of agreement or business usage, withdrawl of the loan 
amount or the deposit in cash is excluded or seriously impeded (§ 3 No.3). 
In terms of § 37 s 1 KWG the Bundesaufsichtsamt can immediately act against any 
prohibited business. It can also implement coercive measures in accordance with the 
Verwaltungsvollstreckungsgesetz (the administrative enforcement legislation) to ensure 
the general order of the credit industry.53o 
1-18. 
527 Ordinance of28 June 1985 BGB!. 11255. 
528 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschief3, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 31, margo n. 
19 et seq. . 
529 Beck, Heinz, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen, commentary on § 31 margo n. 6; Bahre, Inge Lore / 
Schneider, Manfred, KWG - Kommentar, on § 31, margo n. 1, margo n. 6 especially. 
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In accordance with § 44 II, enterprises that are not Kreditinstitute are also subject to 
these provisions. In other words, not only banks are prohibited from conducting the 
business prohibited in the KWG.53\ 
However, the fact that particular business might be prohibited business in terms of the 
KWG does not mean that it is ineffective from a civil-law point ofview.532 
5 Persons Subject to Supervision 
Besides the institutions discussed above, certain natural persons are also subject to the 
KWG's regulations. A director must, for example, meet certain requirements concerning 
professional qualifications and reliability. Directors are often held personally 
responsible for the Kreditinstitut's compliance with the provisions of the KWG in its 
business operations. 533 
B Republic of South Africa 
1 Definition ofterms 
1 1 Introduction 
The scope of banking supervision is disclosed in the preamble of the Banks Act, No. 94 
of 1990 which reads that it is an Act to "provide for the regulation and supervision of 
the business of public companies taking deposits from the public; and to provide for 
matters connected therewith". 
530 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar. on § 37, margo n. 
1 et seq. 
531 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar. on § 44, margo n. 
36 et seq. 
5J2 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar. on § 3, margo Q. 
8. 
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Two points should be noted from this preamble. First, it refers to public companies 
taking deposits from the public. Secondly it refers to this being the business of such 
companIes. 
Since coming into effect the Banks Act has been amended several times.534 The original 
version has been substantially altered in the process. In particular the amendments dealt 
with the definitions stipulating the size of the financial institutions that are subject to the 
Act. 
I 2 Public Companies Taking Deposits from the Public 
"Bank" 
The term "deposit-taking institution" was replaced by the term "bank" in 1993. It is 
defined as "a public company registered as a bank in terms of this Act" . 535 
Whether or not a company qualifies as a bank is therefore determined solely by 
registration in terms of the Banks Act. Only by formal registration can a company 
become a bank.536 Today it is generally accepted that discount houses, commercial 
banks, merchant banks and building societies are all "banks" in this sense.537 
533 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 1, margo n. 
69 et seq. 
534 When this Act first came into operation it was known as the Deposit-taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990. 
The aim of this name was to provide a general term covering all financial institutions that were to be 
subject to the Act. The name was, however, not generally accepted and the earlier name was reinstated by 
the Deposit-taking Institutions Amendment Act 9 of 1993. In this context, the range of definitions of s 1 
(1) also had to be changed to correspond with the new circumstances. The definition of a deposit-taking 
institution was, for example, replaced by the term 'bank'. The act now only distinguishes between banks 
and mutual banks. 
535 S 1 (1) "Definitions". 
536 The forerunner of this Act, the Banks Act)3 of 1965, used the more cumbersome term "banking 
institution" or "institution". See Willis, Nigel, Banking in South African Law (1981),44 et seq. 
537 See Jordaan, Michael, The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions, A comparative 
Analysis of the United Kindom, Germany and South Africa, (1997) Dissertation Stellenbosch, 122 et seq. 
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"Other Banks" 
The Banks Act refers to other institutions which are also known as "banks".538 These 
are, as a general rule, special institutions which have, to meet specific statutory 
requirements. They include the Land Bank,539 Mutual Banks540 and the Reserve Bank.541 
These institutions are exempt from the provisions of the Banks Act. 542 
1 3 Business 
The concept "the business of a bank" is comprehensively defined in the Act.543 The Act 
furthermore provides that the definition can be amended by notice in the Government 
Gazette issued by the Registrar after consultation with the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank.544 This means that the definition can be amended quickly and with relative ease. 
Both its comprehensiveness and the ease with which it can be amended lead to the 
conclusion that the legislature intended the definition to cover every conceivable 
situation. 
The "business of a bank" is: 
d 
(a) "{TJhe acceptance of deposits545 from the general public (including persons in the 
employ of the person so accepting deposits) as a regular feature of the business in 
question".546 This amounts to deposit business, that is the acceptance of deposits as 
investments. The Act does not stipUlate that interest must be paid on the investment. It 
538 S 1(1). 
539 S I (I): '''Land Bank' means the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa". 
540 S I (I): '''mutual bank' means a mutual bank as defined in section 1 (1) 0fthe Mutual Banks Act, 1993 
(Act 124 of 1993)". These financial enterprises are not established as public companies. They are 
supervised in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Banks Act. See Oelofse, A.N., The South 
African Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990, (1991) Journal ofInternational Banking Law, 98. 
541 S 1 (1) '''Reserve Bank' means the South African Reserve Bank". 
542 S 2(b). See also in this chapter, 109 below. 
543 S I (1). 
544 S 1 (1) "the business ofa bank" (e). 
545 The term "deposit" is also defined in the Act (s 1 (1)). 
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can therefore be concluded that the acceptance of interest free deposits also amounts to 
the business ofbanking.547 
(b) "[TJhe soliciting of or advertising for deposits".548 Thus, the mere canvassing for 
deposits is already considered as the conducting of banking business, irrespective of 
whether or not the bank is ultimately successful and deposits are actually made.549 
(c) "{TJhe utilisation of money, or of the interest or other income earned on money, 
accepted by way of deposit as contemplated {above] ... (i) for the granting by any 
person, acting as lender in his own name or through the medium of a trust or a 
nominee, of loans to other persons; (U) for investment by any person, acting as investor 
in his own name or through the medium of a trust or a nominee,- or (iii) for the 
financing, wholly or to any material extent, by any person of any other business activity 
conducted by him in his own name or through the medium of a trust or a nominee". 550 In 
this provision the legislature describes the typical utilisation of the deposits received by 
banks. Due to the fact that the acceptance of a deposit already constitutes banking 
business irrespective of the ultimate utilisation of such money, this paragraph of the 
definition does not really take the matter any further. 551 
(d) "(TJhe obtaining, as a regular feature of the business in question, of money through 
the sale of an asset, to any person other than a bank, subject to an agreement in terms 
of which the seller undertakes to purchase from the buyer at a future date the asset so 
sold or any other asset".552 This section refers to a repurchase agreement/53 a kind of 
546 S 1 (1) "the business ofa bank" (a). 
541 See also the Gennan concept of a deposit discussed at 90 above. 
548 S 1 (1) "the business of a bank" (b). 
549 Oelofse, A.N., The South African Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990, (1991) JIBL, 100. 
550 S 1 (1) "the business of a bank" (c). 
551 Oelofse, A.N., The South African Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990, (1991) JIBL, 100. 
552 S 1 (1) "the business of a bank" (d). 
553 See also the definition of "repurchase agreement" in the Regulations and Rules Pertaining to the 
Banks Act 94 of 1990 (Malan F. R. & Oelofse A. N., South African Banking Legislation, Juta, Cape 
Town, 1-2000). 
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Termingeschdft in the form of a loan. It is controversial due to the fact that it has been 
so broadly formulated that it could include countertrade transactions, a consequence 
probably not foreseen by the legislature.554 . 
(e) "rAJny other activity which the Registrar has, after consultation with the Governor 
of the Reserve Bank, by notice in the Gazette declared to be the business of a bank".555 
This provision is extremely controversial due to the extraordinarily far ranging powers it 
confers on the Registrar. Theoretically, he can declare any conceivable business banking 
business. These powers are only limited by the Act which expressly states that certain 
specified activities do not constitute banking business.556 
14 Summary 
It is thus clear that banking supervision in terms of the Banks Act is activated both by 
registration and by the conducting of banking business. The mere fact that an institution 
conducts "the business of a bank" does not automatically render it a bank for the 
purposes of the Act. The Registrar, in furtherance of his duty to supervise banks, is 
nevertheless empowered to intervene in the activities of such institutions. 
2 Credit Institutions Located Abroad 
2 1 Introduction 
A foreign bank wishing to conduct banking business in South Africa, is subject to some 
or other form of supervision by the Registrar.557 Before 1994 all such banks had to 
register in terms of the Banks Act. However, since the Banks Amendment Act 26 of 
1994, the Banks Act differentiates between what may be termed "legally independent 
subsidiaries" and "legally dependent branches". 
554 Oelofse, A.N., The South African Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990, (1991) JIBL, 100. 
555 S 1 (1) "the business of a bank" (e). 
556 See 109 et seq below. 
557 S 11 (1). 
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2 2 Legally Independent Subsidiaries 
Such companies are dealt with in the same way as any South African banle They must 
accordingly register in terms of the Banks Act in order to conduct business legally. 558 An 
important aspect that must be borne in mind by foreign banks wishing to conduct 
business in South Africa is that the Banks Act contains severe limitations on 
shareholding in banks.559 Some of the general restrictions are: In terms of section 37(1) 
no person may acquire shares in a bank exceeding 15 % of the total nominal capital 
without the prior written approval of the Registrar. Section 79(1)(a) prohibits a bank 
from issuing shares with no par value and section 79(4) provides that this prohibition 
applies to controlling companies as well. Section 54(1) prohibits the transfer of all or 
any part of the assets and liabilities of a bank to another person without the prior 
consent of the Minister of Finance. 
2 3 Legally Dependent Enterprises in the Form of Branches560 
The Banks Amendment Act of 1994 simplified the position of a foreign bank wishing to 
conduct business in South Africa by opening a branch in this country. In terms of 
section 18A a bank that has its head office in another country and conducts banking 
business in accordance with the law of that country, may, with the Registrar's prior 
permission, also conduct business as a branch in South Africa provided certain 
requirements are met. 561 The requirements to be satisfied have been published in the 
Government Gazette.562 They relate to liquidity,563 the management564 and the envisaged 
558 See also Chapter 5 below. 
559 See, for example, ss 36 et seq. 
560 On 31 December 1996 there were six foreign institutions with branches registered in South Africa. See 
in this regard the South African Reserve Bank Banks Supervision Department Annual Report (1996), 59. 
561 S 18A. It used to be necessary to undergo a process of registration when a new bank was to be 
established. Nowadays, this has become easier since the tenninology provides for the opening of a 
branch. See Oelofse, A.N., Banking Regulation Reform, JIBL (1995) 4, N-76. 
562 16356, Government Notice 521 of3 April 1995. 
563 Par. 1 (3) of the Government Notice 521 of3 April 1995. If the institution wished to become active in 
South Africa it had to meet certain requirements additional to those imposed under s 72 of the Banks Act 
("Minimum Liquid Assets"). They are supplemented by provisions restricting the possible volume of 
business activities. 
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banking business.565 There are also certain requi~ements relating to supervision by the 
Registrar. 566 Certain formalities must also be met and certain fees paid.567 The Registrar 
may further demand all information he deems necessary from the institution concerned. 
His decision must be conveyed to the institution in writing and must also contain the 
reasons for the decision. If he is of the opinion that effective supervision cannot be 
ensured, he may refuse to grant the required permission. If permission is granted, the 
foreign bank must be furnished with a certificate to this effect. 568 
2 4 Representative Offices569 
The Act also deals with the opening of representative offices. Again the pnor 
permission of the Registrar is required. 570 In addition there are specific provisions 
concerning the required information and documentation. 571 The Registrar must be 
notified of a prospective name change, the replacement of the chief representative 
564 S 1 (4) of the Government Notice 521 of 3 April 1995. The appointment of qualified and reliable 
directors is one necessity. The requirements are the same as for South African banks. Two natural 
persons domiciled in South Africa must be the directors. One of them must be the chief executive officer 
of the institution. 
565 S 1 (5) of the Government Notice 521 of 3 April 1995. Only deposits up to R 1 million may be 
accepted. Every further establishment of a new branch within the Republic requires the Registrar's prior 
permission. Every business activity of this branch must be secured by way of the main company ensuring 
cover of all liabilities entered into. This letter of comfort and undertaking contains several guarantees 
given by the main company. The content is predominantly determined by the applicable law since it 
essentially ensures that· all requirements of the South African legal system will be met and that 
compliance with these will be monitored continuously. 
566 S 1 (6) of the Government Notice 521 of3 April 1995. This includes the requirement that the Registrar 
must be of the opinion that the bank conducts banking business successfully and lawfully in its country of 
origin, that the foreign supervisory authority is not opposed to the establishment of a branch in South 
Africa, that it complies with the principles of the Basle Agreement, that it ensures that, as far as possible, 
the selection of directors will be in accordance with the requirement that they must be suitably qualified 
and reliable. 
567 S 18A (2). 
I 568 S 18A (3) - (6). 
569 See s 34. It was reported that on 31 December 1996, 58 foreign banking institutions had representative 
offices in South Africa. See South African Reserve Bank Banks Supervision Department Annual Report 
(1996), 60 et seq. 
570 S 34(1). 
571 S 34(2), (2A) & (5). 
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officer, or the changing or giving up of the business address.572 The conducting of 
banking business by such a representative office is, however, prohibited.573 
3 Exceptions 
3 1 Introduction 
The Banks Act contains a number of exceptions. These exceptions relate both to certain 
institutions and to certain business activities or transactions. 
3 2 Institutions not Subject to the Banks Act 
Certain institutions listed in section 2(b) of the Act are not subject to the provisions of 
the Banks Act, mainly for practical reasons. They include the Reserve Bank,574 the Land 
Bank,575 the Development Bank of Southern Africa,576 the Corporation for Public 
Deposits577 established in terms of the Corporation/or Public Deposits Act,578 the Public 
Investment Commissioners579 as understood in the Public Investment Commissioners 
Act/80 any mutual bank58 I and any other institution or body designated by the Minister 
by notice in the Gazette.582 
572 S 34(3). 
573 S 34 (4). 
574 S 2 (b) (i). 
575 S 2 (b) (ii). 
576 S 2 (b) (iii). 
577 S 2 (b) (iv). 
578 Act 46 of 1984 (s 2). 
579 S 2 (b) (v). 
580 Act 45 of 1984 (s 2). 
581 S 2 (b) (vi). 
582 S 2 (b) (vii). These include the Kwazulu Finance and Investment Corporation Ltd. (Government 
Notice 1891 (Government Gazette 16865) of 8 December -1995); The National Housing Finance 
Corporation Ltd. (Government Notice 281 (Government Gazette 17793) of 14 February 1997); Post 
Office Savings Bank (Government Notice 334 (Government Gazette 13744) of 24 January 1992), 
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd. (Government Notice 2169 (Government 
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3 3 Activities not Subject to Supervision under the Banks Act 
In terms of the Act 'the business of a bank does not include: 
"(aa) [T]he acceptance of a deposit by a person who does not hold himself out as 
accepting deposits on a regular basis and who has not advertised for or solicited such 
deposit". 583 The main purpose of this exception is that small and individual loans, 
particularly those given in private, should not as a matter of course be considered 
banking transactions. Otherwise, such loans would also be subject to supervision by the 
Registrar. The exception is subject to the proviso that the person in question must not 
hold deposits, at any given time, from more than 20 persons, or amounting in the 
aggregate to more than R500 000. Further, it must be noted that a person, and a person 
controlled directly or indirectly by him, as well as a subsidiary of such last mentioned 
person, are regarded, for the purposes of this exception, as one person. Thus, the 
provisions of the Act cannot be circumvented for example by making use of a network 
of subsidiaries.584 
"(bb) [T]he borrowing of money from its members by a co-operative subject to such 
conditions as may be prescribed".585 The conditions which deal, inter alia, with the 
minimum amount and duration of such loans, have been taken up in the Regulations and 
Rules Pertaining to the Banks Act 94 of 1990. 586 
"(cc) [A]ny activity of a public sector, governmental or other institution, or of any 
person or category of persons, designated by the Registrar, with the approval of the 
Minister, by notice in the Gazette, provided such activity is performed in accordance 
with such conditions as the Registrar may with the approval of the Minister determine 
Gazette 16167) of 14 December 1994). The latter two are only partially exempt from the provisions of 
the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990. 
583 S 1 (1) "the business of a bank" (aa). 
584 See Oelofse, A.N., The South African-Deposit Taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990, (1991) JIBL, 101. 
See also S v Rosenthal 1980 1 SA 65 (A), 74B-D. 
585 S 1 (1) "the business of a bank" (bb). 
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-
in the relevant notice". 587 This provlSlon exempts the activities· of governmental 
institUtion from supervision under the Banks Act. Also excluded under this provision 
are: (i) Mining Houses, insofar as they accept deposits earmarked for the development 
of mining from members of the affiliated group (that is a group consisting of a public 
company that is a member of the Chamber of. Mines, its subsidiaries and affiliates);588 
(ii) activities of the Teba Savings Fund;589 (iii) certain repurchase agreements by 
stockbrokers;59o (iv) the acceptance of money from the general public against the issue of 
commercial paper;591 (v) certain securitisation schemes;592 and (vi) certain activities of 
"a group of persons between the members of which exists a common bond".S93 
(dd) Any activity which would normally be regarded as banking business in terms of 
paragraph (a), (b) or (c), 594 but which is "(i) performed by any institution registered or 
established in terms oj or by or under any other Act of Parliament and designated by 
the Minister by notice in the Gazette; or (ii) performed in terms of any scheme 
authorised and controlled by, and conducted in accordance with the provisions oj any 
other Act of Parliament and so designated by the Minister, provided such activity is 
performed in accordance with such conditions as the Minister may determine in the 
relevant notice".S9S In terms of this provision business activity controlled under a 
different Act can be released from supervision under the Banks Act. The provision does 
not make much sense as one would expect that the Act in question would in any event 
586 Regulation 46. See Malan F. R. & Oelofse A. N., South African Banking Legislation, Juta, Cape 
Town, 1-200DE. 
587 S 1(1) "the business ofa bank" (cc). 
588 Government Notice 2170 (Government Gazette 16167) of 14 December 1994. The term "affiliate is 
defined in s 1 of the Schedule. 
589 Government Notice 1890 (Government Gazette 16865) of 8 December 1995. 
590 Government Notice 2171 (Government Gazette 16167) of 14 December 1994. See also Oelofse, A.N., 
The South African Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of J 990, (1991) JIBL, 101. 
591 Government Notice 2172 (Government Gazette 16167) of 14 December 1994. 
592 Government Notice 153 (Government Gazette 13723) of 3 January 1992. 
593 Government Notice 2173 (Government Gazeite 16167) of 14 December 1994. 
594 See 104 et seq. above. 
595 S I (I) "the business of a bank" (dd). 
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contain provisions rendering this provision superfluous.596 The acceptance of money in 
terms of the Participation Bonds Act 55 of 1981 and the Unit Trusts Control Act 54 of 
1981 are exempted under this provision.597 
Certain transactions, which involve the acceptance of money against debentures, 
negotiable instruments, or other similar financial instruments, provided the money is 
not used to grant loans or credit to the public. 598 This provision, while recognising the 
value to companies of utilising such financial instruments to generate funds, that funds 
acquired in this manner may not be utilised to grant credit or loans to the public. 
(fj) The effecting of a money lending transaction directly between a lender and a bank 
as borrower through the intermediation of an agent, provided the funds so to be lent are 
entrusted by the lender to the agent under a written contract of agency in which at least 
the following must be recorded: (i) that the agent acts as the agent of the lender; and 
(ii) that the lender assumes all risks connected with the administration of the entrusted 
funds by the agent, and the responsibility of ensuring that the agent executes the 
instructions recorded in the contract of agency. As Oelofse599 argues convincingly this 
entire exception may have been inserted ex abudanti cautela. The provision appears to 
be aimed at protecting the intermediary. His receipt of funds from the lender, is not to 
be regarded as the business of a bank. However, in the light of (aa) above600 it is unlikely 
that the receipt of such funds by the agent would in any event qualify as a deposit. It 
must finally be noted that this exception is also subject to the provisions of any other 
Act of Parliament and to any conditions the Registrar may determine by notice in the 
Gazette. 
596 See Oelofse, A.N., The South African Deposit-Taking institutions Act 94 of 1990, (1991) HBL, 101. 
597 Government Notices 195 & 196 (Government Gazette 13003) of 31 Jan 1991. See also Oelofse, A.N., 
The South African Deposit-Taking institutions Act 94 of 1990, (1991) JIBL, 101. 
598 S 1 (1) "the business of a bank" (ee). 
599 The South African Deposit-Taking institutions Act 94 of 1990, (1991) HBL, 101-102. 
600 See 110 above. 
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(gg) The final exception in the Act refers to the business of a mandatary who has been 
designated by the Registrar by notice in the Gazette, and whose activities are regulated 
or controlled under any other Act of Parliament, and who, for the purposes of effecting 
a money lending transaction with a bank, accepts money from the mandator in terms of 
the contract of mandate, and in the execution 9f this mandate deposits this money into 
an account maintained by the mandatary with a bank, irrespective of whether such 
money is deposited together with money accepted in the same manner by the mandatary 
from other mandators. 
4 Undesirable Practices 
A number of business practices are regarded as undesirable. They are listed in section 
78 of the Act. Included are, inter alia, the holding of shares by the bank in a company of 
which that bank is a subsidiary,60I the granting ofloans to any person on security of its 
own shares,602 and the granting of loans to further the sale of its own shares against 
insufficient security.603 Moreover, this comprehensive list is augmented by the fact that 
the Registrar has the authority to notify a bank that "a practice employed by that bank 
and specified in the notice constitutes an undesirable practice for that bank".604 
5 Natural Persons 
Natural persons are only indirectly subject to the Act. A bank must be a company, that 
is a juristic person. This means that natural persons acting in partnership (with the 
concomitant personal and unlimited liability of the partners) cannot register a bank. 
Bank managers and directors are, of course, natural persons. They are indirectly subject 
to supervision. The Registrar may, for example, refuse registration of a bank if he is not 
satisfied that the directors or chief executive officer of the institution are suitably 
601 S 78(1 )(a). 
602 S 78(1)(b). 
603 S 78(1)(c). 
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experienced and qualified.60s Should it, moreover, become clear at a later stage that any 
member of the key personnel is incompetent, the measures of banking supervision are 
directed at the bank which must then see to it that such persons are replaced to prevent 
the bank from being deregistered.606 
C Summary and Comparison 
The scope of banking supervision in Germany is limited by the statutory definition of a 
Kreditinstitut in § 1 I KWG. This means that the Bundesaufsichtsamt in terms of § 6 I 
KWG is only concerned with the Kreditinstitute listed in § 1 1. Whether a particular 
institute qualifies as a Kreditinstitut depends upon two points. First, it depends upon 
whether it has been allowed to conduct business under § 32 KWG. Secondly, any person 
(natural or legal) can fall under the KWG if it conducts banking business as described in 
§ 1 II KWG.607 Thus, in Germany, a Kreditinstitut is either an institution that has the 
permission to conduct business as a bank, or which simply conducts banking business 
without permission. 
The position is somewhat different in South Africa. Here a bank is only a bank if it is 
registered as such. A person conducting banking business without having been 
registered as a bank commits an offence but is not a bank. The concept "business of a 
bank" is also statutorily defined, but does not serve to qualify an institute as a bank. The 
unlawful conducting of banking business (i e without registration) does, however, bring 
the institution under the banking supervision powers of the Registrar.6os 
The scope of supervision of domestic and foreign banks is similar in both countries. 
Under both systems there are no special provisions for legally dependent subsidiaries of 
604 See s 78(2). 
605 S 13(2)(fA) & (g) read with s 17(2)(a). 
606 Ss 14,23 & 24. 
607 See 89 above. 
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foreign banks.609 The only difference is that in South Africa majority control of 
domestic banks is not possible. There is no similar restriction in Germany, where 100% 
foreign ownership is possible although antitrust measures may contain some 
restrictions. The restrictions in South Africa can be ascribed partly by the political 
situation in the Apartheid era. Against the background of the political isolation of the 
country it was possible by means of such restrictions to keep the economic power within 
the country and control the business of financial institutions. 
In Germany representative offices are merely required to give notice.610 The position in 
South Africa is more strict. Representative offices require permission which is only 
granted on fulfilment of certain conditions.61 I 
Subsidiaries, both those which are separate juristic persons and branches 
(Tochtergesellschaften and Zweigniederlassungen) have to meet very much the same 
requirements as those imposed upon normal local institutions in both countries. 
However, in both countries foreign institutions have to meet additional requirements.6J2 
In Germany, for example, branches of banks with head offices outside the European 
Union have to meet stricter requirements.6J3 
In both countries the legislation specifically exempts certain institutions from normal 
banking supervision.614 The legislation in both countries also contains a provision in 
terms of which the exemptions can be extended to other institutions simply by means of 
regulations. This has occurred to a corisiderable extent in both countries.615 
608 Ss SI - S4. See also 103. 
609 See 95 and 107. 
610 See 97. 
611 S 34 and see also page lOS. 
612 See 95 and 107 above. 
613 § 53 KWG. See 95, 96 above. 
614 See § 2 KWG and s 2 of the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990. 
615 See § 2 IV KWG and s 2 (b) (vii) of the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
116 
Banks are prohibited from taking part in certain business activities in both countries.616 
Under South African law, however, the Registrar has the possibility of extending this 
range merely by regulations. There is no such possibility in German law. This is further 
evidence of the much-criticised extensive powers of the Registrar in South Africa. 
Although supervision m both countries is directed primarily towards the banks 
themselves, the legislation in both countries also contains provisions aimed at natural 
persons. In Germany the provisions address partners in partnerships who can be held 
personally liable,617 as well as directors of companies.618 South African law does not 
recognise a bank in the form of a partnership. Banks may only be established as 
companies.619 As is the case in Germany, however, the directors must meet certain 
requirements concerning expertise and reliability.620 
One may conclude by noting that in the context of this chapter, the similarity of the two 
systems is evident. This can probably be ascribed to the fact that different countries 
. experience very much the same problems in this context. 
616 § 3 KWG. See also s 78 of the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990. 
617 Offene Handelsgesellschafi and Kommanditgesellschafi. Here, the partners have permission In 
accordance with § 32 KWG. 
618 See 102 above. 
619 S 11 (1). 
620 See also § 33 I No.4 KWG and ss 13 (2), 17 (2) of the Banks Act. 
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Chapter 5 
Permission to Conduct Business as a Bank 
A Federal Republic of Germany 
1 Pennission to Conduct Banking Transactions 
In tenns of § 32 I (1) KWG "[w]hoever intends to conduct banking transactions to the 
extent indicated in § 1, paragraph (1), in the territory in which this Law is effective, 
shall require a written licence from the Federal Supervisory Authority." No banking 
transactions may therefore be conducted without pennission. The general freedom of 
trade as set out in § 1 I GewO is accordingly restricted by § 32 KWG. 621 
The granting of pennission in the fonn of a licence and the features of a credit 
institution are, however, independent of one another. If an institution conducts any 
business described in § 1 I 1 and 2, this is enough to render it a credit institution 
irrespective of whether it has acquired the necessary licence. The converse is also true; 
an institution which is in possession of the relevant licence only becomes a credit 
institution once it starts conducting banking transactions.622 
The prohibition on conducting banking transactions without a licence serves to prevent 
unsuitable persons or insufficiently funded enterprises from gaining entry into the credit 
trade.623 
621 See also Chapter 2,37,38 above. 
622 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, margo n. 
2. 
623 BegrRegE KWG 1961 A VII No.1; Schork, Ludwig Die ZulassungsvorschriJten des Gesetzes tiber das 
Kreditwesen, GewArch. 1962, 241 et seq. 
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This requirement of a licence does not violate the principle of freedom of trade as 
embodied in article 12 GG and § 1 Gewo. In terms of § 1 GewO the principle of 
freedom of trade is subject to exceptions or limitations that are prescribed or allowed 
by the relevant industrial code.624 Such limitations of the principle of freedom of trade 
have also been recognised by the Bundesverfassungsgericht.625 The licence requirement 
in the banking industry can be justified with reference to the goals of banking 
supervision. These include the protection of the industry, the maintenance of its capacity 
to function, and the protection of investors. 
In terms of § 32 KWG the licence is required for the conducting of banking 
transactions "in the territory in which this Law is effective". This territory is the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The requirement is therefore also applicable to someone who has 
already been conducting banking transactions elsewhere, and now intends to conduct 
business in Germany. 
The licence must be obtained before banking transactions can be conducted.626 This is 
also clear from § 43 KWG which provides that entries in public registers can only be 
made after possession of the licence has been proved to the satisfaction of the 
Registergericht (Registration COurt).627 
The licence requirement is also applicable to public credit institutions (Offentlich-
rechtliche Kreditinstitute) that are subject to special public supervision in' accordance 
with § 52 KWG.628 
The licence is not only required for the initial establishment of a credit institution, but 
also for an expansion of the banking transactions it conducts as well as for any change 
624 See § 1 GewO (Trade Code). 
625 BVerfGE 7, 377; 33, 303,43 313. 
626 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, marg n. 
9. 
627 Consbruch, Johannes, Registergerichtliche Funktionen bei der Bankenaufsicht nach dem 
Kreditwesengesetz, (1966) BB, 102. 
628 Blihre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG - Kommentar, on § 52, marg n. 1. 
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of the legal form of the establishment, if that change implies that the holder of the 
licence changes.629 If a change of legal form does not simultaneously bring about a 
change in the holders of the licence, it needs only to be notified to the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt in accordance with § 24 I 4 KWG.630 So, for example, a change 
from a sole proprietor (Einzeljirma) to a partnership (Personenhandelsgesellschaft) or to 
a company (Kapitalgesellschaft) requires only notification. 
2 Holders of the Licence 
In the case of sole proprietors and partnerships, the owner and partners are respectively 
the holders of the licence. It follows that, in the event of a change of partners, the new 
partner or partners will have to acquire the necessary licence for the concern to continue 
conducting banking transactions. If the credit institution is a juristic person, the juristic 
person holds the licence.631 
3 Legal Nature of the Licence 
The issuing of a licence is, in South African terms, best described as a quasi-judicial 
administrative act (begiinstigender, gestaltender Verwaltungsakt) in the sense of § 35 
VwVfG. 632 The law of banking supervision, as part of Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht,633 
forms part of administrative law. The decision on whether a licence is to be granted or 
refused is therefore determined in accordance with the general principles of 
administrative law and procedure. However, these principles are supplemented by the 
provisions of the KWG. The provisions of the KWG have precedence. German 
administrative law is organised in a way that specific statutes, such as the KWG, prevail 
629 See infra under section 2 Holder of the Licence. 
630 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, marg. n. 
3 et seq. 
631 Schork, Ludwig, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen, commentary on § 32. 
632 Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG-Kommentar on § 32, margo n. I. For the wording of § 35 
VwVjG see chapter 6, n. 836 below. 
633 See chapter 2, 37 above. 
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over general regulations.634 This also means that if the KWG contains a specific rule on 
an issue, it must be applied. If there is no such rule, the general regulations must be 
applied. 
The granting of a licence is an administrative act with permanent effect (Verwaltungsakt 
mit Dauerwirkung) in the sense that it constitutes the basis of the applicant's right to 
conduct banking transactions of the permitted nature for as long as the licence remains 
valid.635 The compulsory permission required by § 32 KWG and the reasons for refusal 
of the licence set out in § 33 KWG thus constitute a preventative prohibition with 
reservation of permission.636 Without the permission the conducting of banking business 
is unlawful. 
The applicant is accordingly entitled to the licence unless one of the grounds for expiry 
or suspension mentioned in § 35 KWG is applicable,637 for example if there is a danger 
that the credit institution will not be able to meet its obligations to its creditors.6J8 The 
applicant has this right irrespective of whether there is in fact a need for banking 
transactions of the envisaged nature.639 
634 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen -Kommentar, on § 32, marg. n. 
14. 
635 Beck, Heinz, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, marg. n. 32. 
636 Biihre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG -Kommentar, on § 32 margo n. 1; Beck, Heinz, Gesetz 
iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, margo n. 11. One can distinguish between two types of 
licence; Priiventives Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt (preventative prohibition with reserved licence) and, 
Erlaubnis aufgrund des Erlaubnisvorbehalts einer Verbotsnorm - Dispensvorbehalt (repressive 
prohiibition with reserved release). Gusy, Christoph, Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt - Verbot mit 
Dispensvorbehalt, (1981) JA, 80; Schwabe, Jiirgen, Das Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt, (1973) JUS, 133. 
6J7 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, marg. 
n.2; BVerwG NJW 1959,590. 
638 § 35 II 4. 
639 C.! BVerjGE 14, 197. The Bediirfnispriifung (i e determining whether the establishment of another 
bank is in the public interest) on the third level may not be conducted. See also supra Chapter 2, 46, 47. 
See also the text to n.253. 
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In the past, before a licence could be granted for the establishment of a German branch 
of a foreign credit institution, an audit was required.640 This requirement, however, fell 
away with the 1984 amendments to the KWG. 641 
4 The Process of Granting the Licence 
The licence is issued by the Bundesaufsichtsamt. In terms of § 32 I KWG it must be in 
writing for reasons of security.642 
In accordance with the provisions of § 33 KWG a licence can only be issued upon 
application.643 The application must be accompanied by all the necessary documents.644 
Two aspects regarding this application need to be emphasised. First, it is the inception 
of the process and serves as the basis of the eventual granting of permission.645 
Secondly, the granting of permission is a mitwirkungspflichtiger Verwaltungsakt: this 
means that the licence is not simply granted automatically by the Aufsichtsamt as a 
consequence of its office, but that the Mitwirkung (co-operation) of the applicant in the 
form of an application is required.646 
Before a licence can be issued, the Bundesaufsichtsamt must consult the relevant 
association which may be, inter alia, the Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giro-Verband, the 
Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, or the Deutscher Genossenschaftsverband. 
640 § 53 II 5, 2 KWG. 
641 In the past the Bedurfnisprufung (public-need test) took account of whether the country of the foreign 
bank concerned allowed German banks. Only if this question could be answered in the affirmative would 
the foreign bank be permitted. This is no longer the case. The matter is now largely determined on the 
level of international agreements. See also amt. Begrundung, BT-Drs lOI1441 52. 
642 BegrReg£ KWG 1961 on § 31 III. 
643 Schork, Ludwig, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen, commentary on § 32. 
644 The Bundesbank has published a leaflet in several languages which deals with the requirements and 
formalities for the granting of a licence to conduct banking transactions. It can be ordered from the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Referat Offentlichkeitsarbeit, Postfach, Frankfurt a.M. 
645 See 123 below. 
646 This is not possible since the Bundesaufsichtsamt would not have access to the documents necessary to 
reach a decision. 
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However, from the wording of § 32 III KWG it is clear that this rule only applies if the 
credit institution in question intends to conduct deposit business. This subsection must 
be seen in its historic'al context. Since the extension of the securing of deposits as a 
reaction to the Herstatt bankruptcy,647 the manner in which deposit business was 
conducted has been of great importance not only to the institution itself and .its creditors 
but also to the associations that set aside the funds to secure such deposits. 648 Their 
interest in maintaining the functioning capacity of these deposit-securing funds is 
enough to justify their right to be consulted. The association, after all, and not the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt, decides on whether the institution should be granted security 
facilities. This can to a large degree prevent a credit institution being granted a licence 
though not being allowed membership to a security fund.649 However, technically, as 
regards the granting of the licence, the Bundesaufsichtsamt is not bound to follow the 
view of the association. 
The application for the licence must be considered in accordance with the principles 
established by the Verfassungsgericht since it entails an intervention in the freedom of 
profession entrenched in art 12 GG.650 In the event of the application being refused, or 
the licence being restricted to specified types of banking transactions, or if it is subject 
to conditions, the applicant, in terms of §§ 68 ff VwGO, can submit a 
Verpjlichtungsklage to the Verwaltungsgericht (administrative court) after the 
conclusion of the preliminary process. If the court decides that the refusal or limitation 
647 See Chapter 1, 17 above. 
648 GUnther, Hans, Die kunJtige Einlagensicherung der privaten Banken, (1975) Bank-Betrieb, 250; the 
same author, Erweiterte Aufgaben fur den Prufungsverband deutscher Banken, (1976) Bank-Betrieb, 92; 
Schwark, Eberhard, Einlagensicherung bei Banken, (1974) NJW, 1849; Ungnade, Dieter, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte der Einlagensicherung, (1974) ZfgK, 1072; Fischer, Reinfried, Fragen der 
Einlagensicherung in der KreditwirtschaJt, (1975) Gemhlt., 99; Starke Otto-Ernst, Staatliche 
Bankenaufsicht und Einlagensicherung, (1976) VW, 280; Scholl, Claus, Einlagensicherung bei 
Kreditinstituten, (1981) JUS, 88; Kruk, Josef, Einlagensicherung: Auf Anhieb bewahrt, (1976) Bank-
Betrieb, 255; Habscheid, Edgar, Sicherung von Bankeinlagen trotz fehlenden Rechtsanspruchs und 
ausgeschlossener AmtshaJtung?, (1988) BB, 2328. 
649Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieJ3, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, marg. n. 
15. 
650 C.f Chapter 2,45 et seq. 
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was unlawful and the applicant's rights were consequently infringed,65I it can instruct 
the Bundesaufsichtsamt to issue a licence or to free it from the relevant limitations.652 
The cost of the licensing process is fixed. The amount is determined in accordance with 
§ 51 II KWG. 
5 Limitation of the Licence 
The act of granting a licence basically 'represents a purely administrative act (or 
ministerial decision) since the applicant is entitled to a licence in terms of § 32 I KWG 
unless there are valid grounds for refusal.653 The principle of Gesetzesvorbehalt, namely 
that a fundamental right such as the freedom to trade may only be limited in terms of the 
law, must be applied. The licence may, therefore (and in accordance with § 36 I 1 Alt. 
VwVjG), only be restricted or limited if so provided in some provision of law. Such a 
provision can be found in §32 II 1 KWG, which allows conditional or limited licencing 
within the framework of the objectives of the KWG.654 
A condition may compel the beneficiary to do something, tolerate something or refrain 
from something.655 If the condition is not satisfied the licence can be revoked.656 The 
imposed conditions must be in harmony with the objectives of the KWG. A condition 
not in harmony with the objectives of the KWG would be indicative of an abuse of 
discretion and the condition would be contestable.657 
651 Note the wording of § 113 I, IV VwGO. 
652 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, margo n. 
17. See also Chapter 6 below. 
653 This can be deduced from § 33 KWG according to which "[t]he licence may be refused only if ... ". 
654 Cj the wording in § 32 II KWG. 
655 See § 36 II NO.4 VwVjG. 
656 § 35 II KWG in connection with 49 II I No. VwVjG. 
651 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, marg. n. 
12. 
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The issuing of a condition usually takes place within the framework of a supplementary 
provision to a Begunstigender Verwaltungsakt (an administrative act which benefits the 
recipient and takes nothing from him). Conditions that effectively compel the credit 
institution to broaden its base of equity capital, or to employ a further manager of 
suitable expertise, or to exclude a personally liable partner without the necessary 
expertise from managing or representing the credit institution are acceptable.658 
A controversial question, for many years, was whether the Bundesaufsichtsamt could 
impose the condition that the credit institution was to join a deposit-securing fund. The 
Verwaltungsgericht (Berlin) took the view that there was no legal basis for such a 
condition in the KWG.659 The Bundesaufsichtsamt subsequently adapted its 
administrative practice to this verdict.660 In these circumstances the licence is now 
granted together with a suggestion to the effect that the credit institution should join a 
deposit-securing fund. In the event of the credit institution not following this suggestion, 
the Bundesaufsichtsamt responds by imposing the condition that all the relevant 
documents of the institution must expressly state that the institution is not a member of 
any securing fund. In this way the credit institution is placed under considerable 
pressure to conform. 
The possibility of removing supplementary requirements, especially in the form of 
conditions, has for many years been a controversial topic in administrative-law theory. 
The matter has not yet been clearly resolved by the courts. A particular administrative 
act can be removed in its entirety through the procedure known as the Anfechtungsklage. 
However, should the aggrieved party wish not to remove the entire administrative act 
(for example the permission to conduct business), but only some condition relating to 
the act (for example the condition that an additional director be appointed) this can be 
658 Biihre, Lore Inge / Schneider, Manfred, KWG-Kommentar, on § 32 marg. n. 5; Sazgunn, Volkhard / 
Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, marg. n. 12. 
659 VG Berlin WM 1987, 370. 
660 The Okobank, which was founded in 1988, is an example of a bank that is not a member of a deposit 
securing fund. Griines Licht fiir die Okobank, FAZ yom 9. Miirz 1988; Gesterkamp, Harald, Die Okobank 
- eine funktionsfahige Kreditgenossenschajt, (1988) ZfgK, 60; Kuffer, Wolfgang, Typologische 
Betrachtung alternativer Banken (1987). 
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achieved by means of the so-called isolierten A nfectungsklage.66 I If successful, the 
original administrative act remains in place, but the condition is removed. 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt can enforce the directions and conditions it has issued. In terms 
of § 50 KWG it has the powers conferred by the Verwaltungs- Vollstreckungsgesetz 
(Administration Enforcement Act). The culpable non-compliance with a condition is a 
misdemeanour in terms of § 56 I 3 KWG. This does not automatically lead to 
cancellation of the licence. However, the licence can be revoked in accordance with the 
provisions of § 35 II KWG read with § 49 II 2 VwVfG.662 Another possibility is that it 
might lead to the dismissal of managers (in terms of § 36 KWG) or the imposition by the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt of provisional measures in terms of § 46 KWG aimed at protecting 
the safety of assets entrusted to the credit institution. 
Furthermore, in terms of § 32 II 2 KWG the licence can be limited to certain types of 
banking transactions.663 
§ 2 II c KAGG prohibits banks from conducting investment business along with other 
banking transactions.664 Other regulations affecting special ~anks and their fields of 
activity remain untouched by § 62 I KWG. 
The restriction to certain types of banking cannot be removed by means of the isolierte 
Anfechtungsklage procedure.665 The limitation of a licence in this manner is not regarded 
as a supplementary provision (Nebenbestimmung) that can be attacked in this manner.666 
661 BVerwGE 65, 139, commissioned by BVerwGE 55, 135, 157f; Osterloh, Lerke, On BVerwG, Urteil 
vom 17. Februar 1984 4C 70180, (1984) Jus, 978; Stelken, Paul, Problem Auf/age, (1985) NVwZ, 469. 
662 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, marg. n. 
16. 
663 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, marg. n. 
13. It must be assumed, deviating from the legislative wording, that limitation of this kind is not just 
limited to individual banking transactions. Prior licensing for each type of banking transaction is not 
executable in practice which means that a restriction can, at the most, refer to certain individual banking 
transactions. 
664 See also § 1 I 2 6 KWG. 
665 BVerwG, DOV 1974,380; BVerwGE 69,37; BayOLG, UPR 1988,26. 
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An institution that has applied for but not yet been granted a licence, does not act in 
contravention of a condition but is actually operating the business without permission. 
Permission to conduct banking transactions for which application has been made but not 
yet granted can only be obtained by way of. a Verpjlichtungsklage (mandamus) in 
accordance with § 42 I 2 VwGO. 
Conditions as set out in § 36 II 2 VwVfG and time limits (§ 36 II 1 VwVfG) are only 
permissible insofar as they ensure that the administrative act meets its objective.667 
6 Refusal of Licence 
The freedom of profession guaranteed by art 12 I GG entitles applicants, in principle, to 
the necessary licence.668 However, this principle is effectively restricted by § 33 I 1-5 
KWG which sets out the grounds upon which a licence can be refused. The presence of 
any such ground does not necessarily mean that the licence will be refused. The 
Bundesaufsichtsamt retains a discretion in this regard. 669 If, on the other hand, there is 
no ground for refusal, the Bundesauftichtsamt has no discretion. It must grant the 
licence.67o The following grounds for refusal are recognised: 
666 Maurer, Hartmut, Al/gemeines Verwaltungsrecht (1988) § 12; marg. n .. 16; Weyreuther, Felix, 
Modijizierte Aujlagen, (1984) DVBI., 365. 
667 Beck, Heinz, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 32, margo n. 25. 
668 BVerwG, NJW 1959,590. 
669 BegrRegE KWG 1961 on § 32; BT-Drs. 3/1114 on § 32 39; Reischauer, Friedrich / Kleinhans, 
Joachim, Kreditwesengesetz - Kommentar, on § 33, marg. n.. 3. The discretio.nary scope the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt should be comparably small (also because of the principle of equal treatment) so 
that, as a rule, an actual refusal is often the result. See also GUnther, Hans, Der Ermessensspielraum des 
Bundesaufsichtsamtes fiir das Kreditwesen bei der Neuzulassung von Banken, (1968) Bank-Betrieb, 80. A 
different opinion, even if only that of a minority, is held by Bading, Arnold / Holzer, Siegfried / 
Wirsching, Heinz Kommentar zum Kreditwesengesetz (1978), on § 33, marg. n. 1. These authors see 
refusal as compulsory if a reason for it exists. 
670 See Chapter 6 below. See further Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieJ3, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen 
- Kommentar, on § 33, margo n. 3. 
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6 i insufficient Means 
A licence can be refused if the institution does not have sufficient means, especially 
liable equity capital, within the country.67I By "means" is meant "monetary means".672 
This can be equity or foreign capital. Comprehensive foreign means without sufficient 
equity capital is, however, still a sufficient ground for refusal of the licence.673 As to 
what is meant by sufficient (ausreichend), clear standards have not yet emerged from 
the decisions of the Bundesaufsichtsamt. 674 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt has developed certain mInImUm requirements through the 
years. Different requirements are set, however, for different types of banks. The 
requirements for Sparkassen (savings banks) are, for example, more lenient than those 
imposed upon other banks due to the fact that they have the backing of the public (the 
Gemeinde, Stadt and Bundesland) as guarantors.675 
6 2 Unreliability of the Applicant 
A licence can be refused on the basis of facts indicative of the applicant or any of the 
other persons mentioned in § 1 II 1 KWG (that is any of the natural persons appointed to 
manage or represent a credit institution) being not reliable.676 The meaning of 
"unreliable person" has been developed in case law (as in § 35 GewO). Essentially, if 
there is no certainty that a person will in future conduct business in a regular manner, 
he is unreliable.677 In the context of § 33 12 KWG, this means that an unreliable person 
671 § 33 I No. 1 KWG. 
672 In terms of § 33 I Nr. 1 "means" should be understood as "monetary means" (Geldmittel) as opposed 
to "means of operation" (Betriebsmittel) which is a wider concept including for example office 
equipments. See also BegrRegE KWG 1961 on § 32. 
673 C.f the rule in §§ 10 I, 10 a I KWG where "adequate" equity capital is mentioned. The difference is 
due to the fact that the quota of equity capital is determined over the risk-laden assets during the course 
of business. 
674 Reischauer, Friedrich / Kleinhans, Joachim, Kreditwesengesetz-Kommentar, on § 33, marg. n. 6. 
675 See the listing in Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, 
on § 33, marg. n. 5. 
676 § 33 I No.2 KWG. This regulation arises from the protective function of the law (B VerwG NJW 1961, 
1834). 
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is one whose personality does not guarantee the regular and legally sound management 
of a credit institution.678 
Examples of unreliable persons in this sense are: someone who has committed a 
Vermogensdelikt (financial offence); someone who has contravened the regulations 
relating to the operation of a credit institution; and, someone who has shown in his 
private or business conduct that sound business management cannot be expected of 
him.679 Conducting banking business without a licence also forms part of this list as it 
constitutes an offence in terms of § 54 KWG. 
Unreliability is established objectively with reference to the gravity of the offence and 
subjectively with reference to the degree of fault or CUlpability. The gravity of the 
offence or misconduct is therefore weighed up against the degree of fault on the part of 
the person concemed.680 In terms of § 33 I 2 KWG reliability is presumed in principle 
until facts that contradict this presumption become known. In determining unreliability 
the Bundesaufsichtsamt must in each case take account of the specific banking business 
applied for. 681 For example, can it be said that the same criteria should apply for deposit 
business as for credit busines? The concept of reliability represents an indefinite concept 
of law (unbestimmter RechtsbegriffJ. This means that the concept is not defined in the 
legislation but must be developed in case law. Since this is not considered a 
discretionary decision, it can be tested in court to its full extent.682 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt has the discretion to decide on the manner in which to discover 
the relevant facts necessary for evaluation purposes. Here, §§ 150a I 2a GewO and 8 II 
677 BVerwGE 65, 1. 
678 BVerwG, BeschluJ3 vom 31. Mai 1976. 
679 Abs. III BegrRegE KWG 1961 zu § 32. 
680 General infonnation regarding the obligation of a neat and conscientious manager to be thorough and 
responsible as regards legal literature and case law can be found in Kust, Egon, Zur Sorgfaltspflicht und 
Verantwortlichkeit eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften Geschiiftsleiters, (1980) WM, 758. 
681 Amt!. Begriindung, BT-Drs. §/1114, on § 32 39; Reischauer, Friedrich / Kleinhans, Joachim, 
Kreditwesengesetz - Kommentar, on § 33, margo n. 9. 
682 BVerwGE 28,202,204; Beck, Heinz, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 33, marg. n. 
24. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
129 
1 Anzeigeverordnunl83 are usually applied and an extract from the Strafregister 
(register of previous convictions) is obtained.684 In terms of these provisions of the 
GewO the different German Behorden (public offices) are entitled to exchange 
information relating to the applicant. The Behorde who requires the information simply 
asks for it from the other Behorden but must give the grounds for which the information 
is needed. 
A rejection of the application for a licence on the grounds of unreliability must be 
entered in the Gewerbezentralregister (central trade register).685 
6 3 Unreliability of a Person seeking Considerable Participation 
The KWG also provides for the situation where someone who has been found to be 
unreliable under § 33 I No.2 KWG attempts to acquire influence over a Kreditinstitut 
indirectly by means of a Beteiligung(sgesellschaft) (participation or an associated 
company). In terms of a recent addtion to the KWG (§ 33 I No. 2a) this may also 
consitute a ground for refusal of the licence. 
6 4 Insufficient Professional Qualification 
A licence can further be refused on the ground that the Inhaber (proprietor) or any of the 
persons described in § 1 II I KWG (that is any of the natural persons appointed to 
manage or represent a credit institution) does not possess the professional qualifications 
necessary for managing the affairs of a credit institution.686 Professional qualification 
includes sufficient theoretical and practical knowledge of banking business as well as 
senior management experience.687 The onus is on the applicant to satisfy the 
683 Verordnung vom 20. August 1985, BGBI. I 1716. 
684 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieJ3, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 33, marg. n. 
11. 
685 § 153a Gewo. § read with 149 II la Gewo. 
686 § 33 I No.3 KWG. 
687 Schreiben des Bundesauftichtsamtesfiir das Kreditwesen vom 23. Juni 1987 (Gesch No. 12-151-7/87. 
Printed in Bading, Arnold / Holzer, Siegfried / Wirsching, Heinz, Kommentar zum Kreditwesengesetz, on 
§ 33, margo n. 2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
130 
Bundesaufsichtsamt that he has the necessary qualifications. The Bundesaufsichtsamt is 
not required to establish whether the necessary qualifications are present.688 
The required theoretical knowledge embraces economics, business economics, tax and 
general legal matters. The practical knowledge must include comprehensive 
professional competence as well as other capabilities necessary for the position, such as 
intelligence and leadership qualities. As a general rule the Bundesaufsichtsamt takes the 
view that this can only be acquired by experience in a credit institution689 or in a 
supervisory body.690 Insufficient practical experience in banking business therefore 
results in a more stringent test for the entrant.691 
Management experience, in tum, should preferably be in the management of another 
comparable credit institution or in the managing of a branch provided the branch was so 
structured that it allowed its manager a sufficient responsibility and the opportunity of 
making his own decisions.692 Experience outside a credit institution as the manager of a 
team of auditors or as a board member of a federation of auditors is, however, also 
acceptable.693 
In reaching its decision the Bundesaufsichtsamt may only take account of past 
experience and conduct. A mere abstract consideration of the person is not pennitted. 
The previous post is to be used as a point of departure. The unspecified tenn 
"professional qualification" was given substance in the 1984 revision of the KWG in 
tenns of which three years' service in an executive position with a credit institution of 
688 See Kopp, Ferdinand 0., VerwaltungsverJahrensgesetz, on § 24 VwVfG, margo n. 24 et seq. 
689 Schreiben des Bundesaufsichtsamtes vom 23. Juni 1987, Gesch.-No. 12-151-7/87. 
690 BegrRegE KWG-Novelle 1984 zu § 33. 
691 Hafke, Heinz Christian, Ober die Zulassung von A uJ3enseitern, (1980) ZKW, 664 
692 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 33, marg. n. 
13. 
693 BegrRegE KWG-Novelle 1984 zu § 33. 
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comparable SIze and type IS as a general rule deemed to constitute sufficient 
professional qualification.694 
The requirements necessary in terms of the KWG can be met in this way only. The 
relevant activity or experience need not immediately precede the application for a 
licence. However, should it predede the application by a considerable period, the 
presumption falls away and the Bundesaufsichtsamt will determine whether the 
requirement is met with the aid of further documents.69s 
It must be noted that a licence can be refused if even only one of the managers does not 
have the necessary professional qualifications. This is the case despite the fact that not 
all the managers need to have comprehensive knowledge of the entire business. General 
knowledge combined with detailed special knowledge in one or more domains is 
sufficient. 696 
6 5 InsuffiCient Number of Managers 
For the licence to be granted the institution must have at least two managers. The 
requirement of a minimum of two managers arises from the dangers inherent in having a 
single manager. The illness of such a manager, or his absence on vacation, or the fact 
that he has proved to be unreliable may lead to important decision not being taken. 
Furthermore, this four-eyes principle secures greater protection against malpractice and 
criminal acts and is thus in line with the objectives of the KWG. 697 Thus, in terms of § 
33 I No.4 KWG, the licence must be refused if the bank does not have at least two 
managers. The four-eyes principle is only a minimum requirement. It is therefore quite 
admissible to appoint more than two managers. 
694 § 33 II KWG read with § 33 13 KWG. See also: Amt!. Begrundung, BT-Drs. 1011441, on No. 28 (§ 33 
KWG), 49; Dtirr, Wolfram, Bankleiterqualifikation, (1987) ZIP, 1289; Beckmann, Klaus / Bauer, 
Joachim, Bankenaufsichtsrecht, Entscheidungssammlung, on § 33 11 (Nr. 4 und J 3); Buchholz, Angelika, 
Aufsicht ohne Nachsicht, WiWo No.3, 13 January 1989,28. 
695 Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG-Kommentar on § 33, marg. n. 5; Beck, Heinz, Gesetz 
uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 33, marg. n. 26 et seq.; Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, 
Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on §. 33, marg. n. 19. 
696 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 33, marg. n. 
20. 
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It is to be assumed, in principle, that a manager can only devote his working capacity to 
one bank. If it is foreseen that in an exceptional case a particular manager is also to 
manage another bank (for example a subsidiary), this will only be allowed by the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt it it is clear that the orderly management of neither bank will be 
impaired. 
In essence, § 33 I No.4 KWG corresponds with art 3 II of the first EU Banking Law Co-
ordinating Guideline (no 7717801EWG9 of 12 December 1977/98 which standardises the 
introduction of the Vier-Augen-Prinzip. 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt requires the managers to be full-time heads. They may not act 
in a merely honorary capacity. This is regarded as controversial in legal literature due to 
the fact that the above mentioned EU Co-ordinating Guideline does not exclude the 
employment of managers acting in an honorary capacity as long as these are only active 
in decisionmaking.699 
6 6 Other Reasons 
A branch of a foreign credit institution may be refused a licence on the basis of an 
absence of reciprocity in accordance with international agreements (that is that German 
institutions are not allowed to open branches in that country).700 
In terms of § 2a KWG credit institutions may not be conducted in the form of a sole 
proprietorship. Other intentions constitute a reason for refusal. 701 
697 BT-Drs. 7/3657, on § 33, 15. 
698 Abl.E. G. No. L 322 of 17 December 1977, 30. 
699 Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 33, marg. n. 
22. 
700 § 53 II 5 2 KWG. See further Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG - Kommentar, on § 53, 
margo n. 6; Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 53, 
marg. n. 27. 
701 Cj § 2a KWG. 
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The licence can also be refused if § 3 KWG is contravened, in other words if the 
institution intends conducting prohibited business. 
6 7 Refusal for Reasons outside the KWG 
In terms of the general principles of administrative law, the participation of the 
administration in illegal or immoral causes is not allowed.702 The unavoidable 
consequence would be the suspension of the licence as contemplated in § 35 KWG. 
7 The Absence of a Licence 
In terms of § 32 I 2 KWG, a licence can only be granted after application for it has been 
made. In the absence of an application, no banking transactions may be conducted. If 
the licence was granted in part, in other words for only some of the categories of 
banking business requested, it follows that only those categories of transactions may be 
conducted. 
7 1 Expiry of the Licence 
In terms of § 35 I KWG a licence expires if it has not been used within 1 year of it being 
granted. This provision is aimed at guarding the Vbersichtlichkeit (ability to supervise) 
of the granted licences.703 Thus it is ensured that the Bundesaufsichtsamt has a reliable 
overview of the number of licences issued and utilised. The expiry is automatic. 
"Making use" of the licence is to be understood as the taking up of the full commercial 
operation of a bank in the sense of §§ 32 I, 1 I KWG. 
In addition, in terms of the GewO, which applies to a far wider range of enterprises 
including Kreditinstitute, the licence will expire if it is refused or on the death of the 
holder. 704 
702 Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG-Kommentar on § 33, marg. n. 2; Schork, Ludwig, 
Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen, Kommentar, on § 33, marg. n. 3. 
703 BegrRegE KWG 1961 on § 34. 
704 Schork, Ludwig, Die Zulassungsvorschriften des Gesetzes tiber das Kreditwesen, (1962) GewArch, 
244. 
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A licence is granted for a specific period. It follows that the precise moment of 
inception and conclusion of a period can be very important. In German law this is 
regulated in §§ 187 I, 188 II BGB read with § 43 VwVfG. 705 
In principle, there is no legal remedy, except the Feststellungsklage according to § 43 
VWGO, to terminate the licence. For a Feststellungsklage to be brought a special interest 
to seek a declaratory judgment (besondere Feststellungsinteresse) must be shown. This 
implies that the applicant must in fact be affected by the termination of the licence. The 
purpose is to ensure that only a person who has a personal interest in the matter should 
be able to bring the application.706 
In terms of § 34 II KWG the licence also expires on the death of the holder. § 34 I KWG 
expressly excludes § 45 of the Gewerbeordnung (Trade Code) in terms of which an 
enterprise cannot be continued by a representative in these circumstances. § 34 II KWG, 
however, provides that the credit institution may, in the interest of the heirs, be 
continued for a period of up to a year by 2 deputies. During this time the deputies are 
considered to be the managers. 707 § 24 I 1 KWG stipulates that their appointment must 
be reported to the Bundesaufsichtsamt. The managers themselves are required by § 24 
705 § 187 BGB reads as follows: "(I) 1st flir den Anfang einer Frist ein Ereignis oder ein in den Lauf eines 
Tages fallender Zeitpunkt ma/3gebend, so wird bei der Berechnung der Frist der Tag nicht mitgerechnet, 
in welchen das Ereignis oder der Zeitpunkt fallt. (2) 1st der Beginn eines Tages der fur den Anfang einer 
Frist ma/3gebende Zeitpunkt, so wird dieser Tag b~i der Berechnung der Frist mitgerechnet. Das gleiche 
gilt yon dem Tage der Geburt bei der Berechnung des Lebensalters." 
§ 188 BGB reads as follows: "(1) Eine nach Tagen bestimmte Frist endigt mit dem Ablauf des letzten 
Tages der Frist. (2) Eine Frist, die nach Wochen, nach Monaten oder nach einem oder mehreren Monate 
umfassenden Zeitraume - Jahr, halbes Jahr, Vierteljahr - bestimmt ist, endigt im Falle des § 187 I mit dem 
Ablaufe desjenigen Tages der letzten Woche oder des letzten Monats, welcher durch seine Benennung 
oder seine Zahl dem Tage entspricht, in den das Ereignis oder der Zeitpunkt falIt, im Falle des § 187 II 
mit dem Ablaufe desjenigen Tages der letzten Woche oder des letzten Monats, welcher dem Tage 
Yorhergeht, der durch seine Benennung oder seine Zahl dem Anfangstage der Frist entspricht. (3) Fehlt 
einer nach Monaten bestimmten Frist in dem letzten Monate der flir ihren Ablauf ma/3gebende Tag, so 
endigt die Frist mit dem Ablaufe des letzten Tages dieses Monats. 
§ 43 VwVjG reads as follows: "(1) Ein Verwaltungsakt wird gegeniiber demjenigen, fur den er bestimmt 
ist oder der yon ihm betroffen wird, in dem Zeitpunkt wirksam, in dem er ihm bekanntgegeben wird. Der 
Verwaltungsakt wird mit dem Inhalt wirksam, mit dem er bekanntgegeben wird. (2) Ein Verwaltungsakt 
bleibt wirksam, solange und soweit er nicht zuIiickgenommen, widerrufen, anderweitig aufgehoben oder 
durch Zeitablauf oder auf andere Weise erledigt ist. (3) Ein nichtiger Verwaltungsakt ist unwirksam." 
706 Redeker, Konrad / Oertzen, Hans Joachim yon, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung-Kommentar, on § 43 
VwGO, marg. n. 3. 
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III also to report to the Bundesaufsichtsamt. In exceptional cases the one-year deadline 
can be extended in terms of § 34 II KWG. 
7 2 Revocation of the Licence 
.. 
The granting of a licence constitutes a Begiinstigender Verwaltungsakt in the sense of § 
35 VwVfG,708 in other words an administrative act which benefits the recipient and takes 
nothing from him. The revocation of a licence can be the withdrawal of an unlawful 
administrative act (Riicknahme eines rechtswidrigen Verwaltungsaktes). An example 
would be if the applicant was younger than 18 years and was therefore contractually 
incapable. In this case the revocation is effected in terms of § 48 Vw VfG. However, the 
revocation can also be revocation of a lawful administrative act (Widerruf eines 
rechtmdfJigen Verwaltungsaktes). This would be the case where the licence was 
properly issued but is revoked later due to non-fulfillment of stipulated conditions. This 
revocation then takes place in terms of § 49 VwVfG. The authority to revoke in terms of 
§ 48 or 49 must be sought in § 35 II KWG. 709 
The revocation amounts to a Belastender, gestaltender Verwaltungsakt, the opposite of 
a begiinstigenden Veraltungsakt, in that it takes a right from a person and gives 
nothing. 7IO As a general rule a Widerspruch (objection) or an Anfechtungsklage 
(application to rescind) relating to an administrative act has Aufschiebende Wirkung (a 
postponing effect) in German law. In other words the legal consequences of the 
adminsitrative act are postponed until the Widerspruch or Anfechtungsklage has been 
decided. It must be noted however, that this is not the case with administrative action 
based on § 35 II 2, 3. (§ 49 KWG). 
707 § 34 II 3 KWG. 
708 See supra in this chapter under 3 Legal Natur.e of the Licence. 
709 Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG-Kommentar, on § 35, marg. n. 3. 
710 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 35, margo n. 
30. 
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The bases upon which the Bundesaufsichtsamt may suspend a licence are set out in § 35 
. II KWG. The decision is discretionary. The Bundesaufsichtsamt may revoke the licence; 
it is not duty-bound to do SO.711 This implies that it must consider carefully all the 
relevant circumstances in order to reach a fair decision. Irrelevant considerations should 
not be taken into account. It is also possible not to revoke the licence immediately, but 
rather to allow some time for the parties concerned to meet the necessary conditions. 
The discretion also extends to a partial revocation, that is a discontinuation of the 
permission to conduct certain but not all banking transactions.712 
The licence may be revoked by the Bundesaufsichtsamt if the business operations to 
which the licence refers have not been exercised for the period of one year (§ 35 II no 1 
KWG). This regulation is also aimed at maintaining the ability to supervise. 
§ 35 II 2 KWG, which was introduced by the amendirig legislation of 1976 also allows 
for revocation if the credit institution is conducted in the Rechtsform des 
Einzelkaufmans (form of a sole proprietorship). 713 
The licence may further be revoked if the applicant or a manager is unreliable or if he 
does not have sufficient professional qualification (§ 35 II No. 3a KWG). In this case it 
is crucial to know whether these facts already existed when the licence was granted, or 
whether they were subsequently discovered, or whether they arose after that time. If the 
facts were known at the time of the granting of the licence, but they were disregarded, 
there will not necessarily be a revocation. The moment upon which knowledge of the 
facts is gained is thus decisive. 714 
711 This contrary to § 35 I KWG in terms of which the licence expires. Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieJ3, 
Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar. on § 35, margo n. 17. 
712 Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG-Kommentar. on § 35, marg n. 3. 
713 This provision, however, does not affect individual bankers who were already in existence on 1 May 
1976. Since that date, individual bankers have not been permitted. Thus, the rule only pertains to credit 
institutions that were transformed to the legal form of the single businessman or if that form came about 
as a result of the death or retirement of a partner after 30 April 1976 (BegRegE KWG-Nove/le 1976 zu § 
35). 
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The KWG distinguishes between geborene Geschtiftsleiter and gekorene 
Geschtiftsleiter. A geborene Geschtiftsleiter is a manager who leads automatically by 
virtue of being, for example, a partner or managing director. A gekorene 
Geschiiftsleiter (chosen manager), on the other hand, is one who is temporarily in 
charge as a consequence of some crisis, for example. the sudden death of the previous 
manager. The unreliability and insufficient professional qualification of such a chosen 
manager will not justify the revocation of a licence.715 
Similarly, if it becomes known that the credit institution does not have at least two 
managers who are not acting merely in an honorary capacity, the licence can be 
revoked.7I6 
The licence may also be revoked if the obligations of a credit institution towards its 
creditors are endangered, especially if this threatens the security of the assets entrusted 
to the institution and the danger cannot be averted by other measures available under the 
KWG. Such a danger is regarded as being present, and therefore does not need to be 
proven by the Bundesaufsichtsamt, if the institution has lost half the standardising liable 
equity capital (determined in accordance with § 10 VII KWG) , or if more than 10% of 
the liable equity capital has been lost during the course of at least three consecutive 
business years. 717 
As noted above the revocation can be based on the provisions of §§ 48 or 49 VwVfG. 
The licence can be revoked in terms of § 48 Vw VfG if it was obtained by wilful deceit, 
threats or bribery,718 or by submitting fraudulent particulars upon application. 719 In terms 
of § 48 IV 1 Vw VfG the application to revoke an administrative act must be brought 
714 A list of exemplary circumstances that lead to a retrospective suspension of the licence can be found in 
Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 35, marg. n. 22. 
715 BVerwG, WM 1971, 1214. 
716 § 35 II 3b KWG. 
717 § 35 II 4 KWG. 
718 § 48 II 3 No.1 VwVjG. 
719 § 48 II No.2 VwVjG. See Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschie13, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen -
Kommentar, on § 35, marg. n. 14. 
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within one year of the act. However, in accordance with § 35 IV KWG this time limit 
does not apply to the revocation ofa licence as set out in § 32 I KWG. 720 
The revocation of the licence can be based on § 49 VwVfG, especially in the case of the 
submission of fraudulent particulars721 and where the holder of the licence does not meet 
the conditions attached to the licence in terms of § 32 II KWG or is late in complying 
with the conditions.722 
7 3 Legal Consequences of the Absence of a Licence 
The expiry or suspension of a licence means that the banking transactions covered by 
the licence may no longer be conducted. 
Conducting banking transactions without a licence is punishable in terms of § 54 
KWG. The maximum penalty is imprisonment for a term of three years or a fine. In 
addition it may constitute a misdemeanour under § 56 KWG read with §§ 30 I, 130 
o Wi G 723 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt may, in terms of § 37 KWG, take immediate action against 
the illegal conduct of banking transactions, and may implement corresponding coercive 
measures in accordance with § 50 I KWG and the provisions of the VwVG.724 
7 4 Liquidation of a Credit Institution 
From the moment upon which the licence is suspended, the credit institution may no 
longer conduct banking transactions.725 It must, however, fulfil all its existing 
720 This Section was introduced by the 1984 amendments to the KWG. The suspension of the licence is 
often only the ultima ratio. Audits in the banking trade to determine whether the discovered deficiencies 
can be removed by way of less charging measures, often require a long period of time which often 
exceeds one year (Amtl. Begrundung, BT-Drs. 1011441, on No. 29 (§ 35 KWG) 50). 
721 § 49 II No.2 VwVjG. 
722 Bahre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG-Kommentar, on § 35, marg. n. 3. 
72J See also below Chapter 6, 167 et seq. 
724 Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschiel3, Karl, Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 35, marg. n. 
31 and on § 37 marg. n. 1 et seq. 
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obligations. This is necessary to protect the interests of creditors. Thus, all transactions 
that serve the purpose of winding up the business of the institution must be completed. 
Only then can the criminal law take its course, or banking supervisory measures be 
imposed.726 The order of liquidation must be entered in the Register of the relevant 
Registergericht (Registration Court). The Bundesaufsichtsamt may issue general 
directives regarding the liquidation of a credit institution and may apply to the 
Registration Court to have liquidators appointed if the persons otherwise responsible for 
the liquidation afford no guarantee of orderly liquidation proceedings.727 
8 Conducting Banking Transactions without a Licence 
Banking transactions may be conducted without a licence in the following 
circumstances: (i) where the volume of the transactions does not require a commercially 
organised business operation;728 where their nature does not necessitate supervision and 
the enterprise is consequently exempted;729 where the institution is continued after the 
death of the holder of the licence by a representative;730 and, where the credit institution 
is being 1iquidated.731 
9 Other Duties related to Licensing and Registration 
This concerns especially § 14 I 1 of the GewO (Trade Code} which requires registration 
to take place with the competent authority of the relevant place according to the Law of 
that Land when an independent enterprise of an existing trade is started, or a branch or 
an independent branch is established. 
725 As to what amounts to a "banking transaction" see § I I of the KWG. 
726 BGH, DB 1966, 1725; Sazgunn, Volkhard / WohlschieB, Karl, Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen -
Kommentar, on § 35, marg. n. 9. 
. 727 § 38 II 2 KWG. 
728 § I I 1 KWG. 
729 § 2 IV KWG. 
730 § 34 II KWG. 
731 § 38 I KWG). 
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Furthennore, §§ 137, 138 A0732 must be taken into account. These statutes provide that 
taxpayers who are not natural persons must report circumstances affecting tax that are of 
importance to the Inland Revenue Office as well as the community. Especially common 
in this regard is the reporting of acquisitions abroad and participation in foreign 
partnerships and of participation of a particular amount. 
B Republic of South Africa 
1 Introduction 
Section 11 of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 provides: 
"(1) Subject to the provisions of section 18A, no person shall conduct the 
business of a bank unless such person is a public company and is registered as a 
bank in tenns of this Act. 
(2) Any person who contravenes a provision of subsection (1) shall be guilty of 
an offence." 
The issue of pennission to conduct banking business in South African law must be 
approached from this point of departure. 
2 Obligatory Pennission 
According to this provision, prior registration is necessary in order to take up and 
conduct banking business.733 This prerequisite of registration in effect implies that 
pennission to conduct banking business is obligatory. Contravention of section 11 of the 
Banks Act (that is conducting banking business without pennission) is an offence.734 
732 Abgabenordnung (Tax Code). 
733 Before a bank is finally registered, however, a series of preliminary procedures must be carried out. 
See in this chapter, 143 below. 
734 S 11 (2). 
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The reasoning behind a general prohibition of this nature can be found in the objectives 
of banking supervision.735 Admission to the banking business can, by withholding 
pennission (registration), be refused if the applicant is not suitable. The criminal 
sanctions following on a contravention of section 11, guarantee the strongest' possible 
protection of the banking industry in this regard. 
It is suggested that these provisions are not suspect from a constitutional viewpoint. The 
banking sector of the economy clearly needs provisions of this nature to maintain and 
ensure its capacity to function properly, especially in light of its elevated position in the 
economy as a whole. The fundamental rights of individuals, which might possibly be 
infringed by these provisions, must yield to the general, predominating interest of the 
public to maintain the functioning capacity of this sector of the economy.736 
The obligation to register clearly relates only to the territory within which the Banks Act 
is in force, that is within the Republic of South Africa. 
The Banks Act does not contain any provisions that automatically render an enterprise 
conducting banking business a bank. However, it must be noted that the Registrar, as 
the supervising organ, has the power to intervene and implement measures to prevent 
the further conduct of such proh'ibited economic activity.737 
3 Who Holds the Pennission? 
The pennission is only granted to public companies established in accordance with the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973. Neither natural persons nor partnerships can register as a 
bank. Only a particular type of juristic person, a public company, can so register. 738 The 
company is the holder of the pennission. 
735 Cj Chapter 2, 54 et seq. above. 
736 Cj Chapter 2, 54, 55 above. 
737 Ss 81 - 84 and see also page 155 below. 
738 S II (l). 
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4 Legal Nature of the Permission 
The granting of permission is an administrative act. 739 According to the theory of 
subordination in South African law, an administrative act is performed when an 
administrative body executes an act of state power which affects the public. "Public" 
includes both natural and juristic persons. The Registrar, acting as an organ of state, can 
clearly be regarded as an administrative authority.740 
South African courts have developed categories of such acts of state power. In this 
respect the terms "legislative", "judicial" and "administrative" have been utilised to 
differentiate between different adminsitrative acts. These have further been 
supplemented by terms such as "semi-" or "quasi-judicial", "purely administrative" and 
"ministerial".741 In accordance with this approach the category into which an 
administrative act falls determines the legal rules and principles governing it. It IS, 
however, disputed whether these classifications are unequivocal.742 
The granting of permission represents a purely administrative act. This is because it 
concerns an administrative body that makes a decision within the legal framework of its 
739 See on the definition and function of an administrative act in South African Law: Robson, William A., 
Justice and Administrative Law: a Study of the British Constitution, (1951) London 3rd ed., Griffith, 1. A. 
G. / Street, H., Principles of Administrative Law, (1973) 5. ed., 140 et seq.; De Smith, S. A., De Smith 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (1980) 4. ed. By Evans, 1. M. , Ch 2; Wiechers, Marinus, 
Administratiefreg, (1984) 2. ed., Ch 4. 
740 Wiechers, Marinus, Administrative Law, in Joubert, W. A., The Law of South Africa (1993), First 
Reissue Vol. 1, Par. 60f. 
741 In accordance with this approach a legislative act that has a similar effect to an Act, e.g. a 
proclamation by the State President or by a Provincial Governor or an ordinance. See in this regard S v 
Adams; S v Werner 1981 (1) SA 187 (A); 222F-G; S v Ockers 1974 (2) SA 523 (C), 529-30; 
Bedfordview Village Council v Kovar 1960 (4) SA 333 (W), 337; Oertel NO v Direkteur van Plaaslike 
Bestuur 1983 (1) SA 354 (a), 378F-379A. Judicial acts are seldom encountered. They are acts of court 
like institutions that are concerned with certain questions of administration such as the court of the 
Commissioner of Patents, the Court of the Commissioner for Inland Revenue or courts martial. See in this 
regard Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150, 157; Municipiality of Vereening v Mahomed Essop 1916 AD 550, 
553; Theron v Ring van Wellington 1976 (2) SA 1 (A), 17-20; James Brown and Hamer (Pty) Ltd. v 
Simmons NO 1963 (4) SA 656 (A), 660B-C; Prinslooo v Newman 1975 (I) SA 481 (A),505. 
742 Baxter, Lawrence, Administrative Law (1991), 344. 
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empowerments.743 This decision may be subject to control by the courts by means of the 
review procedure. 744 
5 The Process of Obtaining Permission 
5 1 Introduction 
The granting of permission is a lengthy procedure, which involves two steps.745 Before 
registration can actually be applied for, the applicant must apply for authorisation to 
establish a banle However, banking business cannot be commenced before registration. 
Different requirements are set for authorisation to establish a bank and registration of 
that bank. 
5 2 Authorisation to Establish a Bank 
Before the actual registration can take place the Registrar must authorise the process of 
establishing a bank.746 To set the process in motion the applicant must complete a 
specific form, form DI 002, which is published as part of the Regulations issued by the 
Minister of Finance in terms of the Banks Ace47 The application must be accompanied 
by a statement containing prescribed information748 which includes a statement 
concerning the intended range of business to be conducted by the company, 749 an 
opening balance sheet,750 the names and addresses of the auditors75I and several other 
743 See Baxter, Lawrence, Administrative Law (1991),347 and Wiechers, Marius, Administrative Law, in 
Joubert, W. A., The Law of South Africa (1993), First Reissue, Vol. 1, Par.71et seq. 
744 See Chapter 6, 176 et seq. below. 
745 In its original version of 1990, this procedure still had three levels. Between authorisation and 
registration, preliminary registration had to take place. This intermediary step was, however, abolished by 
the Banks Amendment Act 26 of 1994. See the explanations of Oelofse, A. N., Banking Regulation 
Reform, (1995) 4 JIBL, N-75 et seq. 
746 S 12 (I). 
747 See S 12(2)(a) of the Banks Act read with Reg 33. 
748 S 12 (2) (b). 
749 Application form DI 002 (t). 
750 Application form DI 002 (g) and (h) read with application form DI 100. 
751 Application form DI 002 (q). 
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prescribed declarations.752 The Registrar has the power to call for any further 
information or documents he may deem necessary. 753 He may also require the 
submission of'a report as defined754 in the Public Accountants' and Auditors' Act 80 of 
1991. 755 When these documents have all been submitted, the Registrar decides whether 
or not to authorise the establishment of the banle In terms of section 13 he then has a 
discretion whether or not to register. However, in terms of section 13(2), the Registrar 
has no discretion, and must refuse authorisation, if he has not been satisfied that the 
applicant meets all the requirements set in section 13(2)(a)-(h) of the Act.756 Once the 
Registrar has made his decision he must give notice of it in writing to the applicant. 757 
If the application is successful, the applicant is entitled to start making the necessary 
arrangements in order to establish a bank An institution of this kind can also be 
described as a "banking company in foundation" and thus has the legal personality 
comparable to but also different from that of a Vorgesellschaft in German law.758 
During the phase of foundation, the authorisation to establish such an institution may be 
revoked (in writing) at any time should it become known that the Registrar received 
false or misleading information concerning the application, or if the applicant has not 
managed to form a bank within a period of 6 months from the date of the 
authorisation. 759 
752 Cj form DI 002. 
753 S 12 (3) (a). 
754 S I (I): 
755 S 12 (3) (b). 
756 See in this chapter, 147 et seq. below. 
757 S 13(3). 
758 In German law the legal capacity of a GesellschaJt comes into existence upon entry into the 
Handelsregister. Before such entry it is generally regarded as a BGB-GesellschaJt, i e a civil law 
GesellschaJt. During this period the different members are collectively liable for the obligations of this 
VorgesellschaJt . 
759 S 14 (I). 
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5 3 Application for Registration as a Bank 
Within a period of 12 months of the granting of authorisation to form a bank, an 
application may be submitted to the Registrar for the actual registration of the bank.760 
Registration is a sine qua non for operating as a bank. The application must contain 
certain prescribed documents. At this stage too the Registrar may call for further 
information apart from that specified in the Act. 761 The application itself and all 
documents relating to it that are submitted to the Registrar must be signed by the 
chairman or the chief executive officer of the institution.762 
Provided the information submitted is satisfactory and the Registrar is satisfied that (i) 
the business the applicant intends conducting is that of a bank, (ii) undesirable methods 
of conducting business will not be adopted, and (iii) the public documents of the 
institution are consistent with the Banks Act and are not undesirable for any reason, the 
application must be successful (that is the Registrar does not have the discretion to 
refuse the application).763 The Act specifically provides in which circumstances the 
Registrar does have a discretion to refuse the application.764 This matter is specifically 
dealt with below. 
The applicant must be notified in writing of the decision to grant or dismiss the 
application.765 If the application is granted, and on payment of the registration fee, the 
applicant is issued with a certificate of registration as a bank.766 Provided the bank meets 
760S 16(1). 
761 S 16 (1). The legally required documents that must be handed in are the company's constitution as well 
as a declaration of the intended name of the bank, the address of its head office as well as its postal 
address, the specifications as to which banking transactions will be conducted, the mentioning of names 
and addresses of the bank's management as well as a list of majority shareholders with participation in 
the sense of s 59. 
762 S 16 (4). 
763 Joubert, W. A. / Scott, T. 1. / Faris, J. A.; The Law of South Africa, Cumulative Supplement 1996, Par. 
742. See also s 17 (1). 
764 See S 17(2). 
765 S 17 (3). 
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the requirements of section 70 of the Act (in which the requirements relating to 
minimum share capital and unimpaired reserve funds are set out) it may then commence 
with banking business: 767· 
5 4 Branches of Foreign Institutions 
In conclusion it must be noted that in terms of seCtion 18A of the Banks Act a branch of 
a foreign bank may, notwithstanding the absence of formal registration, conduct 
banking business in South Africa provided it has been authorised to do so by the 
Registrar. A specific procedure akin to registration that such an institution needs to 
follow is set out in section 18A of the Act. 
6 Restriction of Permission 
The possibilities of restricting permission are extensively provided for in the Act. The 
point of departure in this regard is to be found in sections 13(1) (in the context of the 
application for authorisation) and 18 (1) (in the context of the application for 
registration). Both sections empower the Registrar to restrict the permission by 
imposing any conditions he deems fit. 768 In this regard the Registrar is master of his own 
decision. Naturally the Willkiirverbot, which also forms part of South African 
administrative law, may not be contravened.769 The conditions he decides to impose 
must also relate to the objectives of banking supervision under the Act, and must not 
stem from other considerations. 
If the applicant disregards any of the conditions imposed by the Registrar this may lead 
to cancellation or suspension of the authorisation or registration.170 An applicant who 
766 S 17 (4). 
767 Cf ss 17 (5), 18 (1). The conditions laid down in s 70 refer to the required amounts concerning 
minimum capital and reserves. 
768 Cf also s 13(1) which contains a similar provision relating to the application for authorisation. 
769 S 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. 
770 S 14 (1) and s 17 (2). 
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feels aggrieved with conditions imposed by the Registrar may appeal in terms of the 
Act to the Board of Appeal or may institute review proceedings.771 
7 Refusal of Permission 
7 I Introduction 
The Act makes provision for the refusal of permission in numerous situations.772 In this 
regard it is necessary to differentiate between application for authorisation and 
. application for registration. The point of departure should, in principle, be that an 
applicant is entitled to be successful with his application for authorisation of 
registration. If this were not the case, section 22 of the Constitution (which entrenches 
the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession) would be contravened. 
However, sections 13 and 17 of the Banks Act curtail this right by setting out specific 
bases upon which the Registrar may refuse the application. If the Registrar decides to 
refuse the application, he must notify the applicant in writing and give reasons for his 
decision. 773 
72 Applicationfor Authorisation to Establish a Bank 
In terms of section 13(2) the application for authorisation must be refused by the 
Registrar in the following situations: 
(i) The Registrar is not satisfied that the establishment of the proposed bank will be in 
the public interest: 774 The Act gives no guidance on the circumstances in which the 
establishment of the bank will not be in the public interest. The constitutionality of this 
provision may be suspect. Certainly, if it is interpreted as intending to enable the 
Registrar simply to prevent a large number of banks from flooding the market, the 
771 See Chapter 6, 170 et seq. and 178 et seq. 
772 Joubert, W. A. / Scott, T. 1. / Faris, J. A.; The Law o/South Africa, Cumulative Supplement 1996, Par. 
742. 
71J Ss 13 (3), 17 (3). Reasons must be given as this is a requirement of just administrative action. See S 33 
of the Constitution read with Item 23 Schedule 6. 
774 S 13 (2) (a). 
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provision must be questioned. It is, after all, in conflict with the right to freedom of 
profession and trade which is entrenched in the Constitution.77S It is suggested that the 
infringement of this fundamental right by this provision of the Banks Act cannot be 
justified by the objectives of the Act. More banks simply means more competition, and 
if the Registrar, for this reason, wants to prevent more banks in this manner, his conduct 
would amount to inadmissible state intervention. 
(ii) The Registrar is not satisfied that the business the applicant proposes to conduct is 
banking business: 776 The concept "the business of a bank" is defined in the Act. In terms 
of this provision the Registrar must refuse authorisation unless he is convinced that the 
proposed business is "the business of a bank,,777 in this sense. This provision serves to 
protect the banking industry by distinguishing clearly between the activities of banks 
and other sectors of the economy. 
(iii) The Registrar is not satisfied that the business will be conducted by a public 
company incorporated under the Companies Act: Unless it is clear that the applicant 
intends conducting banking business in the form of a public company, the Registrar is 
obliged to refuse authorisation. 778 
(iv) The Registrar is not satisfied that the applicant will be able to establish itself 
successfully as a bank: This is a broad provision. One application would be that the 
Registrar must refuse authorisation if he is of not satisfied that the applicant's 
management has the qualifications and qualities to establish itself successfully as a 
bank.779 This would include sufficient practical and theoretical knowledge of banking 
affairs. It is suggested that the principle in German law to the effect that similar 
775 S 22. 
776 S 13 (2) (b). 
777 S 1 (1) the business of a bank together with ss 76 et seq. 
778 S 13 (2) (c); simultaneous registration of a company that intends to conduct banking transactions 
under the Companies Act, No. 61 of 1973 may only take place with the Registrar's permission. See s 15. 
779 S 13 (2) (d). 
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previous business activity is a good indication that the applicant should be able to 
establish itself successfully as a bank, is equally applicable here.780 
(v) The Registrar is not satisfied that the applicant has the financial means to comply 
with the requirements of the Act: . The Banks Act contains certain prudential 
requirements designed to protect depositors.781 If the Registrar is not satisfied that these 
requirements can be met he must refuse authorisation. 782 
(vi) The Registrar is not satisfied that the bank's business will be conducted prudently: 
Should the Registrar suspect the envisaged bank will not be managed in a risk-
conscious manner as can be expected in the banking industry, he must refuse the 
application for authorisation.783 Due to the extreme sensitivity of this trade and its 
dominant position in the economy, the business policy of a banking establishment must 
meet certain requirements, and be sufficiently risk conscious. 
(vii) The Registrar is not satisfied that the directors and executive officers of the 
proposed bank are fit and proper persons to hold such offices: Authorisation must also 
be refused if the Registrar does not consider the directors and executive officers of the 
bank to be sufficiently reliable. 784 Reliability means that the person who has this 
position justifies the trust placed in him or her. The conduct of these people in the past 
is an important point of reference in this regard. 
(viii) The Registrar is not satisfied that an executive officer of the proposed bank has 
sufficient relevant experience: Whilst the previous ground for refusing authorisation 
relates to the trustworthiness of the executive officers, this provision focuses on 
objective criteria such as experience (and perhaps qualifications).785 
780 See 130 above. 
781 See ss 70 et seq. 
782 S 13 (2) (e). 
783 S 13 (2) (t). 
784 S 13 (2) (fA). 
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(ix) The Registrar is not satisfied that the board of directors is appropriate having 
regard to the nature and scale of the business it intends conducting: This provision is 
intended to ensure that the board of directors of the bank is sensibly chosen to result in a 
group of people ~ho have sufficient experience concerning the nature and the extent of 
the business activities. 786 
7 3 Application for Registration as a Bank 
The Registrar is not only empowered to refuse authorisation, but can also, in certain 
circumstances, refuse to register an institution that was successful at the authorisation 
stage. The Banks Act provides for this in detail. 787 In terms of section 17(2) the 
Registrar has the discretion to disallow registration in the following cases, which may 
overlap: 
(i) The institution no longer meets the requirements of section 13(2) (that is the 
requirements necessary for authorisation to form a bank): If the institution therefore no 
longer meets anyone of the requirements it had to meet during the authorisation 
process, the Registrar has the discretion to refuse the application for registration. 788 
(ii) The institution is likely not to be able to meet a requirement of the Act, or to pursue 
a practice contrary to a provision of the Act: Registration may accordingly be refused if 
it becomes evident that the bank will probably not be able to meet the requirements of 
the Act or that its practices will be irreconcilable with the provisions of the Act. 789 
(iii) The interests of some person in the institution appear to be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Act: Registration can also be refused if it appears that the interests of 
785 S 13 (2) (g). Cfalso the details in this chapter, 148, 149. 
786 S 13 (2) (h). 
787 The conceptualisation of the registration procedure was slightly changed by means of the Banks 
Amendment Act, No. 55 of J 996. See also South African Reserve Bank Banks Supervision Department 
Annual Report (1996), 52. 
788 S 17 (2) (a). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
151 
any person in the institution is inconsistent with any provision of the Act.790 This would 
be the case where, inter alia, unclear connections with other companies makes effective 
supervision impossible or difficult. Unclear and overly complex company structures 
may not only endanger the security of deposits but could also be abused for the purposes 
of organised crime such as money-laundering operations. 
(iv) The interests of depositors will be affected detrimentally by the manner in which 
the institution proposes to conduct its business, or for some other reason. Thus, if the 
Registrar is of the opinion that for whatever reason the interests of depositors will be 
detrimentally affected, he can refuse registration.791 This provision gives effect to one of 
the main objectives of banking supervision namely the protection of the depositors. 
(v) Problems relating to the name of the institution: If the name intended for the bank 
already exists or is similar to an existing or previously registered bank name, and as a 
consequence may mislead the public, registration can also be refused. 792 
(vi) The application does not comply with the requirements of the Act: In this case, too, 
the Registrar may refuse registration. 793 One example would be where the company is 
unable to meet the liquidity requirements of the Act. 
7 4 Branches of Foreign Institutions 
As noted above, a foreign institution wishing to conduct banking business in the form a 
branch needs authorisation in terms of section 18A of the Act. In the present context it is 
of interest to note that such authorisation will be refused by the Registrar if he is not 
789 S 17 (2) (b). cfthe details in this chapter, 148 and 149. 
790 S 17 (2) (c). 
791 S 17 (2) (d). 
792 S 17 (2){e). 
793 S 17 (2) (t). See also Barclays (DC & 0) v Volkskas Bpk 1951 (2) SA 296 (T), 1952 (3) SA 343 
(AD); Willis, Nigel, Banking in South African Law (1981),55 et seq. 
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satisfied that proper supervision will be exercised by the supervisory authority of the 
foreign institution's domicile. 794 
8 Revocation, Cancellation and Suspension of Permission 
8 1 Introduction 
As is evident in the above discussion both the authorisation to establish a bank and the 
subsequent registration of that bank are subject to the permission of the registrar. The 
fact that such permission has been granted, does not mean that it cannot be revoked or 
suspended. The circumstances in which the Registrar can revoke or suspend are spelt 
out in the Banks Act which makes provision for both the revocation of authorisation to 
establish a bank, and the cancellation or suspension of registration. 
82 Revocation of Authorisation 
In terms of section 14 of the Banks Act, the authorisation to establish a bank can be 
revoked by the Registrar on two grounds. The first is that the application contained false 
or misleading information. This would also generally constitute an offence under the 
Act. 795 The second ground for revocation is that no progress had been made within a 
period of 6 months from the granting of the authorisation towards establishing the bank. 
This provision ensures both that applicants execute the process speedily and that there 
are no old, valid, but unused authorisations of this nature. As such this provision helps 
the Registrar to have an accurate overview of new potential banks. 
8 3 Cancellation or Suspension of Registration 
The registration of a bank may be cancelled or suspended by the Registrar in certain 
circumstances, and otherwise by the Court on application by the Registrar. 
Cancellation or suspension by the Registrar is dealt with in section 23 of the Act. This 
is possible if: (i) the bank has not conducted the business of a bank for a period of 6 
794 S ISA(5) 
795 See s 21 (a) and in this chapterLegal Consequences a/Cancellation, 154. 
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months commencing on the date of its registration; 796 (ii) its registration was obtained on 
the strength of untrue or misleading infonnation furnished by a person who has since 
been convicted of an' offence in tenns of section 21 of the Act;797 (iii) it has failed to 
comply with conditions prescribed by the Registrar/98 and (iv) its main place of business 
is outside the Republic and its authorisation to conduct business has been revoked in 
that country. 799 
Before steps of this nature are taken, the Registrar must, however, notify the Chainnan 
or the Chief Executive Officer of the bank of his intention and the reasons for it. The 
notice must call upon the affected institution to show cause within a period of 30 days 
of the notice why its registration should not so be cancelled or suspended.80o After 
considering any representations by the bank the Registrar must reach his decision and 
infonn the chainnan or chief executive officer in writing. 801 
If the Registrar on some other ground than those set out in section 23, is of the opinion 
that the registration of a bank should be suspended or cancelled, he can, in tenns of 
section 25 of the Act, apply to the Court for an order to this effect. In lieu of such an 
application the Registrar is empowered, by written notice to the bank concerned, to 
restrict with immediate effect the activities of such bank as he sees fit. 802 
The registration of a bank will also be cancelled by the Registrar on submission to him 
of (i) a special resolution of the bank authorising such cancellation,803 or (ii) a certificate 
by the Master to the effect that the bank has been wound Up.804 
796 S 23(1), 
797 S 23(2)(a). 
798 S 23(2)( c). 
799 S 23(2)(b). 
800 S 24(1). 
801 S 24(2). 
802 S 26. 
803 S 27. 
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The cancellation or suspension of registration of a bank, or any restriction on its 
activities must be published by the Registrar in the Government Gazette. S05 A 
cancellation or suspension in terms of section 23 becomes effective 30 days after 
publication in the Government Gazette, or, if an appeal was lodged by the bank against 
the decision of the Registrar to the Board of Appeal,806 on the date upon which it is 
notified that the Board has confirmed the Registrar's decision. s07 The cancellation or 
suspension in terms of section 25 becomes operative on the date ordered by the court. sos 
The Registrar determines the date upon which the cancellation comes into effect where 
it stems from a special resolution or a Master's certificate. s09 
When the registration. becomes effective the Registrar may order the institution in 
writing to pay back all deposits and interest, and to change its name and public 
documents to reflect its new status.SIO 
8 4 Foreign institutions 
A procedure akin to the cancelling of registration by the Registrar is provided for as 
regards branches of foreign banks in section 18B of the Act. By following this 
procedure the Registrar can cancel or suspend his authorisation to such an institution to 
conduct banking business. 
Legal Consequences of Cancellation 
The cancellation of a bank's registration means that it may not conduct any further 
banking business.811 Non-compliance is a serious criminal offence punishable with a 
S04 S 28. 
805 S 30 (a) (11) & (iv). 
S06 See Chapter 6, 170 et seq. 
807 S 31(b) 
808 S 3I(c). 
S09 S 31 (d). 
810 S 32(1). 
811 S II (I). 
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maximum fine of R 100.000 and/or five years imprisonment.812 To ensure compliance 
the Registrar has the powers conferred upon him by section 6 of the Act as well as those 
provided for in the Inspection of Financial Institutions Act 38 of 1984. They include the 
power to appoint an inspector to investigate existing or suspected malpractice, as well as 
the power of short-term, unannounced audits.813. 
After the cancellation of the registration, the affairs of the institution are finally wound 
up. This is done in accordance with section 32, which determines that deposits must be 
repaid. The Registrar may specify further details. 
9 Conducting Banking Transactions without Authorisation 
It has been noted that only registered banks may conduct banking business. The powers 
of the Registrar to ensure compliance with this fundamental principle.are far reaching. 
In terms of section 81 of the Act he may apply for an interdict to prohibit an anticipated 
contravention of section 11, or to prohibit the continuation or repetition of such conduct. 
In terms of section 82 he has the power to exact information from unregistered persons 
(in order to ascertain whether they might be conducting banking business). Furthermore, 
in terms of sections 83 and 84 the Registrar can order and control the repayment of 
money illegally obtained from depositors. Non-compliance with orders of the Registrar 
in this regard is a criminal offence.814 
C Summary and Comparison 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, every enterprise that intends to conduct banking 
business requires a licence from the Bundesaufsichtsamt as set out in § 1 I KWG. In the 
Republic of South Africa, the institution must be registered as a bank by the 
812 S 11 (2) together with s 91 (4) (a). 
813 Ss 2 - 8 of the Inspection of Financial Institutions Act, No. 38 of 1984. 
814 S 82 (3) & 91. 
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Registrar. 815 The effect of the registration is similar to that of the licence. Thus, the 
admission to banking business is strictly controlled and regulated in both countries. 
In principle, in both countries, if there are no reasons for refusal, the application for a 
licence or registration should be granted. This principle is, however, somewhat weaker 
in South Africa than in Germany due to the general provision in section 13(2)(a) in 
terms of which the Registrar is entitled to refuse authorisation on the ground of the 
public interest.816 This provision must now, however, be interpreted in the light of the 
new Constitution which entrenches the right of freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession. 817 This provision binds the state to a neutral approach to economic policy.sl8 
Although different in some respects, the application procedure is formalised in both 
countries. In both countries, granting of permission is seen as an administrative act. The 
procedure in Germany is simply in accordance with the general codified law of 
administrative procedure. In South Africa the procedure is set out in detail in the Banks 
Act itself.819 There are substantial differences between South African and German 
administrative law. This is a consequence of the difference in the respective legal 
structures. The principles of administrative law in South Africa are derived from the 
common law and case law (with a significant English influence) and not primarily from 
a general statute as in Germany. 820 
A further similarity between the two systems lies in the question whether a particular 
institution should be subject to supervision. In Germany the point of departure is 
whether the institution is a credit institution. If this is the case, it is subject to the 
supervision by the Bundesaufsichtsamt. An institution is regarded as a credit institution 
815 See 140 et seq. above. 
816 The constitutionality of this provision is thus doubted. 
817 Under the previous constitutional dispensation (the dispensation in which the Banks Act was initially 
drafted) Parliamentary legislation was supreme and could not be attacked for being unconstitutional. 
818 See Chapter 2, 58 above. 
819 See this Chapter, 143 et seq. above. 
820 See this Chapter, 121 et seq. and 143 et seq. above. 
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both if it is licensed as such or if it conducts banking transactions (irrespective of 
whether it is licensed). There is no similar provision in South African law. However, the 
Registrar is empowered to intervene if banking business is conducted by an 
unregistered institution.821 The end result is very much the same. 
In both countries the supervisory organs examine the financial situation of the planned 
bank and the experience and qualifications of key personnel of the applicants on the 
basis of comprehensive data submitted by the applicant.822 Negative findings in either of 
these areas constitute the main reasons for the dismissal of applications. In the absence 
of some valid ground for refusal the applicant is basically entitled to the necessary 
permission.823 
In South Africa, unlike in Germany, the application procedure has two levels: 
authorisation and registration. The applicant may only commence business once both 
procedures have been successfully completed and it has been notified of the Registrar's 
decision.824 
Because of the fact that the issuing of a licence in the Federal Republic of Germany is a 
gebundene Entscheidung (a non-discretionary decision), the applicant has a right to 
licence if all legal requirements have been met. Restrictions are only possible In 
accordance with § 36 I VwVfG. Such restrictions, which usually take the form of 
conditions, must, however, be reconcilable with the objectives of the KWG. 825 In this 
regard the powers of the Registrar, in South Africa, are more far-reaching. The wide-
ranging possibilities of restriction are based on the power of the Registrar to attach any 
conditions he sees fit to registration.826 This does not mean, however, that the Registrar 
821 See § 32 I I KWG and s II of the Banks Act No. 94 of 1990. 
822 Next to other criteria, see § 33 I Nr. 2, 2a, 3 KWG and ss 13 (2) (fa), (g); 17 (2) (a) of the Banks Act. 
823 See § 33 KWG and ss 13, 17 of the Banks Act No. 94 of 1990 and in this chapter, 126 et seq. and 147 
et seq. 
824 See 147 above. 
825 See 123 - 125 above. 
826 See 146, 147 above. 
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can attach conditions arbitrarily. The right to fair administrative action is fundamental 
and entrenched in the Constitution.827 
In both countries. provision is also made for the revocation of the licence or 
registration.828 An interesting difference is that in South Africa the Registrar can cancel 
the authorisation if no use has been made of it within six months. If he does not cancel 
it, it remains in force. In Germany, in contrast, permission is automatically nullified if it 
has not been used within one year.829 Both systems recognise several other grounds for 
cancellation. In Germany the Bundesaufsichtsamt can revoke permission on any of the 
grounds stipulated in the KWG. In addition, it has the general provisions of the VwVfG 
at its disposal. In South Africa the Registrar can only cancel or suspend registration on 
the specific grounds provided for in the Banks Act. However, the court is entitled to 
cancel registration on any ground on application by the Registrar.83o 
Conducting banking transactions without the necessary permission is a criminal offence 
in both countries.831 
In conclusion, it can be said that the two systems are surprisingly similar. The objectives 
of the legislation are very much the same. This can be explained by the fact that in this 
area the problems faced by the two countries are also similar. 
827 See s 33 of the Constitution. 
828 See § 35 KWG and s 23 of the Banks Act. 
829 See § 35 I KWG. 
830 See §§ 35 KWG, 48, 49 VwVfg, see therefor 134 et seq. above and ss.13, 17 of the Banks Act No. 94 of 
1990, see 146 et seq. 
831 §§ 54 et seq. KWG and s 91 of the Banks Act No. 94 of 1990. 
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Chapter 6 
The Remedies of Financial Institutions against 
Supervisory Action 
A Federal Republic of Germany 
1 Introduction 
If a person's rights are affected or violated by a public authority, that person has 
standing to challenge such action in terms of article 19 IV GG. The Bundesaufsichtsamt, 
as a Superior Federal Authority,832 qualifies as a public authority in terms of article 19 
IV 1 GG. Thus, all decisions made and all steps taken by the Bundesaufsichtsamt may 
be tested by the courtS.833 
2 Protection Based on Administrative Law 
2 1 General Provisions 
As a rule § 6 I KWG forms the legal basis of administrative action taken by the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt. 834 This rule is invoked irrespective of whether the action favours or 
prejudices the credit institution concerned. Further, the precise nature of the action, that 
is whether it is a decree, regulation, licence, prohibition eVer/iigung, Anordnung, 
Erlaubnis, Untersagung) or something else, is irrelevant. 835 
832 § 5 I 1 KWG. 
833 MUnch, Ingo von / Kunig, Philip, Grundgesetz-Kommentar. on Art 19 IV, marg. n. 47 et seq. 
Concerning credit institutions see Moschel, We111hard, Das Wirtschaftsrecht der Banken. 119 et seq. 
834 Banking supervisory measures usually rely on this provision which does not, however, mean that there 
are no other legal bases for such action in the KWG. 
835 Biihre, Inge Lore / Schneider, Manfred, KWG - Kommentar. on § 6, marg. n. 4. 
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An administrative act may be defined as every decree, decision or other measure taken 
by a public authority aimed at having immediate and external legal effect. A general 
decree is an administrative act that addresses a specific group of persons, or concerns 
the public at large.836 
Every decision taken by the Bundesaufsichtsamt aimed at fulfilling its functions in 
terms of the KWG is of special importance to the particular credit institution concerned. 
For example, an administrative decision enables the credit institution to function. It is 
taken in response to an application of the institution and clearly has external 
consequences. 
In most cases, the Bundesaufsichtsamt has a discretion. It must, however, exercise its 
discretion m accordance with the criteria set out in the KWG. The exercise of the 
discretion IS further governed by the principle of proportionality (Grundsatz der 
VerhaltnismafJigkeit des Verwaltungshandelns). The exercise of its discretion is 
therefore governed by the principle that the means must always be proportionate to the 
end. This entails that the means must be rationally connected to the objective and that 
the least infringing measure must be chosen. Stricter measures may only be used if less 
infringing alternatives cannot achieve the desired result. 837 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt also needs to consider the general principles of procedure 
relating to administrative acts as set out in §§ 9-30 VwVjG. Especially relevant is § 28 
VwVjG,838 which contains the audi alteram partem principle. Other important principles 
836 § 35 VwVjG reads as follows: "Der Verwaltungsakt ist jede Verfogung, Entscheidung oder andere 
hoheitliche MaJ3nahme, die eine Behorde zur Regelung eines Einzeljal/es auf dem Gebiet des offentlichen 
Rechts trifft und die auf unmittelbare Rechtswirkung nach auJ3en gerichtet ist . .. , " 
837 BVerjGE 60,295; BVerwG, NVwZ 1987, 886. See also Stelkens, Paul/Bonk, Heinz Joachim / Sachs, 
Michael; Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz - Kommentar, on § 1, margo n. 19. 
838 ,,§ 28 (VwVjG) 
(1) Bevor ein Verwaltungsakt erlassen wire/, der in die Rechte eines Beteiligten eingreijt, ist diesem 
Gelegenheit zu geben, sich zu denfiir die Entscheidung erheblichen Tatsachen zu auJ3ern. 
(2) Von der Anhorung kann abgesehen werden, wenn sie nach den Umstanden des Einzeljalls nicht 
geboten ist, insbesondere wenn 
i. eine sofortige Entscheidung wegen Gefahr im Verzug oder im offentlichen interesse notwendig 
erscheint; 
2. durch die Anhorung die Einhaltung einer fiir die Entscheidung maJ3geblichen Frist in Frage 
gestellt wiirde; 
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pertain to clarity and form: 839 the measure must be clear840 and properly announced.841 
Generally, an administrative act can in terms of § 37 II VwVfG, be issued in a written, 
oral or other form. However, banking supervisory measures of the Bundesaufsichtsamt, 
including the granting ofa licence, must be in writing.842 One of the reasons for this is to 
secure evidence in these matters. 
Written administrative acts that negatively affect a person must be accompanied by a 
notice containing the possible remedies available to such a person.843 The notice must 
identify the correct remedy, the authority where it may be sought, and the time period 
available (or the deadline) to set it in motion (generally 1 month844).845 The identification 
of the remedy is compulsory. 846 If it is not identified, the deadline for the correct remedy 
is extended to one year in terms of § 70 II read with § 58 VwGO. 
Before such an Anfechtungsklage or Verpjlichtungsklage can be instituted against the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt for supervisory measures taken by it, a preliminary procedure, the 
Widerspruchsverfahren, must be instituted in terms of §§ 68 ff VwGO. 847 This process 
3. vOn den tatsdchlichen Angaben eines Beteiligten, die dieser in einem Antrag oder einer Erkldrung 
gemacht hat, nicht zu seinen Ungllnsten abgewichen werden soli; 
4. die Behorde eine Allgemeinverjiigling oder gleichartige Verwaltllngsakte in grofierer Zahl oder 
Verwaltllngsakte mit Hilfe automatischer Einrichtllngen erlassen will; 
5. Mafinahmen in der Verwaltungsvollstreckung getroffen werden sollen. 
(3) Eine Anhorung unterbleibt, wenn ihr ein zwingendes offentliches Interesse entgegensteht. " 
839 § 37 VwVjG. 
840 § 39 VwVjG. 
841 § 41 VwVjG. 
842 § 32 I KWG. 
843 For the general requirements iro advice of legal remedy, see Kopp, Ferdinand 0., 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, on § 58, margo n. 10 et seq. 
844 If the advice of legal remedy provides a longer period for contradiction, the given period counts as 
deadline. 
845 §§ 59, 70.73 III VwGo. 
846 This stems from the fact that the Bundesaufsichtsamt is a Federal Authority. See § 59 VwGO. See 
further Eyermann, Erich / Frohler, Ludwig / Kormann, Joachim, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung -
Kommentar, on § 59, margo n. 1; Redeker, Konrad / Oertzen, Hans-Joachim von, 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - Kommentar, on § 59, margo n. I et seq. 
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requires the legality and the merits of the administrative act to be re-evaluated by the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt. The preliminary procedure is initiated by submitting an informal 
objection (Widerspruch) to the Bundesaufsichtsamt. This objection must be made within 
the period of one month after the administrative act took place. If this deadline is not 
met, the administrative act becomes effective and a complaint will not be allowed. The 
Bundesaufsichtsamt is also the authority848 (Widerspruchsbehorde) that deals with the 
objection within an appropriate period of time and, correspondingly, gives notice of the 
result of the objection in accordance with § 73 I 1, 2; § 56 VwGo. As far as the 
objection is not successful, a notice must be given in accordance with the stipulations 
of the VwZG. The notice must be in writing and be accompanied by an advice 
concerning the possibilities of legal remedies (§ 73 III VwGO). 
Should the preliminary procedure be unsuccessful, the objecting credit institution may 
submit a complaint (within a specified period)849 to the administrative court in Berlin.850 
Depending on the nature of the administrative act, the application is either for setting the 
administrative act aside or for a mandamus to compel the performance of the 
administrative act. The action is brought against the Federal Republic of Germany as 
represented by the Bundesaufsichtsamt. 
A complaint relating to banking supervisory measures or to the rejection or the omission 
of an administrative act must comply with all the procedural prerequisites.85l For 
example, the correct statutory provisions must be invoked, the correct defendant must 
be specified, the internal remedies must be exhausted, and the time periods must be 
complied with. The substance of the complaint is then dealt with. 
847 The purpose of the preliminary procedure is to relieve the burden of the courts. MoreoveI:, a 
reconsideration of the matter by the Bundesaufsichtsamt could detennine the facts of the matter more 
clearly, settle legal issues and give attention to the complaints of the objector. This could lead to the 
resolution of disputes without involving the courts (BVerwGE 26, 161; NJW 1967, 1245; Bettennann, 
Karl August, Das erfolglose Vorverfahren als Prozej3voraussetzung des verwaltungsgerichtlichen 
Verfahrens, (1959) DYBI, 308). The preliminary procedure therefore serves to test the legitimacy of the 
administrative action. 
848 This also arises from its construction as an independent Superior Federal Authority. 
849 See §§ 74, 81 VwGO The period is one month. 
850 Since the Bundesaufsichtsamt is based in Berlin, the Berlin Administrative Court is responsible. 
851 Most of these are not problematical and they are nonnally complied with. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
163 
Section 40 I VwG(J52 regulates such disputes, provided that the dispute is not of a 
constitutional nature.8~3 The KWG clearly forms part of public law. The powers of the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt are derived straight from the KWG. Thus, its decisions are of a 
public nature.854 
A complaint may be brought directly to the administrative court, without first going 
through the preliminary procedure, if the Bundesaufsichtsamt fails to decide on the 
objection within the time limit and offers no valid explanation for the failure to do so. 
This complaint is known as an action for the failure to perform (Untatigkeitsklage).855 In 
terms of § 75 2 VwGO the credit institution must wait for a period of three months 
before it can lodge such a complaint.856 
To lodge a complaint the credit institution must, however, be klagebefugt (that is 
capable of lodging a complaint) in accordance with § 42 II VwGD. Th rights of the 
institution must have been affected by the banking supervisory measure. This will 
always be the case where the administrative act is unlawful. Where the administrative 
act is unlawful, an infringement of the institution's art 2 I GG rights always takes place 
since the general freedom right may only be limited by decisions which conform with 
the legal order as a whole.857 In this way art 2 I GG serves to uphold the rule of law. The 
852 In principle, recourse is ensure by art 19 IV 2 GG. However, this provion is subsidiary and has no real 
importance in these circumstances. § 40 VwGO stipulates the more specific provision, which provides for 
remedies in the administrative procedure. 
853 There is no specific provision in this regard. The general provisions of § 40 VwGO are accordingly 
applicable. 
854 See on the theories relating to the difference between private and public law Maurer, Hartmut, 
Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, § 3, marg. n. 12ff for further detail. See also Wolff, Hans 1., Der 
Unterschied zwischen offentlichen und privatem Recht, (1950) A6R, 205 and Bachof, Otto, Ober 
offentfiches Recht, in: Festgabe fur BVerwG, 1978, I; For the legal classification of banking supervisory 
measures see also Chapter 5, 119 et seq. above. 
855 This is an attempt to prevent the administration to protract a contradiction. 
856 Redeker, Konrad / Oertzen, Hans Joachim von, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - Kommentar, on § 75, 
margo n. 1 et seq. 
857 Credit institutions, as juristic person have, according to general consensus, constitutional legal 
capacity. See M6schel, Wemhard, Das Wirtschaftsrecht der Banken, 120 et seq. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
plaintiff must present facts which show that the administrative act infringed his own 
subj ecti ve rights.858 
2 2 The Specific Actions· 
Anfechtimgsklage (Action/or setting aside) 
An Anfechtungsklage (action for setting aside) is brought if the aggrieved party wishes 
to avoid the consequence of a specific administrative act (in casu the particular banking 
supervisory measure). This can only be done if the administrative act is not academic or 
moot. For example, if the Bundesaufsichtsamt rules that a certain credit institution must 
close for a period of one week, ending on the third of June 1998 and the complaint is 
lodged on the tenth of June, this issue will be moot. In other words, this occurs if the 
administrative act no longer has any legal consequences. This will be the case if it has 
been revoked, or if the complaint against it has fallen away, or when for reasons such as 
such as the passing of time, the setting aside becomes impossible or useless. 
The complaint may be directed against the original administrative act (§ 79 I no 1 
VwGO) or against the notice of Bundesaufsichtsamt itself (§79 I no 2, II VwGO) insofar 
as the latter may give rise to an additional complaint because it compromised the 
position ofthe credit institution even further. 
In terms of § 113 I 1 VwGO, an action may be brought to set an administrative act aside 
if the action of the Bundesaufsichtsamt is unlawful and infringes the rights of the credit 
institution concerned. 
The court must test both the formal859 and the material lawfulness of the banking 
measure. The material requirements are that the administrative act must be lawful in the 
858 This corresponds with the so-called 'theory of possibility' which is seen as the predominant opinion in 
legal literature and case law. 
859 c.j the section supra dealing with the formal legal requirements such as the consideration of 
principles of procedure (§§ 9-30 VwVjG), the rule of determination (§ 37 VwVjG), the explanation (§ 39 
VwVjG) and the orderly announcement (§ 41 VwVjG). 
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sense that it must be in accordance with a specific provision of the KWG and must 
satisfy the requirements of the provision.860 
The administrative court must also test whether the Bundesaufsichtsamt exercised its 
discretion properly,861 and whether the principles of proportionality were considered.862 
Verpf/ichtungsklage (Mandamus) 
The aim of the Verpf/ichtungsklage (the mandamus) is to compel the authority to do 
something, in this context normally the issuing of a licence in terms of § 32 I KWG. The 
application may only be brought if the matter is ready to be decided on (spruchreifJ863 
and if the credit institution's rights were infringed by the unlawful refusal to commit the 
desired administrative act. 864 
The rule that the matter must be ripe for legal decision (spruchreifJ is problematic. In 
the absence of valid reasons, the Bundesaufsichtsamt has no discretion to refuse to issue 
a licence.865 But the Bundesaufsichtsamt has the discretion to subject the licence to 
conditions or restrict it to certain types of banking transactions.866 Thus, the 
administrative court can generally only direct that the discretion ought to be exercised 
(Bescheidungsurteil in terms of § 113 IV 2 VwGO). The court cannot usurp the 
authority of the Bundesaufsichtsamt or decide on its behalf. 
860 Here usually § 6 I KWG. 
861 §§ 114 VwGO,40 VwVjG. 
862 See 160 and n. 837 supra. 
863 Spruchreife means that no further arguments are required for a final decision to be reached (Redeker, 
Konrad / Oertzen Hans-Joachim von, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - Kommentar, on § 113 margo n. 45 et 
seq.). 
864 § 113 IV 1 VwGO. 
865 See Chapter 5, 120 et seq. above. 
866 § 32 II KWG. 
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In other words, it may not replace the administrative discretion of the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt with its own. The court would therefore direct that the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt reconsider the matter, in accordance with the legal position as set 
out in the decision of the court. In this way the court may give guidance to the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt. 867 
23 Form o/the Decision 
In general, the administrative court passes judgement after entertaining oral argument 
(§§ 101, 107 VwGO). An appeal (§ 124 VwGO) to the Highest Administrative Court in 
Berlin (Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin) against this decision may be brought within one 
month after the verdict. The decision of this appeal tribunal may be reviewed by the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court). Such a review, however, is 
only possible if allowed by the court (§ 132 I, II VwGO) or if substantial deficiencies are 
evident. (§ 133 VwGO). 
Under certain conditions Sprungrevision may be submitted to the Federal 
Administrative Court according to § 134 VwGO In other words, the complaint may be 
lodged directly with the Federal Administrative Court, without first approaching the 
Highest Administrative Court in Berlin. This IS permissible when the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt agrees thereto and the complaint raises issues of fundamental 
importance for the credit industry as a whole. This ensures that time is saved and legal 
certainty achieved. 
2 4 Interim Legal Protection 
Both the Verpjlichtungsklage and the Anfechtungsklage generally have the effect of 
suspending the challenged administrative act (§ 80 I VwGO). But there are many 
exceptions to the principle. Suspension does not take place, according to § 80 II no 1 
VwGO when the Bundesaufsichtsamt's demand is one for costs and fees, according to § 
867 Kopp, Ferdinand 0., VerwaltungsverJahrensgesetz, on § 113, margo n. 72ff; Redeker, Konrad / 
Oertzen, Hans- Joachim von, Veraltungsgerichtsordnung - Kommentar, on § 113, margo n. 19 et seq. 
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51 KWG. 868 In tenns of § 80 II no 3, the suspension is also cancelled in the cases listed 
in § 49 KWG. 869 
The Bundesaufsichtsamt may in addition order immediate compliance with the measure 
if it is in the public interest or in the interest of an affected person or institution (§ 80 I, 
II no 4 VwGO). However, in tenns of § 80 III VwGO, reasons must be given in writing 
for such a decision.870 
Interim relief may further not be requested if it would undennine the purpose of the 
regulation of the credit industry. For example, when an application for pennission to 
conduct business is to be decided, interim relief may in fact mean that the credit 
institution is allowed to operate. This should be avoided. Therefore the complaint must 
not be made in terms of § 123 VwGO but only in tenns of § 80 V VwGO. Put 
differently, where the granting of a licence (as set out in § 32 KWG) is refused, a 
temporary order in tenns of § 123 VwGO would theoretically be the correct remedy in 
order to obtain immediate protection. However, an application of this kind is not 
admissible since it would have the same result as the main remedy and as such 
contradict the essence of preliminary legal protection.871 
868 Haftke, Heinz Christian, Zur Kosten- und Gebiihrenpjlicht gegeniiber dem Aufsichtsamt, (1983) ZfgK, 
610. 
869 § 49 KWG " "Widerspruch und Anfechtungsklage gegen MaJ3nahmen des Bundesaufsichtsamtes haben 
in den Fallen des § 2b Abs. 1 Satz 5 und Abs. 2 Satz 1, des § 12a Abs. 2, des § 35 Abs. 2 Nr. 2, 3 
Buchstabe b und 4, der §§ 36, 45, 45a Abs. 1, §§ 46, 46a Abs. 1 und des § 46b sowie bei einer Priifung 
nach § 44 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 und la und § 44a Abs. 2 Satz 1 keine aufschiebende Wirkung." The most 
important of these regulations are § 35 s 2 No.2, 3 band 4 (the suspension of the license if there is a 
danger that the credit institution will be unable to meet its obligations towards its creditors); § 36 (request 
for the dismissal and prohibition of the manager from exercising his functions); §§ 46, 46a (measures in 
case of danger of bankruptcy); §46b (bankruptcy petition); and § 28 s 1 (appointment of an auditor in 
special cases). On the basis of the last mentioned provision, the Bundesaufsichtsamt can refuse the credit 
institution's appointment of an auditor for purposes of auditing the financial statements if this is 
necessary for the purpose of the audit. This could happen if the appointed auditor does not have the 
necessary amount of co-workers to ensure that the audit will be completed in time or if he has objectively 
contravened certain duties which arise from his appointment as an auditor or from his professional duties. 
(Sazgunn, Volkhard / Wohlschief3, Karl, Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen - Kommentar, on § 28, margo n. 7.) 
The refusal of such an auditor is a could be countered by way of an objection (Widerspruch) and a legal 
complaint (Anfechtungsklage). A further legal ground for exclusion outside the KWG can be found in § 
36c SchifJsBG. 
870 Finkelnburg, Klaus / Jank, Klaus Peter, Vorlaufiger Rechtsschutz im Verwaltungsverfahren, 3. ed. 
1986, margo n. 231 et seq. 
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The affected credit institution must therefore apply to the administrative court in Berlin, 
in terms of § V 1 VwGO in order to obtain complete or partial interim relief in the cases 
of § 80 II no 1-3 or to restore it in the case of § 80 II no 4. Should the administrative 
court in Berlin grant the application,872 the Bundesaufsichtsamt can, in terms of § 146ff 
VwGO, lodge a complaint against this decision. If the administrative court does not 
reject the complaint, as set out in § 148 VwGO, it must present the matter to the 
Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin for its decision in terms of § 150 VwGO. 873 
3 Process of Fining 
According to § 60 KWG read with § 36 I no 1 OWiG, the Bundesaufsichtsamt is the 
administrative authority responsible for imposing fines. There is no legal obligation to 
take action for misdemeanours. Therefore the Bundesaufsichtsamt normally has a 
discretion whether to impose a fine or not. Until notice of a fine is given (as stipulated 
in §§ 65,66 OWiG), the process can be interrupted at any time in terms of § 47 I 
OWiG.874 The principles which apply to this process is that equal treatment must be 
given in similar cases and the appropriateness of the measure must be considered. The 
fine is imposed by means of notice (Bussgeldbescheid). The notice must be delivered in 
order to comply with § 50 OwiG and reasons for the fine must be given. 
Fines range between 5 DM and 100 000 DM.875 The degree of guilt, the level of 
unlawfulness and the economic situation of the perpetrator876 as well as the financial 
benefit the perpetrator derived from the deed must be taken into account. 877 
871 Kopp, Ferdinand 0., Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - Kommentar, on § 123, margo n. 13ff; Eyermann, 
Erich / Frohler, Ludwig / Kormann, Joachim, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - Kommentar, on § 123, 
margo n. 8; Finkelnburg, Klaus / Jank, Klaus Peter, Vorlaufiger Rechtsschutz im Verwaltungsverfahren, 3 
ed. 1986, margo n. 231 et seq. 
872 The decision is made in accordance with the VwGO in the BeschlufJverfahren. 
873 Redeker, Konrad / Oertzen Hans-Joachim von, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - Kommentar, on § 80, 
margo n. 34 et seq. 
874 The institution of an action for a fine can be announced informally (§ 50 I 1 o WiG). 
875 Negligently or recklessly committed misdemeanours are fined with up to 50 000 OM. 
876 BegRegE 1959 zu § 52 - BT-Ors. 3/111444. 
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After being fined, the person or institution concerned may appeal to the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt within two weeks.878 If the appeal is rejected and the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt does not revoke the fine, the file is sent to the office of the Attorney 
General (Staatsanwaltschaft) in terms of § 69 III OWiG.879 From this moment, this 
office is the prosecuting authority. The Berlin Tiergarten lower district COurt880 then 
decides whether the fine is legally valid or not. 
It is admissible to submit a complaint against the judgement of the Amtgerichts Berlin-
Tiergarten or against the decision according to § 72 OWiG to the Berlin chamber court 
(Kammergericht Berlin) under the conditions of § 79 DWiG. 
Misdemeanours as provided for in § 56 KWG prescribe after three years.881 
4 Public Claims of Liability 
It is also possible for a natural person or a credit institution that has suffered damage to 
its assets as a result of the negligence of Bundesaufsichtsamt to claim compensation. 
The claim is based on § 839 BGB882 read with art 34 GG.883 In terms of art 34 GG the 
877 § 17 IV OWiG. 
878 § 67 OWiG. 
879 If the objection is not allowed, the Bundesaufsichtsamt may reject it in accordance with § 69 I 
o WiG. 
880 The seat of the Bundesaufsichtsamt is in the district of the Amtsgerichts-Tiergarten of Berlin. 
881 § 31 II No.1 o WiG. 
882 ,,§ 839 (BGB) 
(1) Verletzt ein Beamter vorsatzlich oder fahrlassig die ihm einem Dritten gegenuber obliegende 
Amtspflicht, so hat er dem Dritten den daraus entstehenden Schaden zu ersetzen. Fallt dem Beamten 
nur Fahrlassigkeit zur Last, so kann er nur dann in Anspruch genommen werden, wenn der Verletzte 
nicht auf andere Weise Ersatz zu erlangen vermag. 
(2) .... " 
883 "Art. 34 (GG) 
Verletztjemand in Ausubung eines ihm anvertrauten offentlichen Amtes die ihm einem Dritten gegenuber 
obliegende Amtspflicht, so trifft die Verantwortlichkeit grundsdtzlich den Staat oder die Korperschajt, in 
deren Dienst er steht. Bei Vorsatz oder grober Fahrlassigkeit bleibt der Ruckgriffvorbehalten. Fur den 
Anspruch auf Schadensersatz und fur den Ruckgriff darf der ordentliche Rechtsweg nicht ausgeschlossen 
werden. " 
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civil courts have jurisdiction over a dispute of this nature. However,. in terms of § 6 III 
KWG, a claim of this nature has little chance of succeeding since the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt only performs the duties assigned to it by the KWG in public 
interest. 884 
B Republic of South Africa 
1 Introduction 
Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 
1996 guarantees the rule of law. It provides that the Republic of South Africa is one, 
sovereign, democratic state founded on, inter alia, the value of "supremacy of the 
constitution and the rule of law". 
Thus, all conduct of the executive885 - and the Registrar as an organ of state forms part 
of the executive - must be judged in the light of this provision. Should a bank886 
disagree with a decision of the Registrar, there are, in principle, two ways in which the 
bank can have the decision reviewed. One possibility is to lodge a complaint with the 
Board of Appeal. The other is to approach a court for relief. The first is not a 
prerequisite for the second. 
2 Proceedings before the Board of Appeal 
The proceedings take place in terms of section 9 of the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990. The 
section affords everyone who does not agree with a decision of the Registrar the 
possibility of approaching the Board of Appeal. 887 This tribunal is authorised to overrule 
or amend the decisions of the Registrar ifnecessary.888 
884 Earlier decisions of the BOH that were opposed to the interpretation eventually lead to the addition of 
sub 3 to § 6 KWO. Cj also Chapter 2,42 et seq .. above .. 
885 See Chapter 2, 50 et seq. above. 
886 See s 8 (4) of the Constitution which extends the protection of the Bill of Rights to juristic persons. 
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The Board of Appeal consists of five members who are all appointed by the Minister of 
Finance.889 They are: (i) the chairman who must be a lawyer with appropriate 
experience;89o (ii) three members whom the Minister deems to have extensive 
experience and knowledge concerning developments in banking;891 and (v) a chartered 
accountant (in terms of section 15 of the Public Accountants' and Auditors' Act, No. 80 
of 1991). The Minister must be satisfied that this person is qualified for appointment on 
the basis of experience and knowledge regarding the latest developments in his field of 
expertise.892 
When the Board of Appeal sits to decide on a particular dispute it must be composed of 
at least four members namely the chairman and the chartered accountant (both of whom 
must sit in all hearings), and two of the other members.893 If one of the members of the 
Board of Appeal has a personal interest, he or she must be excluded from the 
proceedings. Should this be the chairman, the Minister must appoint another person to 
that position for the proceedings in question.894 The same applies for the accountant.895 
The other members can also be replaced with substitutes. If one of them has an interest, 
the Minister will temporarily appoint a new member for the proceedings.896 
887 S 9 (1). 
888 S 9 (10). 
889 The appointment has a duration of three years. After that one, several or all of the members can be re-
appointed. See s 9 (5). The members receive remuneration for their efforts in terms of this act. See s 9 
(14). 
890 This always concerns a trained lawyer with completed tertiary training and several years of 
professional experience. See s 9 (2) (a). 
891 S 9 (2) (b). 
892 S 9 (2) (c). 
893 S 9 (3). 
894 S 9 (4) (a). 
895 S 9 (4) (c). 
896 S 9 (4) (b). A temporary vacancy of that post is filled by the short-term nomination of a new member 
for the remaining period of office by the Minister. See s 9 (6). 
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The bank must submit a written appeal to the Board of Appeal within 30 days of the 
Registrar's decision.897 The Registrar obtains a copy from the chairman who 
simultaneously gives the Registrar a deadline for giving reasons for the decision.898 The 
petitioning bank receives a copy of the reasons by registered mail, and must declare 
within 21 days whether it wishes to withdraw the appeal. 899 In other words, the bank 
first approaches the Board, who then instructs the Registrar to give reasons and the bank 
then has time to consider the reasons and decide whether to proceed with the appeal 
against the decision. 
If the bank wishes to withdraw its appeal, the proceedings are terminated.90o Should the 
bank decide to continue with the proceedings, it must give notice of its intention within 
the specified time in t~e form of an answering statement.901 Payment of the costs of the 
proceedings must accompany this statement.902 After receiving these documents, the 
chairman ,determines a date, time and place of the proceedings, and notifies the bank and 
the Registrar in writing.903 
The course of the proceedings is determined by the chairman.904 The Board of Appeal 
has wide-ranging powers to determine facts. It can, for example, call as a witness any 
897 Here, a specific fonn of representation of an application of this nature is required. The fonnalities are 
set out in Regulation No. 34 (I) as promulgated in Government Notice R 628 of 26 April 1996 
(Government Gazette 17115). 
898 Regulation No. 34 (2) as promulgated in Government Notice R 628 of 26 April 1996 (Government 
Gazette 17115). 
899 The chainnan has the possibility of extending the time limit. See Regulation No. 34 (3) as promulgated 
in Government Notice R 628 of 26 April 1996 (Government Gazette 17115). 
900 If this time limit or the time limit specified by the chainnan is exceeded, the proceedings are 
automatically disallowed because of expiry. See Regulation No. 34 (4) as promulgated in Government 
Notice R 628 (Government Gazette 17115) of26 April 1996. 
901 Regulation No. 34 (5) as promulgated in Government Notice R 628 (Government Gazette 17115) of26 
April 1996. 
902 At present, these are R 5.700, (includeing VAT). See Regulation No. 34 (6) as promulgated in 
Government Notice R 628 (Government Gazettf! 17115) of 26 April 1996 in connection with Regulation 
No. 40 (1) as promulgated in Government Notice R 628 (Government Gazette 17115) of 26 April 1996. 
903 S 9 (7). 
904 S 9 (9). 
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person who, in the opinion of the Board may possess relevant information. It can also 
demand the presentation of documents in the possession of such a person, and may keep 
these documents until the matter has been decided.905 The Board of Appeal is also 
empowered to adminsiter the oath to all parties involved and to take affidavits.906 All 
persons coincidentally present during the proceedings may be called as witnesses and be 
questioned on the matter should it become evident that they have knowledge that would 
facilitate a decision in the case.907 
After the proceedings the Board of Appeal decides whether to confirm, invalidate or 
amend the Registrar's decision. It can also instruct the Registrar to comply with a 
decision if that is the finding of the Board.908 The decisions of the Board of Appeal are 
reached by means of majority vote. Should the votes be equal, the chairman has a 
casting vote.909 The decision and the reasons for it must be forwarded to the bank and 
the Registrar in writing.910 In cases where the Registrar's decision is set aside, the 
plaintiff receives a refund of the fees of the proceedings. If the Registrar's decision is 
only partially set aside, the Board of Appeal has the discretion to determine who will be 
liable for the costs of the proceedings and to what extent. 911 
90S S 9 (8) (a). 
906 S 9 (8) (b). 
907 S 9 (8) (c). This empowennent is even more far-reaching than s 9 (8) (a). The provision covers people 
who are coincidentally present. 
908 S 9 (10). 
909 S 9 (II). 
910 S 9 (12). 
911 S 9 (13). 
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3 Legal Action 
3 1 Introduction 
Historically, the structure of the courts in South Africa is based on the South Africa Act 
of 1909 and the Administration of Justice Act, No. 27 of 1912, which were later replaced 
by the Supreme Court Act, No. 59 of 1959. It must be noted that the South African legal 
structure contains neither special administrative courts,9J2 nor other special courts that 
could, for example, review a fine imposed by the Registrar. The South African legal 
system distinguishes mainly between criminal and civil cases. All matters that are not 
criminal (StrajjJrozej3recht) are regarded as civil matters. These include executive 
measures, which, in the broad sense, form part of administrative law. 
Remedies against banking supervision measures must accordingly be sought within the 
domain of civil procedure. Civil jurisdiction in South Africa is divided five levels.913 
The bottom level consists of the Small Claims Courts which deals with civil 
proceedings of minor importance.914 The next level is the Magistrate's Court with 
jurisdiction as set out in the Magistrate's Court Act, No. 32 of 1944 and the 
Magistrate's Courts Rules.915 The High Court916 ranks above the Magistrate's Court and 
its jurisdiction is set out in the Supreme Court Act, No. 59 of 1959 and the Supreme 
Court Rules.9J7 This court has inherent jurisdiction that includes jurisdiction over all 
disputes of a civil, criminal, administrative and constitutional nature.918 There are two 
912 There is also, for example, no act comparable to an Administrative Procedure Act as it is known in 
other legal systems (such as the USA, England or Gennany). 
913 S 167 read with s 170 of the Constitution. 
914 For its jurisdiction, see Eckard, C.F., Principles of Civil Procedure in the Magistrates' Court (1990); 
12. 
915 S 167 and s 170 of the Constitution. 
916 This Court used to be known as the Supreme Court. The name was changed on 4 February 1997. 
Concerning the structure of the courts before. this time, see Zimmennann, Reinhard, Das romisch-
holkindische Recht in Siidafrika: Einfiihrung in die Grundlagen und usus hodierus (1983), 28 et seq. See 
also s 166 read with s 169 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. 
917 The change of the name of this act in the High Court Act is foreseeable in the near future. 
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ways of continuing after a matter has been decided by the High Court: the aggrieved 
party can appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal919 or, if it is a constitutional matter, a 
party can approach the Constitutional COurt.920 
3 2 The Jurisdiction of the High Court 
The High Court is the court of first instance when it comes to the lawfulness of banking 
supervisory measures.921 In terms of section 19 of the Supreme Court Act the High 
Court's jurisdiction extends to all matters that are not specifically assigned to other 
courts in terms of legislation. This inherent jurisdiction also arises from the common 
law.922 As has been held in a Canadian decision "the reserve or fund of powers, a 
residual source of powers, which the Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is 
just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process 
of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and 
to secure a fair trial between them. ,,923 
The wide-ranging jurisdiction of the High Court has been recognised in South Africa for 
a long time.924 As part of its inherent jurisdiction, the High Court also has the power to 
review administrative action. It has the authority to protect and regulate its own 
918 Zimmennann, Reinhard, Das romisch-hollandische Recht in Siidafrika: Einfiihrung in die Grundlagen 
und usus hodiernus (1983), 29. 
919 The name of this court was also changed due to the new constitution. It used to be known as the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. This court's jurisdiction is also detennined by the Supreme 
Court Act, No. 59 of 1959, specifically s 12. 
920 Its jurisdiction is detennined by s 166 and 167 of the Constitution read with the Constitutional Court 
Complementary Act, No. 13 of 1995 as well as the Constitutional Court Rules. 
921 Pistorius, David, Pollak on Jurisdiction (1993) 2. ed., 30. Magistrate's courts only have very limited 
jurisdiction. The areas of jurisdiction are not all applicable to measures of banking supervision. See 
Erasmus, H.J. / Van Loggerenberg, D. E., The Civil Practice of the Magistrates' Courts in South Africa 
(1996) 9. ed., 343 et seq. In the context of banking supervision the parties can apply directly to the High 
Court. See Eckard, C.F., PrinCiples of Civil Procedure in the Magistrates' Court (1990) 2. ed., 48 et seq. 
922 Taitz, Jerold, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (1985), 7 et seq. 
923 Montreal Trust Co v Churchill Forrest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd. (1971) 2 DLR (3 rd) 75. See also 
Jacob, G.; The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23; Millsite 
Investment Co (Pty) Limited; Ex parte 1965 (2) SA 582 (W). 
924 C! Ritchie v Andrews (1881-1882) 2 EDL 254 or Collony v Ferguson 1909 TS 195; Union 
Government v Union Steel Corporation (SA) Ltd. 1928 AD 220 at 237. 
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process.925 The procedure for such review proceedings IS set out m Rule 53 of the 
Supreme Court Rules.926 
925 S 173 of the Constitution read with s 19 of the Supreme Court Act, No. 59 of 1959. The latter, 
especially s 3, serves as the legal basis for the creation of the Rules of Court. 
926 S 24 of the Supreme Court Act, No. 59 of 1959 provides for the review of decisions of a lower court. 
The review proceedings applicable in the banking supervision context, however, solely refer to Rule 53 
proceedings. Rule 53 standardises and simplifies the proceedings but it is not absolute. The court has the 
discretion to demand further requirements to be met (see Adfin (Pty) Ltd. v Durable Engineering Works 
(Pty) Ltd. 1991 (2) SA 366 (C) at 368F; Steyn v Delport 1973 (I) SA 822 (T); Motaung v Mukubela & 
NNO; Motaung v Mothiba NO. 1975 (I)SA 618 (0) at 625F-626A; Safcor Forwarding (Pty) Ltd. v 
National Transport Commission 1982 (3) SA 654 (A) at 673C-G; Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Midkon (Pty) Ltd. 1984 (3) SA 552 (T) at 5581; Rampa v Rektor, Tshiya Onderwyskollege 1986 
(I) SA 424 (0) at 429G; Nakani v Attomarg. n.ey-General, Ciskei 1989 (3) SA 655 (Ck) at 656A-C; 
Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes 1993 (I) SA 649 (A)). In this way, the court may, in the case of 
proceedings dealing with banking supervision, suspend such proceedings until the plaintiffs complaint to 
the Board of Appeal (as set out in the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990) has proved to be unsuccessful (see 
Baxter, Lawrence, Administrative Law (1991), 720ff, Rose Innes, L.A., Judicial Review of Administrative 
Tribunals in South Africa (1963), 76 et seq., Wiechers, Marinus, Administratiefreg (1984) 2 ed .. , 304 et 
seq.; Bindura Town Management Board v Desai & Co 1953 (I) SA 358 (A) at 362H; Golube v 
Oosthuizen 1955 (3) SA I (T) at 4F). Such suspension is compulsory if the result of preliminary 
proceedings may have a bearing on the outcome of the court case. The same applies if there is uncertainty 
as to whether the court applied to has the necessary jurisdiction to try the case. (See Welkom Village 
Management Board v Leteno 1958 (I) SA 490 (A) at 502C - 503C. This decision was used as authority in 
many subsequent cases, such as Wahlhaus v Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg 1959 (3) SA 113 (A); 
Lenz Township Co (Pty) Ltd. v Lorentz NO. 1961 (2) SA 450 (A) at 459A; Local Road Transportation 
Board v Durban City Council 1965 (I) SA 586 (N) at 593; Theron en andere v Ring van Wellington van 
die NG Sendingkerk van SA 1976 (2) SA 1 (A) at 25B; Haysom v Additional Magistrate, Cape Town 
1979 (3) SA 155 (C); Msomi v Abrahams NO. 1981 (2) SA 256 (N) at 260G-H; Lawson v Cape Town 
Municipality 1982 (4) SA I (C) at 6C-G; Grundlingh v Van Rensburg NO. 1984 (3) SA 207 (W) at 208 
H-209B; South African Technical Offiers Association v President of the Industrial Court 1985 (I) SA 
597 (A) at 613C; Mahlaela v De Beer NO. 1986 (4) SA 782 (T) at 790E-G; Shah v Minister of Education 
and Culture (House of Delegates) 1989 (4) SA 560 (D) at 573D-I; Ndara v Umtata Presbytery, 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika (Transkei) 1990 (4) SA 22 (Tk) at 26A-27B; Simpson v 
Selfmed Medical Scheme 1992 (I) SA 855 (C) at 862J-863B; Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 
1994 (3) SA 625 (E) at 638E-G). The prescription of this legal remedy is not determined by law. General 
consensus is, however, that an application must be made within a reasonable period of time. The question 
as to what exactly is a "reasonable" period of time is a disputed one (see Wolgroeiers Afslaers (Edms) 
Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Kaapstad 1978 (I) SA (A) at 38H-42D; Radebe v Government of the Republic 
of South Africa 1995 (3) SA 787 (N) at 798A-F). The court may decide whether the applicant brought the 
proceedings within a reasonable period of time. Even if the application is considered to have been late, 
the court may still decide to allow it. This must, however, be explained in the reasons for the decision and 
supported by good reasons so that the other parties to the review will not have grounds for criticism (see 
Schoulz v Voorsitter, Personeel-Advieskomitee van die Munisiple Raad van George 1983 (4) SA 678 (C) 
at 697D-698A; Setsokosane Busdiens (Edms) Bpk v Voorsitter, Nasionale Vervoerkommissie 1986 (2) 
SA 57 (A) at 75D-83C; Jeffrey v President, SA Medical and Dental Council 1987 (I) SA 387 (C) at 
390D; South African Transport Services v Chairman, Local Road Transportation Board, Cape Town, 
1988 (I) SA 665 (C) at 668E-F; Sedgefield Ratepayers' and Voters' Association v Government of the 
Republic of SA 1989 (2) SA 685 (C) at 696C-E; National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, 
Engineering, Metallurgical Industry v Photocircuit SA (Pty) Ltd. 1993 (2) SA 245 (C) at 250F-J; Mnsi v 
Chauke 1994 (4) SA 715 (T) at 719G-720C.) The problem of the prescription of the application is usually 
taken into consideration by the court. An applicant is thus well advised to already give reasons for this in 
the written application (see Scott v Hanekom 1980 (3) SA 1182 (C)at 1 193C-G). 
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The term administrative action needs to be analysed. It includes every act or action of a 
public office or a public-law body, which carries out its responsibilities directly or 
indirectly in accordance with a statute.927 The term is not defined by legislation but was 
developed over the years in case law - a good example of the importance of case law as 
a source of law in South Africa (more so than in Germany). The High Court has not 
limited its review jurisdiction to decisions of the bodies described above, but has 
extended it to decisions of several other types of institutions. 928 It is thus evident that the 
jurisdiction of the High Court not only includes the administrative actions of a public 
office but also that its sphere of jurisdiction is virtually limitless. 
The term review must also be distinguished from the term appeal. In Changuoin & 
Another v Secretary for the Interior,929 Potgieter J explained the difference as follows: 
"The application to the court ... was not an appeal from the Secretary's decision ... but a 
review of his decision ... [thus] this Court is not called upon to adjudicate on the 
correctness of the classification but on the validity thereof." 
The purpose and effect of review proceedings therefore goes further than merely 
providing a remedy to the plaintiff. It extends to the actual validity of a provision or 
decision. As such, review proceedings, in a sense, serve as a mechanism of judicial 
control of decisions and provisions. The review proceedings can be multi-faceted and 
are not necessarily limited to providing a plaintiff with a legal remedy.930 
Judicial review can be based on legislation or on the common law.931 
927 See Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS III at 115. 
928 Such as Voluntary Associations (see Goldman v Johannesburg Club 1904 TH 251, Crisp v SA Council 
of the Amalgamated Engineeing Union 1930 AD 225 or Theron en andere v Welligton Ring van die NG 
Sendingskerk in Suid-Afrika 1976 (2) SA 1 (A», Universities (see: Jacob & another v The Council of the 
University of Dwban-Westville 1974 (3) SA 552 (A» or Courts of Arbitration (see Allied Mineral 
Development ~otporation (Pty) Ltd. v Gemsbok Vlei Kwartsiet (Edms) Bpk 1968 (1) SA 7 (C), Stuart 
Nixon Estate Agency (Pty) Ltd. v Brigadoon (Pty) Ltd. & another 1970 (1) SA 97 (N». 
929 1971 (I) SA I (A) 5A. 
930 Taitz, Jerold, When is an Appeal not an Appeal? A Legal Conundrum' (1979) 42 THRHR 70, 71. 
931 Taitz, Jerold, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (1985), 7 et seq. 
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3 3 The Review Procedure in terms of Rule 53 
The formal requirements of the review procedure are set out in Rule 53.932 Essentially a 
review is a specific type of application.933 Thus Rule 53 can be considered as a specific 
rule to be read in conjunction with Rule 6 (which deals with the application procedure in 
general).934 
It must also be noted that South African proceedings are characterised by principle 
known in Germany as 'Parteienmaxime '. This means that the parties alone determine 
what the case is about. It is therefore the business of the disputing parties to formulate 
their submissions and supporting affidavits (in application proceedings). As far as the 
facts are concerned, the role of the judge in this regard is a passive one. 
The bank bringing the application must first submit a notice of motion to the court as set 
out in First Schedule to the Rules Form 2.935 A sufficient number of copies for everyone 
who is to be a party to the proceedings must be included. The original documents, along 
with the application, are kept by the Registrar (of the court).936 The respondent must be 
named. The application is then signed and delivered to the addressed to the chairman of 
the Board of Appeal. Legal representation is permissible but not obligatory. This must, 
however, be made clear by way of a power of attorney.937 The plea is not regarded as an 
affadavit, which means that it can be corrected at any time.938 
932 This rule describes the procedure which forms the basis of a review of the decision of an official who 
executes administrative legal duties (see Brenner's Service Station and Garage (Pty) Ltd. v Milne 1983 
(4) SA 233 (W) at 238E). 
933 Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes 1993 (1) SA 649 (A) at 661E. 
934 See inter alia Du Plessis v Tager 1953 (2) SA 275 (0) at 277F-G. For a detailed discussion of the 
distinction between the two: De Villiers Van Winsen, Louis / Eksteen, Johannes Paulus Gardener / 
Cilliers, Andries Chari, Herbstein and Van Winsen - The Civil Practice of the Superior Courts in South 
Africa (1979) 3. ed., 69 et seq. und 660 et seq. 
935 Rule 53 (1). Other acts may prescribe a different form. This happened in s 33 (1) and (2) of the 
Arbitration Act, No. 32 of 1965, for example. 
936 The naming of the parties involved is especially important to define the point of dispute. 
937 Levinsohn's Meat Products (Edms) Bpk v Addisionele Landdros, Keimoes 1981 (2) SA 562 (NC). 
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Extra-judicial preliminary proceedings are not obligatory.939 The submission of the 
application commences the proceedings. The proceedings can be directed against the 
decision of the Board of Appeat40 or of the Registrar.941 The parties' arguments are then 
heard and the court will decide on whether the measure should be upheld or struck 
down. 
34 Remedies against Decisions of the High Court 
A party who is dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court in the review 
proceedings may appeal to a full bench of the High Court.942 The appeal must be 
brought within fifteen days after the decision of the High Court by submitting a notice 
of appeal. The legal basis of these proceedings is to be found in sections 20 and 21 of 
the Supreme Court Act, No. 59 of 1959 read with Appeal Court Rule 49. It is also 
possible to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The rules applicable here 
are the same as those for the High Court. 
If the question concerned is a constitutional one, the aggrieved party may also approach 
the Constitutional COurt.943 Direct access to the Constitutional Court is expressly 
guaranteed in section 167 (6) of the Constitution. It is not necessary to exhaust all other 
938 Deputy Minister of Tribal Authorities V Kekana 1983 (3) SA 492 (B) at 497E-G; Chief Motiegi v 
President of Bophuthatswana 1992 (2) SA 480 (B) at 488D; Federal Convention of Namibia v Speaker, 
National Assembly of Namibia 1994 (I) SA 177 (NmHC) at 193A-B. 
939 Odendaal v Kerkraad van die Gemeente Bloemfontein & another 1952 (2) SA 83 (0). 
940 Rule 53 (I) "of any board". It is irrelevant whether the proceedings of the Board were of a purely 
administrative legal nature or whether they were, in terms of the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1990, to be seen as 
proceedings concerned with legal protection. See also LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd. v Cape Town 
Municipality 1969 (2) SA 256 (C) at 274H and Kennasystems South Africa CC v Chairman, Board on 
Tariffs and Trade 1996 (1) SA 69 (T). 
941 Rule 53 (I) "or officer". The term officer has no generally accepted definition, although a wide-
ranging interpretation is accepted. 
942 The abovementioned proceedings are usually carried out by a single judge. The full bench consists of 
a chamber of at least three judges. 
943 This will probably be the case very often in the future, since the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996 (Administrative Justice) contains a provision that can be used as a provision 
in virtually every decision of the Registrar. See Harms, L.T.C., Civil Procedure in the Supreme Court 
(1990) Issue 12, W2 et seq. 
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possible remedies before approaching the Constitutional Court. The proceedings are 
governed by the Constitutional Court Complementary, Act No. 13 of 1995 as well as the 
Constitutional Court Rules of 1995.944 
3 5 Interim Relief 
The proceedings dealing with temporary relief follow the same order as the mam 
proceedings. The relevant provision in this regard is Rule 6. It is virtually identical to 
Rule 53. The only significant difference is that the proceedings are carried out more 
speedily, and if successful it leads to temporary relief.945 It is up to the plaintiff to begin 
the proceedings as soon as possible. This can usually be achieved by means of a notice 
of motion.946 In very urgent matters the notice of motion can be addressed to the 
Registrar (of the court). Normally, the respondent must also receive a copy. The notice 
of motion must be supported by an affidavit. 947 The court, after considering the papers 
submitted, can grant temporary relief (for example by allowing a bank to proceed with 
business) pending the final decision of the Court in the application proceedings (that is 
the review application in terms of Rule 53). 
3 6 Process of Fining 
The provisions of the Banks Act that contain the terms offence or penalty refer to 
criminal proceedings. These are instituted by the state prosecutor, but the Registrar 
obviously hands the prosecutor all relevant documents. The prosecution then takes place 
in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977.948 In the event of a 
conviction one of the possible penalties is a fine. 
944 See Erasmus, H.1. / Breitenbach, A.M. / Van Loggerenberg, D.E., Superior Court Practice (1994) 
[Revision Service 7,1997] S. A2-103, 113, 115; C4-25/34. 
945 Pietermaritzburg City Council v Local Road Transportation Board 1959 (2) SA 758 (N); Safcor 
Forwarding (Pty) Ltd. v National Transport Commission 1982 (3) SA 654 (A) at 674C-D; I L & B 
Marcow Caterers (Pty) Ltd. v Hypermarkets (Pty) Ltd. 1981 (4) SA 108 (C); Nasionale Bierbrouery 
(Edms) Bpk v John NO. 1991 (1) SA 85 (T); Magano v District Magistrate Johannesburg (1) 1994 (4) SA 
169 (W) at InA-C. 
946 Rule 6 (2). 
947 See the wording in Rule 6 (4) "supported by an affidavit". 
948 For a comprehensive overview, see Geldenhuys, Tertius / Joubert, J.1., Criminal Procedure Handbook 
(1996) 2. ed. 
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In terms of the Banks Act the Registrar is also empowered to impose fines for certain 
transgressions with or without recourse to criminallaw.949 The imposition of such a fine 
is also a form of administrative action subject to the review procedure discussed 
above.95o 
4 Public Claims of Liability 
In terms of South African law, a claim against the Registrar for negligence in the 
performance of his duties is excluded. Section 88 of the Banks Act, No. 94 of 1989 
precludes such a claim. 
C Summary and Conclusion 
The comparative overview reveals that in both systems a party who feels aggrieved by 
banking supervisory measures imposed upon him, has certain remedies in law. There 
are, however, both similarities and considerable differences between the approaches of 
the two systems. 
The similarities are the following. The Constitutions of both countries guarantee an 
aggrieved party (also in the context of banking supervision) access to the courts. In 
Germany, the guarantee arises from s 19 IV GG whereas in South Africa, it is based on 
section 33 and 34 of the Constitution. Both systems also provide a procedure by which a 
banking supervisory measure can be challenged outside the courts. In Germany this 
procedure is the Widerspruchsverfahren and in South Africa it is the appeal to the 
Board of AppeaZ.951 It is also possible in both systems to obtain interim (temporary) 
legal protection and to challenge any fines imposed under the legislation in COurt. 952 A 
claim for damages against the state arising from banking supervisory measures is 
949 See s 74 (3) & (4). 
950 Rule 53. 
951 C.f in this chapter, 161 et seq (§§ 68 et seq. VwGO) and 170 et seq (also s 9 of the Banks Act). 
952 C.f 166 et seq. and 180 et seq., also 168 et seq. and 180 above. 
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excluded in both countries. This is provided for in of § 6 III KWG in Germany and 
section 88 of the Banks Act in South Africa. 
The differences between the two legal systems are to be found in the details of the 
respective remedies. In Germany the remedies are based on the 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (Code of the Administrative Court). Such legislation 
pertaining to administrative procedure does not, however, exist in South Africa. The 
only clear procedural distinction in South Africa, is between criminal and civil 
procedure, where the latter encompasses all cases that are not of a criminal nature. In 
Germany, these proceedings would be brought before special administrative courts - the 
Verwaltungsgericht, the Oberverwaltungsgericht and the Bundesverwaltungsgericht. 
These courts were created specifically to hear administrative disputes. There are no 
similar courts in South Africa. The dispute is brought before the general courts whose 
jurisdiction encompasses both private-law and public-law issues.953 
These differences are, to a large degree, due to historical influences. South African law 
was strongly influenced by English law during the colonial era. The court structure was 
also based on the English model. German law, on the other hand, underwent a different 
development. 
The order of institutions to be approached is also strictly regulated in Germany. As a 
general rule a court can only be approached after the extra-judicial 
Widerspruchsverfahren. 954 In South Africa the proceedings before the Board of Appeal 
may have very much the same objective, that is to provide an extra-judicial remedy. 
However, unlike in Germany, there is no clear indication that this procedure is 
compulsory. This means that in South Africa the bank in question may possibly have 
the two proceedings running alternatively or concurrently. There is no statutory 
provision that precludes such an approach, but, applying the general principles of 
administrative law, the courts may take the view that the applicant bank must first 
953 See 163 and 174 et seq. above. 
954 Cf §§ 68 et seq. VwGO and in this chapter, 162 et seq. above. 
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exhaust the internal remedy before approaching the court. Case law in this area is very 
sparse and there is no precedent in point.955 
In Gennany, an aggrieved bank may, in tenns of § 124 VwGO, only approach two 
institutions namely the Verwaltungsgericht and the Oberverwaltungsgericht.956 In South 
Africa, the lowest court having jurisdiction over the review of banking supervisory 
measures is the High Court (which may be compared to the Gennan 
Oberverwaltungsgericht). However, the affected bank may take these proceedings all 
the way to the Constitutional Court. This difference can be ascribed to the fact that 
specialised administrative-law courts have a long tradition in Gennany that has led to an 
independent course of law. No such independent course of law has developed in South 
Africa. Administrative-law disputes are dealt with as part of civil procedure. This may 
be an indication that administrative law has generally been regarded as more important 
in Gennany than in South Africa. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that 
administrative law is not governed by a specific Act but originates from case law. 
However, because of the new constitution, changes in this field can be expected in the 
near future. 
The jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal is also more far-
reaching than that of comparable Gennan courts. The proceedings in South Africa are 
not necessarily restricted to testing the contested measure of banking supervision but 
may also extend to the legal basis (constitutionality) of the measure.957 In Gennany, the 
court of first instance, the Verwaltungsgericht, does not have similar powers. Should the 
need for such a finding arise, the matter must be adjourned and referred to the 
Oberverwaltungsgericht to decide on the constitutionality of the measure as set out in § 
47VwGO. 
The two systems also differ considerably when it comes to the grounds for testing 
banking supervisory measures. Gennan courts undertake comprehensive scrutiny of the 
955 Cj n. 926 and 940 above. 
956 If the review is permitted, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht can eventually also become involved. 
957 C.! 175 et seq. above. 
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legitimacy of the administrative act. Apart from testing whether the formal requirements 
for a valid administrative act have been met, the courts also investigate whether 
jurisdictional facts on which the legal decision is based are present and whether the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt has exercised its authority in an orderly way.958 
A similar comprehensive test of a formal and factual nature has not yet been developed 
in South Africa. This can probably be ascribed to the wide powers of the Registrar. 
Time will tell whether these powers can be retained in the Act. It seems unlikely, 
especially since section 33 of the Constitution (Just Administrative Action) might well 
bring with it the limitation of such a wide discretion. 
The procedures relating to interim legal protection are also different. § 80 V of the 
German Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung contains a specific provision in terms of which a 
bank can obtain temporary legal protection. There is no such specific provision in South 
Africa. Interim protection is acquired by means of the general Rule 6 application.959 
The legitimacy of fines is not decided upon by the Verwaltungsgerichte in Germany but 
by the Strafgerichte (criminal-law courts). In South Africa, fines may be imposed by the 
criminal-law courts (as penalty upon conviction for an offence) or in certain specific 
situations by an administrative act of the Registrar. In the former case an aggrieved 
bank's only recourse would be the appeal procedure, and in the latter case the review 
procedure (in terms of Rule 53).960 
" . 
958 Cj the whole procedure in this chapter, 159-'168 above. 
959 Cj in this chapter, 166 et seq. and 180 et seq. above. 
960 Cj in this chapter, 168 et seq. and 180 above. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis is concerned with the law of banking supervision in the Federal Republic of 
Germany and South Africa. The legal systems of the two countries are compared and 
contrasted. The matter is topical especially in the context of the increasing 
internationalisation of banking. The globalisation of markets and the co-operation 
encountered in and between international organisations makes it highly advisable for 
those active in this field to look wider than their own countries. It must be stressed that 
the topic is by no means exhausted in this thesis. It provides only an overview of part of 
this extensive area of law. The comparison has revealed that the supervisory institutions 
of the two countries face very similar problems. 
The legal system of the Federal Republic of Germany forms part of the Germanic or 
Continental European legal family whilst the South African legal system amounts to a 
mixture of Roman-Dutch law and common law. Despite the differences, both systems 
deal with the problems of banking supervision in a surprisingly similar way. This might 
seem strange since the influence of English law, with its emphasis on case law, is 
unmistakable in South Africa. German law, in contrast, is codified. In practice, however, 
this difference has not been as far-reaching as one may have imagined. On the one hand 
the art of distinguishing uncomfortable precedents is highly refined in South Africa.961 
On the other hand case law is also becoming increasingly important in Germany; a 
Prajudizenrechf62 in the sense of an adherence to the decisions of the highest courts in 
Germany has lately come to the fore. One may add that in any event this area of law is 
dominated by legislation, rather than case law, in South Africa. 
The following conclusions can be drawn. 
961 Zweigert, Konrad / Kotz, Hein, Einfuhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung (1996), 227 et. seq. David, Rene 
/ Grasmann, GUnther, Einfuhrung in die Rechtssysteme der Gegenwart (1988), 62 et. seq . 
. 962 Kriele, Martin, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung (1976), 243ff, 260 et. seq. Zajtay, Imre, System und 
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In Germany the law of banking supervision is precisely defined, more so than in South 
Africa. It is regarded as a specific part of administrative law namely 
Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht (the law of business administration). The principles of 
administrative law are to be found in a statute.in Germany. In South Africa the law of 
banking supervision is also largely governed by the principles of administrative law. 
There is, however, no finer subdivision. Unlike in Germany administrative law in South 
Africa is derived from the common law and case law. 
Both systems regulate banking supervision almost exclusively by means of legislation 
that is effective nation-wide. This means that in Germany it is a federal issue and does 
not fall into the province of the different Bundeslander. 
The supervision in both countries is performed by an institution with comprehensive 
powers.963 However, they are not totally independent of the executive. Their powers can 
be curtailed by regulations or directives. Furthermore, they must of course move within 
the confines of the enabling parliamentary legislation. 
In both countries banking is highly regulated because of its importance to the economy. 
Thus, in both countries, the conducting of business as a bank requires permission or a 
licence. The formal process of acquiring permission in both countries is primarily aimed 
at ensuring that only those who are competent to do so shall operate a bank. Thus, 
permission can be refused due to the insufficient qualifications of the applicant or his 
insufficient financial means. In addition, in South Africa, permission can also be refused 
on considerations of public interest. This may, however, be unconstitutional. Certainly, 
in Germany, this test of need is irreconcilable with Art 12 I GG. The requirements for 
opening a Representative Office differ somewhat in the two countries. In Germany 
submission of a notice to the supervisory authority (Bundesaufsichtsamt) is sufficient. 
The requirements for such an establishment in South Africa are considerably higher. 
Prajudiz in den kontinenta/en Rechten und im Common Law, AcP 165 (1965), 97 et. seq. 
963 In the Republic of South Africa, the Registrar is in charge of this office whereas the 
Bundesaujsichtsamt!ur das Kreditwesen is responsible for it in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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The perrmsslOn to conduct banking business (or registration) is regarded as an 
administrative act in favour of the applicant in both countries. In the absence of one of 
the reasons for refusing permission stipulated in the legislation, the applicant has a right 
to be permitted to conduct business as a bank. This right is stronger in Germany than in 
South Africa due to the fact that unlike in Germany, registration of a bank can be 
disallowed by the Registrar on the basis that it is not in the public interest. 
In both countries the permission can be conditional or restricted to certain specified 
activities. 
The objectives of banking supervision are very much the same in both countries. They 
are essentially the maintenance of a well-functioning banking industry, the protection of 
depositors and the protection of the economy as a whole. 
The foundation of a deposit-securing fund is currently being considered in South Africa. 
In Germany, it is already possible to join one of these voluntarily, and there is 
significant indirect pressure on banks to join. 
In South Africa a bank is subject to the supervisory measures of the Banks Act from the 
moment of registration. From this moment it is entitled to conduct banking business. 
The size of the business is largely immaterial. In Germany, this is different. The 
supervisory measures under the legislation become applicable once the institution 
qualifies as a Kreditinstitut in terms of 8 1 I KWG. Here the size of the business does 
play an important role. 
A further similarity between the two systems is that the measures of banking 
supervision may also affect natural persons. This is especially true in Germany where it 
is possible for a bank to exist in the form of a Personenhandelsgesellschaft which is 
never the case in South Africa. In both countries natural persons are also affected by 
these measures insofar as they have to fulfil certain personal and professional 
requirements in order to hold certain posts within the bank. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
188 
In both systems an act in violation of statutory provisions does not necessarily mean that 
it is invalid and ineffective in the private-law sense. However, such a contravention is an 
offence which may lead to criminal prosecution. 
The supervisory institutions of both countries have access to a wide range of 
possibilities of intervention and of obtaining information to ensure effective and 
sensible supervision. In Germany the instrument of obligatory notice is more wide-
spread than in South Africa where the procedure requires prior permission more often. 
In both systems banks are obliged to report on various issues periodically. In Germany 
this includes the Jahresabschluj3 as well as the Prufungsbericht des Abschluj3prufers, 
and in South Africa the various returns. These are supplemented by informal 
supervision in the sense of regular consultations between the Registrar and the 
individual banks. In this context, the annual audit by external, independent auditors 
which is necessary in both countries should also be mentioned. In so doing, they 
contribute in a significant way to the stability of the banking system as a whole. 
In both countries the central bank plays a decisive role in the supervision process. In 
Germany the Bundesbank aids the Bundesaufsichtsamt by placing its network of 
Landeszentralbanken to its disposal. Essentially this contributes to the gathering of 
information. In South Africa, the Reserve Bank is in charge of banking supervision 
seeing that the Registrar's Office forms part of it. 
The legislation of both countries contains provisions that empower the supervisory 
bodies to react to imminent crises or to take action against violations of the law. The 
Bundesaufsichtsamt is equipped with more far-reaching authority than the Registrar in 
this regard. The Registrar must, for example, work in exceptionally close co-operation 
with the Minister of Finance when an institution is to be subjected to compulsory 
administration. However, it is common practice in both countries to react to certain 
developments informally in advance. This is especially to prevent the waning of general 
trust in the banking industry. The formal powers to intervene are thus only used 
reluctantly. 
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In South Africa the measures are often derived from a very general provision of the 
legislation, such as that application of the measures are simply subject to Registrar's 
discretion. Whether such wide latitude can stand the test of a constitutional review 
remains to be seen. In Germany the enabling provisions tend to be more specific. The 
German Federal Kreditwesengesetz only provides for one really general clause in 86 I.. . 
Both legal systems exclude claims for damages against the state for faulty actions of the 
supervisory authorities. 
In special cases of danger, the authorities in both systems have the powers to impose 
temporary measures. In both countries, the formalities of the proceedings may be 
scrapped if the matter is urgent. 
In Germany the administrative courts do not decide on the lawfulness of fines imposed 
by the Bundesaufsichtsamt. Only the criminal courts have jurisdiction in such matters. 
In South Africa it is necessary to distinguish between a fine as punishment of a offence 
(criminal law) and a fine imposed in terms of administrative law. The latter is dealt with 
in general courts in terms of the review proceedings. 
In both countries a party who feels himself aggrieved by supervisory actions has some 
redress to law. In Germany Art 19 IV GG entrenches a guarantee of the course of law 
against unlawful measures of a public authority. The South African equivalent of this 
provision can be found in s 1 read in conjunction with s 34 of the Constitution. The 
redress to law is, however, formalised to a larger degree in Germany than in South 
Africa. The aggrieved party has access to the remedies stipulated in the 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung before special administrative courts. In South Africa there 
is no special court of this nature and the matter must be heard by the normal courts (the 
High Court). 
The testing of measures of banking supervision by the courts is somewhat different in 
the two countries. Since the Registrar in South Africa has wide-ranging discretion, the 
control is mainly concerned with whether the rules of procedure were followed. The 
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German administrative courts consider the formal as well as the material requirements 
for the validity of the administrative act. 
The German Federal administrative courts also do not have as comprehensive a 
competency of norm control as the South African courts do. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany, this is restricted to special courts. 
The steps that have been taken towards the internationalisation of banking supervision 
require further efforts. The harmonisation within the European Union as well as co-
operation in international bodies of experts such as the Bank fur Internationalen 
Zahlungsausgleich in Basle. This co-operation is urgently necessary because of the 
globalisation of the financial markets. This phenomenon is accelerated by the advent of 
new means of electronic and digital communication, such as satellites and the internet. 
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